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Foreword
The Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) is an independent public body
of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). JST
plays a key role in implementing science and technology policies formulated in line
with the nation’s Science and Technology Basic Plan. The Basic Research Programs
at JST focus on fundamental research areas that help developing technological
breakthroughs, which in turn lead to the advance of S&T and creation of new
industries. The programs also encourage researches that trigger, through innovations,
reformation of social and economic structures. Core Research for Evolutionary
Science and Technology (CREST) program is one of the Basic Research Programs at
JST. With an aim to promote and encourage the development of breakthrough tech-
nologies that contribute to the attainment of the country’s strategic objectives, JST
provides a variety of research funding programs for promising research projects.
CREST is one of JST’s major undertakings for stimulating achievement in funda-
mental science fields. In addition, returning the fruits of such research to society
through innovations is another important responsibility of JST.
“Advanced Core Technologies for Big Data Integration” study area will aim for
the creation, advancement, and systematization of next-generation core technology
solving of essential issues common among a number of data domains, and inte-
grated analysis of big data in a variety of fields. Specific development targets
include technology for stable operation of large-scale data management systems
that compress, transfer, and store big data, technology for efficiently retrieving truly
necessary knowledge by means of search, comparison, and visualization across
diverse information, and the mathematical methods and algorithms enabling such
services. In pursuing these studies, with a view to overall system design up to the
creation of value for society from big data, the creation, advancement, and sys-
tematization of next-generation common core technology highly acceptable to the
public will be undertaken, through active efforts at fusion with fields outside of
information and communication technology. There are total 11 projects. Especially,
“The Security Infrastructure Technology for Integrated Utilization of Big Data,” by
Atsuko Miyaji (Research director), focuses on secure well-balanced utilization of
big data. Many existing security researches focus on technologies of “fast encrypted
v
calculation” since they focus on statistical computation such as sum and average.
However, the big data are varied, and thus, there are many usages. It cannot be said
that use only for statistical data such as sum and average is enough. It would not be
limited to statistical data in the case of medical image data, picture data, etc. What
should be the security infrastructure for the utilization of such a wide variety of big
data? In addition, extremely secure technologies often may give any benefit to
neither the data owner nor the data user. Her project builds a technology to realize
balanced security and utilization of big data from the viewpoint of three organi-
zations of the data owner, analyst, and user. Their technology can be combined with
fast encrypted calculation, which is a typical target of existing cryptographic
researches. We really hope that their concept of security infrastructure technology
for the utilization of big data would open up the world of big data utilization in
various fields such as the medical and living safety field.
January 2020 Prof. Masaru Kitsuregawa




A project of “The Security Infrastructure Technology for Integrated Utilization of
Big Data” started in October 2014. Our team consists of four groups: security
primitive group under the guidance of Atsuko Miyaji at Osaka university, security
management primitive group under Kiyomoto at KDDI Laboratory, the living safety
field under Kitamura at AIST and Nishida at Tokyo Institute of Technology, and the
medical field under Tanaka at the National Cancer Center and Yamamoto at MEDIS.
Concretely, both Kiyomoto and Miyaji have investigated the security infrastructure
necessary for the utilization of big data. Based on this security infrastructure,
Kitamura and Nishida made testbed systems in the living safety field; Tanaka and
Yamamoto made testbed systems in the medical field. All studies combined aim to
ensure the good working of the security infrastructure in the real world. Furthermore,
after both Kitamura and Nishida will integrate the necessary big data excluding
privacy information using our security infrastructure, they will analyze why serious
injuries occur at elementary schools. In contrast, both Tanaka and Yamamoto have
made an open medical network using our security infrastructure, which enables
patients to check the usage of their medical records distributed in different hospitals.
One of the features of our project is that it builds security infrastructure for big
data utilization based not on security researchers but on issues from the living safety
and medical fields that actually use big data. In other words, it is an important
feature that the required specifications do not deviate from actual problems. In
addition, we report the results of actual research in both fields using the security
infrastructure constructed according to their requirements. Thus, the analysis has
been performed on only the available and acceptable data from the point of view of
privacy policy until our security infrastructure was realized. Furthermore, the
evaluation or analysis of security primitives is often based on dummy data.
However, our security primitives have been evaluated by researchers who actually
use big data. Furthermore, we clarify how to introduce such security solutions into
living safety and medical fields. We also provide guidance on how to use the
security infrastructure. We hope that this book will be used by companies, schools,
and public organizations that are considering using big data.
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1.1 Purpose of Miyaji-CREST
Recently, big data analysis results are expected to be used in various situations such
as medical or industrial fields for new medicine or product development. For this
reason, it is important to establish a secure infrastructure of the collection, analysis,
and use of big data. We need to consider mainly three entities for the infrastructure:
data owner, analysis institutions, and users. This research pays attention to a balance
between privacy and utilization and also realizes appropriate reduction and feedback
of the data analysis results to the data owners.
To build a secure big data infrastructure that connects data owners, analysis
institutions, and user institutions in a circle of trust, we construct security tech-
nologies necessary for big data utilization. Our main security technologies are obliv-
ious RAM (ORAM), private set intersection (PSI), privacy-preserving classification,
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Fig. 1.1 Overview of security infrastructure from data collections to utilization
privacy configuration support, privacy risk assessment, and traceability. Furthermore,
we consider the robustness against various attacks such as cyber attacks and post-
quantum security.
We construct a safe and privacy-preserving big data distribution platform that
realizes the collection, analysis, utilization, and return of owners of big data in a
secure and fair manner.
In addition, we demonstrate our secure big data infrastructure in a medical and
living safety field. Figure1.1 shows an overview of our research.
1.2 Roles of Each Group
1.2.1 Security Core Group
We constructed security primitives in the following fields with the aim of realizing an
infrastructure for big data utilization that conducts collection, analysis, and utiliza-
tion of big data securely: 1. Analysis of security basis: Any security primitive which
is used for an infrastructure of big data utilization is based on cryptology algorithms.
That is, a security primitive becomes compromised if the underground cryptology
algorithm is attacked. Therefore, security analysis on cryptographic primitives is
important. In this research, we focus on elliptic curve cryptosystems, which achieve
a compact public key cryptosystem, and learning with error (LWE)-based cryp-
tosystems, which are types of post-quantum cryptosystems. 2. Privacy-preserving
data integration among databases distributed in different organizations: This primi-
tive integrates the same data among databases kept in different organizations while
keeping any different data in an organization secret to other organizations. 3. A
privacy-preserving classification: This primitive executes a procedure for the server’s
classification rule to the client’s input database and outputs only a result to the client
while keeping client’s input database secret to the server and server’s classification
rule to the client.
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1.2.2 Security Management Group
Our group focuses on research on data anonymization techniques. First, we analyze
the existing anonymization techniques and adversary models for the techniques and
clarify our research motivation. Then, we propose our adversary model applicable to
several anonymization methods and propose a novel privacy risk analysis method.
An implementation of our data anonymization tool based on the risk analysis method
is introduced in the chapter.
1.2.3 Living Safety Testbed Group
The Living Safety Group deals with developing new technologies for injury pre-
vention in daily environments such as school safety and home safety based on the
security platform developed by the Security Core Group and the Security Manage-
ment Group. This group has devoted itself to not only developing technology for
handing the big data related to injury but also empowering practitioners through
social implementation utilizing the developed technologies in cooperation with mul-
tiple stakeholders.
1.2.4 Health Testbed Group
Health Testbed Group is focused on implementing a secure clinical data collection
and analysis infrastructure for clinical research using the cloud by applying the
security primitives developed by the Security Core Group and Security Management
Group. This group is working on standardization of data storage, cross-institutional
collection, and analysis for electronic medical record data, management mechanism
of patient consent information, and traceability for secondary use of medical data,
for the development of our health testbed.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
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Abstract In this chapter, we describe the analysis of security basis. One is the
analysis of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). ECDLP is one of the
public-key cryptosystems that can achieve a short key size but it is not a post-quantum
cryptosystem. Another is analysis to learning with error (LWE), which is a post-
quantum cryptosystem and has the functionality of homomorphic encryption. These
two security bases have important roles in each protocol described in Sect. 2.2.4.2
2.1 Analysis on ECDLP
2.1.1 Introduction
In recent years, elliptic curve cryptography is gaining momentum in deployment
because it can achieve the same level of security as RSA using much shorter keys
and ciphertexts. The security of elliptic curve cryptography is closely related to the
computational complexity of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Let p be a prime number and E , a nonsingular elliptic curve overFpn , which is a finite
field of pn elements. That is, E is a plane algebraic curve defined by the equation
y2 = x3 + ax + b for a, b ∈ Fpn such that  = −16(4a3 + 27b2) = 0. Along with
a point O at infinity, the set of rational points E(Fpn ) forms an abelian group with O
as the identity. Given P ∈ E(Fpn ) and Q in the subgroup generated by P , ECDLP
is the problem of finding an integer α such that Q = αP .
C.-M. Cheng · K. Kodera · A. Miyaji (B) · S. Okumura
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Today, the best practical attacks against ECDLP are exponential-time, generic
discrete logarithm algorithms such as Pollard’s rhomethod [34]. However, recently, a
line of research has been dedicated to the index calculus for ECDLPwhichwas started
bySemaev,Gaudry, andDiem [25, 30, 35].Under certain heuristic assumptions, such
algorithms could lead to subexponential attacks to ECDLP in some cases [27, 31,
33]. The interested reader is referred to a survey paper by Galbraith and Gaudry for
a more comprehensive and in-depth account of the recent development of ECDLP
algorithms along various directions [28].
In this section, we investigate the computational complexity of ECDLP for ellip-
tic curves in various forms—including Hessian [36], Montgomery [32], (twisted)
Edwards [23, 24], and Weierstrass, using index calculus. Recently, elliptic curves of
various forms such as Curve25519 [22] have been drawing considerable attention
in deployment partly because some of them allow fast implementation and secu-
rity against timing-based side-channel attacks. Furthermore, we can construct these
curves not only over prime fields (such as the field of 2255 − 19 elements as used in
Curve25519) but also over extension fields. In this section, we will focus on curves
over optimal extension fields (OEFs) [21]. An OEF is an extension field from a prime
field Fp with p close to 28, 216, 232, 264, etc. Such primes fit nicely into the processor
words of 8-, 16-, 32-, or 64-bit microprocessors and hence are particularly suitable
for software implementation, allowing efficient utilization of fast integer arithmetic
on modern microprocessors [21]. As we will see, our experimental results show
considerably significant differences in the computational complexity of ECDLP for
elliptic curves in various forms over OEFs.
2.1.2 Previous Works
2.1.2.1 Index Calculus for ECDLP
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fpn . For cryptographic applica-
tions,we aremostly interested in a prime-order subgroup generated by a rational point
P ∈ E(Fpn ). Here, we first give a high-level overview of a typical index-calculus
algorithm for finding an integer α such that Q = αP for Q ∈ 〈P〉.
1. Determine a factor base F ⊂ E(Fpn ).
2. Collect a setR of relations by decomposing random points ai P + bi Q into a sum





ai P + bi Q =
∑
j





3. When |R| ≈ |F |, eliminate the right-hand side using linear algebra to obtain an
equation of the form aP + bQ = O and α = −a/b mod ord P .
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The last step of linear algebra is relatively well studied in the literature, so we will
focus on the subproblem in the second step, namely, the point decomposition problem
(PDP) on an elliptic curve in the rest of this section.
Definition 2.1 (Point Decomposition Problem of mth Order) Given a rational point
R ∈ E(Fpn ) on an elliptic curve E and a factor base F ⊂ E(Fpn ), find, if they exist,
P1, . . . , Pm ∈ F such that
R = P1 + · · · + Pm .
2.1.2.2 Semaev’s Summation Polynomials
We can solve PDP by considering when the sum of a set of points becomes zero on
an elliptic curve. It is straightforward that if two points sum to zero on an elliptic
curve E : y2 = x3 + ax + b in Weierstrass form, then their x-coordinates must be
equal. Let us now consider the simplest yet nontrivial case where three points on E
sum to zero. Let
Z =
{
(x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3) ∈ F6pn : (xi , yi ) ∈ E(Fpn ), i = 1, 2, 3;
(x1, y1) + (x2, y2) + (x3, y3) = O
}
.
Clearly, Z is in the variety of the ideal I ⊂ Fpn [X1,Y1, X2,Y2, X3,Y3] generated by
{
Y 2i − (X3i + aXi + b), i = 1, 2, 3;
(X3 − X1)(Y2 − Y1) − (X2 − X1)(Y3 − Y1)
}
.
Now let J = I ∩ Fpn [X1, X2, X3]. Using MAGMA’s EliminationIdeal func-
tion, we find that J is actually a principal ideal generated by the polynomial
(X2 − X3)(X1 − X3)(X1 − X2) f3, where
f3 =X21X22 − 2X21X2X3 + X21X23 − 2X1X22X3 − 2X1X2X23 − 2aX1X2 − 2aX1X3
− 4bX1 + X22X23 − 2aX2X3 − 4bX2 − 4bX3 + a2.
Clearly, the linear factors of this generator correspond to the degenerated case where
two or more points are the same or of opposite signs, and f3 is the 3rd summation
polynomial, that is, the summation polynomial for three distinct points summing to
zero.
Starting from the 3rd summation polynomial, we can recursively construct the
subsequent summation polynomials fm for m > 3 by taking resultants. As a result,
the degree of each variable in fm is 2m−2, which grows exponentially as m. This is
the observation Semaev made in his seminal work [35]. In short, his proposal is to
consider factor bases of the following form:
F =
{
(x, y) ∈ E(Fpn ) : x ∈ V ⊂ Fpn
}
,
8 C.-M. Cheng et al.
where V is a subset of Fpn . Then, we solve PDP of mth order by solving the corre-
sponding (m + 1)th summation polynomial fm+1(X1, . . . , Xm, x̃) = 0, where x̃ is
the x-coordinate of the point to be decomposed.
Note that this factor base is naturally invariant under point negation. That is,
Pi ∈ F implies −Pi ∈ F . In this case, we have about |F |/2 (trivial) relations Pi +
(−Pi ) = O for free, so we only need to find the other |F |/2 nontrivial relations. In
general, we will only discuss factor bases that are invariant under point negation, so
by abuse of language, both F and F modulo point negation may be referred to as a
factor base in the rest of this section.
2.1.2.3 Weil Restriction
Restricting the x-coordinates of the points in a factor base to a subset of Fpn is
important from the viewpoint of polynomial system solving. Take f3 as an example.
When decomposing a random point aP + bQ, we first substitute its x-coordinate
into say X3, projecting the ideal onto Fpn [X1, X2]. The dimension of the variety of
this ideal is nonzero. Therefore, we would like to pose some restrictions on X1 and
X2 to reduce the dimensions to zero so that the solving time can bemoremanageable.
When looking for solutions to a polynomial f = ∑ ai Xi ∈ Fpn [X ] in Fpn ,
we can view Fpn [X ] as a commutative affine algebra A = Fpn [X ]/(X pn − X) ∼=
Fpn [X1, . . . , Xn]/(X p1 − X1, . . . , X pn − Xn). This can be done by identifying the
indeterminate X as X1θ1 + · · · + Xnθn , where (θ1, . . . , θn) is a basis forFpn over Fp.
Hence, f can be identified as a polynomial f1θ1 + · · · + fnθn , where f1, . . . , fn ∈
A′ = Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]/(X p1 − X1, . . . , X pn − Xn), by appropriately sending each
coefficient ai ∈ Fpn to a(1)i θ1 + · · · + a(n)i θn for a(1)i , . . . , a(n)i ∈ Fp. Therefore, an
equation f = 0 over Fpn will give rise to a system of equations f1 = · · · = fn = 0
over Fp. This technique is known as the Weil restriction and is used in the Gaudry–
Diem attack, where the factor base is chosen to consist of points whose x-coordinates
lie in a subspace V of Fpn over Fp [25, 30].
2.1.2.4 Exploiting Symmetry
Naturally, the symmetric group Sm acts on a point decomposition P1 + · · · + Pm
because elliptic curve groups are abelian. As noted by Gaudry in his seminal
work [30], we can therefore rewrite the variables x1, . . . , xm ∈ Fpn by elemen-
tary symmetric polynomials e1, . . . , em , where e1 = ∑ xi , e2 = ∑i = j xi x j , e3 =∑
i = j,i =k, j =k xi x j xk , etc. Such rewriting can reduce the degree of summation poly-
nomials and significantly speed up point decomposition [27, 31].
We might be able to exploit additional symmetry brought by actions of other
groups, e.g., when the factor base is invariant under addition of small torsion points.
For example, consider a decomposition of a point R under the action of addition of
a 2-torsion point T2:
2 Cryptography Core Technology 9












Clearly, this holds for any u1, . . . , un−1 ∈ {0, 1}, so a decomposition can give rise to
2n−1 − 1 other decompositions. Similar to rewriting using the elementary symmetric
polynomials for the action of Sm , we can also take advantage of this additional
symmetry by appropriately rewriting [26].
Naturally, such speedup is curve-specific. Furthermore, even if the factor base is
invariant under additional group actions, we may or may not be able to exploit such
symmetry to speed up the point decomposition depending on whether the action is
“easy to handle in the polynomial system solving process” [26].
2.1.2.5 PDP on (Twisted) Edwards Curves
Faugère, Gaudry, Hout, and Renault studied PDP on twisted Edwards, twisted Jacobi
intersections, and Weierstrass curves [26]. For the sake of completeness, we include
some of their results here. An Edwards curve over Fpn for p = 2 is defined by the
equation x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 for certain d ∈ Fpn [24]. A twisted Edwards curve
t Ea,d overFpn for p = 2 is defined by the equation ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 for certain
a, d ∈ Fpn [23]. A twisted Edwards curve is a quadratic twist of an Edwards curve by
a0 = 1/(a − d). For P = (x, y) ∈ t Ea,d , −P = (−x, y). Furthermore, the addition
and doubling formulae for (x3, y3) = (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) are given as follows:




x3 = x1y2 + y1x2
1 + dx1x2y1y2 ,
y3 = y1y2 − ax1x2
1 − dx1x2y1y2 .










1 − dx21 y21
.















Y 21 + Y 22 − 1
) − Y 21 Y 22 .
Again, the subsequent summation polynomials are obtained by taking resultants.
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2.1.2.6 Symmetry and Decomposition Probability
Symmetry brought by group action on point decompositionwill inevitably be accom-
panied by a decrease in decomposition probability. For example, if a factor base F
is invariant under addition of a 2-torsion point, then the decomposition probability
for PDP of themth order should decrease by a factor of 2m−1. This is due to the same
reason that the decomposition probability decreases by a factor of m! because the
symmetric group Sm acts on F .
However, this simple fact seems to have been largely ignored in the literature. For
example, Faugère, Gaudry, Hout, and Renault explicitly stated in Sect. 5.3 of their
study that “[the] probability to decompose a point [into a sum of n points from the
factor base] is 1n!” for twisted Edwards or twisted Jacobi intersections curves, despite
the fact that the factor base is invariant under the addition of 2-torsion points [26].
At first glance, this may not seem a problem, as we would expect to obtain 2n−1
solutions if we can successfully solve a PDP instance. (Unfortunately, this is also not
true in general. We will return to it in more detail in Sect. 2.1.5.3.) However, when
estimating the cost of a complete ECDLP attack, they proposed to collapse these
2n−1 relations into one to reduce the size of the factor base and thus the cost of the
linear algebra, cf. Remark 5 of the paper. In this case, the decrease in decomposition
probability does have an adverse effect, and their estimation for the overall ECDLP
cost ended up being overoptimistic by a factor of at least 2n−1.
2.1.3 Montgomery and Hessian Curves
2.1.3.1 Montgomery Curves
A Montgomery curve MA,B over Fpn for p = 2 is defined by the equation
By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x (2.1)
for A, B ∈ Fpn such that A = ±2, B = 0, and B(A2 − 4) = 0 [32]. For P =
(x, y) ∈ MA,B , −P = (x,−y). Furthermore, the addition and doubling formulae









− A − x1 − x2 = B(x2y1 − x1y2)
2
x1x2(x2 − x1)2 ,
y3 = (2x1 + x2 + A)(y2 − y1)
x2 − x1 −
B(y2 − y1)3
(x2 − x1)3 − y1.
2 Cryptography Core Technology 11







4x1(x21 + Ax1 + 1)
,
y3 = (2x1 + x1 + A)(3x
2




1 + 2Ax1 + 1)3
(2By1)3
− y1.
It was noted by Montgomery himself in his original paper that such curves can give
rise to efficient scalar multiplication algorithms [32]. That is, consider a random
point P ∈ MA,B(Fpn ) and nP = (Xn : Yn : Zn) in projective coordinates for some
integer n. Then
{
Xm+n = Zm−n[(Xm − Zm)(Xn + Zn) + (Xm + Zm)(Xn − Zn)]2,
Zm+n = Xm−n[(Xm − Zm)(Xn + Zn) − (Xm + Zm)(Xn − Zn)]2.




X2n = (Xn + Zn)2(Xn − Zn)2,
Z2n = (4Xn Zn)
(
(Xn − Zn)2 + ((A + 2)/4)(4Xn Zn)
)
,
4Xn Zn = (Xn + Zn)2 − (Xn − Zn)2.
In this way, scalarmultiplication on theMontgomery curve can be performedwithout
using y-coordinates, leading to fast implementation.
2.1.3.2 Summation Polynomials for Montgomery Curves
Following Semaev’s approach [35], we can construct summation polynomials for
Montgomery curves. Like Weierstrass curves, the 2nd summation polynomial for
Montgomery curves is simply fM,2 = X1 − X2. Now, we consider P, Q ∈ MA,B
for P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2). Let P + Q = (x3, y3) and P − Q = (x4, y4).
By the addition formula, we have
x3 = B(x2y1 − x1y2)
2
x1x2(x2 − x1)2 , x4 =
B(x2y1 − x1y2)2





x3 + x4 = 2 ((x1 + x2)(x1x2 + 1) + 2Ax1x2)
(x1 − x2)2 ,
x3x4 = (1 − x1x2)
2
(x1 − x2)2 .
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Using the relationship between the roots of a quadratic polynomial and its coeffi-
cients, we obtain
(x1 − x2)2x2 − 2 ((x1 + x2)(x1x2 + 1) + 2Ax1x2) x + (1 − x1x2)2.
From here, we can obtain for Montgomery curve which is the 3rd summation poly-
nomial:
fM,3(X1, X2, X3) = (X1 − X2)2X23 − 2((X1 + x2)(X1X2 + 1)
+ 2AX1X2)X3 + (1 − X1X2)2,
as well as the subsequent summation polynomials by taking resultants:
fM,m(X1, . . . , Xm) = ResX
(
fM,m−k(X1, . . . , Xm−k−1, X),
× fM,k+2(Xm−k, . . . , Xm, X)
)
.
2.1.3.3 Small Torsion Points on Montgomery Curves
A Montgomery curve always contains an affine 2-torsion point T2. Because T2 +
T2 = 2T2 = O, −T2 = T2. If we write T2 = (x, y), then we can see that y = 0 in
order for −T2 = T2 as p = 2. Substituting y = 0 into Eq. (2.1), we get an equation
x3 + Ax2 + x = 0. The left-hand side factors into x(x2 + Ax + 1) = 0, so we get





Therefore, the set of rational points over the definition field Fpn of a Montgomery
curve includes at least two 2-torsion points, namelyO and (0, 0). The other 2-torsion
points may or may not be rational, so we will focus on (0, 0) in this section. Sub-
stituting (x2, y2) = (0, 0) into the addition formula for Montgomery curves, we get
that for any point P = (x, y) ∈ MA,B , P + (0, 0) = (1/x,−y/x2).
To be able to exploit the symmetry of addition of T2 = (0, 0), we need to choose
the factor baseF = {(x, y) ∈ E(Fpn ) : x ∈ V ⊂ Fpn } invariant under addition of T2.
This means that V needs to be closed by undertaking multiplicative inverses. In other
words, V needs to be a subfield of Fpn , i.e., V = Fp for some integer  that divides
n. In this case, fm is invariant under the action of xi → 1/xi . Unfortunately, such an
action is not linear and hence not easy to handle in polynomial system solving. How
to take advantage of such kind of symmetry in PDP is still an open research problem.
2.1.3.4 Hessian Curves
A Hessian curve Hd over Fpn for pn = 2 mod 3 is defined by the equation
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x3 + y3 + 1 = 3dxy (2.2)
for d ∈ Fpn such that 27d3 = 1 [36]. For P = (x, y) ∈ Hd , −P = (y, x). Further-
more, the addition and doubling formulae for (x3, y3) = (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) are given
as follows.






1 x2 − y22 x1
x2y2 − x1y1 ,
y3 = x
2
1 y2 − x22 y1
x2y2 − x1y1 .














2.1.3.5 Summation Polynomials for Hessian Curves
Following a similar approach outlined by Galbraith and Gebregiyorgis [29], we can
construct summation polynomials for Hessian curves. First, we introduce a new
variable T = X + Y , which is invariant under point negation. The 2nd summation
polynomial for Hessian curves is simply fH,2 = T1 − T2. Now let
Z =
{
(x1, y1, t1,x2, y2, t2, x3, y3, t3) ∈ F9pn : (xi , yi ) ∈ Hd(Fpn ), i = 1, 2, 3;
(x1, y1) + (x2, y2) + (x3, y3) = O; xi + yi = ti , i = 1, 2, 3
}
.





X3i + Y 3i + 1 − 3dXiYi , i = 1, 2, 3;
(X3 − X1)(Y2 − Y1) − (X2 − X1)(Y3 − Y1);





Again, we compute the elimination ideal I ∩ Fpn [T1, T2, T3] and obtain a principal
ideal generated by some polynomial. After removing the degenerate factors, we can
obtain for Hessian curve the 3rd summation polynomial:





3 + dT1T 22 T3 + dT1T2T 23 + 3d2T1T2T3 + 2T1T2 + 2T1T3+
2dT1 + dT 22 T 23 − T 22 + 2T2T3 + 2dT2 − T 23 + 2dT3 + 3d2,
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as well as the subsequent summation polynomials by taking resultants:
fH,m(T1, . . . , Tm) = ResT
(
fH,m−k(T1, . . . , Tm−k−1, T ), fH,k+2(Tm−k , . . . , Tm , T )
)
.
2.1.3.6 Small Torsion Points on Hessian Curves
As we shall see in Sect. 2.1.4.1, we will compare elliptic curves in various forms
that are isomorphism to one another over the same definition field. As a result, we
will only experiment with those Hessian curves that include 2-torsion points like
Montgomery or (twisted) Edwards curves. Because T2 + T2 = 2T2 = O, it follows
that −T2 = T2. If we write T2 = (x, y), then we can see that x = y in order for
−T2 = T2 as −T2 = (y, x). Substituting x = y into Eq. (2.2), we get an equation
2x3 − 3dx2 + 1 = 0. Therefore, aHessian curve Hd(Fpn ) has a 2-torsion point (ζ, ζ )
if the polynomial 2X3 − 3dX2 + 1 has a root ζ in Fpn . In this case, the addition of




x ′ =ζ y
2 − ζ 2x
ζ 2 − xy ,
y′ =ζ x
2 − ζ 2y
ζ 2 − xy .
Obviously, the typical factor bases are not invariant under addition of this 2-torsion
point in general.
A Hessian curve always contains a 3-torsion point T3 such that 3T3 = O [36]. If
we let T3 = (x, y), then we see that 2(x, y) = −(x, y) = (y, x), substituting which





x3 − y3 = y,
x(y3 − 1)
x3 − y3 = x .
Because x and y cannot be zero at the same time, we have x3 − y3 = 1 − x3 =
y3 − 1, or x3 = y3 = 1.Nowbecause pn = 2 mod 3,Fpn does not have anyprimitive
cubic roots of unity, x = y = 1 and T3 = (1, 1). By the addition formula, if P =
(x, y), then
P + T3 = (x, y) + (1, 1) =
(
y2 − x





However, for P ∈ F , we only know that t = x + y ∈ V ⊂ Fpn , but we know nothing
about 1 − xy, which can lie outside of V . Therefore, again, typical factor bases are
not invariant under addition of this 3-torsion point in general. Therefore, it is not
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Fig. 2.1 Experimental
results on PDP solving for
the case of n = 5
m p Curve Time Dreg Matcost Rank
3
239
Hessian 0 6 42336.8 1
Weierstrass 0 6 41259.0 1
Montgomery 0 6 61239.0 4
tEdwards 0 6 6308.4 4
251
Hessian 0 6 41420.4 1
Weierstrass 0 6 42132.0 1
Montgomery 0 6 61127.9 4
tEdwards 0 6 6308.4 4
4
239
Hessian 3.990 19 12066100000 1
Weierstrass 3.680 19 12064700000 1
Montgomery 3.489 18 11399100000 5
tEdwards 0.150 18 54093000 5
251
Hessian 3.459 19 12069800000 1
Weierstrass 3.659 19 12066400000 1
Montgomery 3.280 18 11401700000 5
tEdwards 0.119 18 54102900 5
clear how to exploit such symmetry brought by addition of small torsion points for
Hessian curves.
2.1.4 Experiments on PDP Solving
This section shows the results of our experiments conducted to compare the compu-
tational complexity of PDP on four different curves: Hessian(H ), Weierstrass(W ),
Montgomery(M), and twisted Edwards(t E).
2.1.4.1 Experimental Setup
As explained in Sect. 2.1.2.1, we focus on PDP in these experiments as the linear
algebra step is already well understood. Furthermore, we focus on the bottleneck
computation in PDP, namely, the cost of the F4 algorithm for computing Gröb-
ner bases of the polynomial systems obtained after rewriting using the elementary
symmetric polynomials and applying the Weil restriction technique to summation
polynomials. This way we will be taking advantage of the symmetry of Sm acting
on point decompositions. However, we did not exploit symmetry of any other group
actions. This is because we want to compare the intrinsic computational complexity
of PDP and hence only consider the symmetry that is present in all curves. Exploiting
further curve-specific symmetry whenever possible will result in a further speedup,
but it would be independent of our findings here.
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2.1.4.2 Experimental Results
Figure2.1 presents our experimental results for the case of n = 5. Here, we choose
our factor base by taking V as the base field Fp of Fpn . All our experiments were
performed using the MAGMA computation algebra system (version 2.23-1) on a
single core of an Intel Xeon CPU E7-4830 v4 running at 2 GHz. Comparisons to
solve each PDP were performed by running time (in second), Dreg, Matcost, and
Rank. The “Dreg” is the maximum step degree reached during the execution of the
F4 algorithm, which is referred to as the “degree of regularity” in the literature [29]
and provides an upper bound for the sizes of the Macaulay submatrices involved in
the computation, the “Matcost” is a number output by the MAGMA implementation
of the F4 algorithm and provides an estimate of the linear algebra cost during the
execution of the F4 algorithm, and finally, the “Rank” is the number of linearly
independent relations we obtain once successfully solving a PDP instance. It is an
important factor to consider, as it determines how many PDP instances we need
to successfully solve to have enough relations for a complete ECDLP attack using
index calculus. We can clearly see that the PDP solving time andMatcost for twisted
Edwards curves are much smaller than those for the other curves. In contrast, the
degrees of regularity for Montgomery and twisted Edwards curves are smaller than
those of the other curves in the case of m = 4. In addition, we can see that the rank
for Hessian and Weierstrass curves is 1 in all cases, whereas for Montgomery and
twisted Edwards curves, it is 4 and 5 in the case of m = 3 and m = 4, respectively.
Last but not least, although we only present the results for small p (around 8-bit
long), here, we have some preliminary results for larger p (around 16-bit and 32-bit
long). Apart from the slight difference in the absolute running time, all other results
such as Dreg, Matcost, and Rank are similar, so we do not repeat them here.
2.1.5 Analysis
2.1.5.1 Revisit Summation Polynomial in Each Form
As we have seen in Sect. 2.1.4.2, PDP on (twisted) Edwards curves seems easier to
solve than on other curves. The explanation offered by Faugère, Gaudry, Hout, and
Renault is “due to the smaller degree appearing in the computation of Gröbner basis
of SDn in comparison with the Weierstrass case,” cf. Sect. 4.1.1 of their paper [26].
Unfortunately, this cannot explain the difference between (twisted) Edwards and
Montgomery curves as the highest degrees appearing in the computation of Gröbner
bases are the same for these two curves. Therefore, there must be other reasons. We
have found that the total number of terms for twisted Edwards curves is significantly
lower than that for the other curves in all cases. Naturally, this could lead to faster
solving time with the F4 algorithm.We also note that, except for the twisted Edwards
curves, the summation polynomials before Weil restriction for the other curves are
all 100% dense without any missing terms.
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2.1.5.2 Missing Terms of Summation Polynomials in (Twisted)
Edwards Curves
In this section, we will show that the summation polynomials for (twisted) Edwards
curves mainly have terms of even degrees. The set of terms of even degrees is closed
under multiplication, so intuitively, such polynomials are easier to solve, which can
be the main reason for the efficiency gain observed in the case of (twisted) Edwards
curves.
We shall make this intuition precise in Theorem 2.1, but before we state the main
result, we need to clarify our terminology for ease of exposition.When amultivariate
polynomial is regarded as a univariate polynomial in one of its variables T , we say
that the coefficient ai of a term ai T i is an even or odd-degree coefficient depending
on whether i is even or odd, respectively. Note that these coefficients are themselves
multivariate polynomials in one fewer variable.
We say that a monomial m = ∏ni=1 xeii , ei ≥ 0 in a multivariate polynomial in
n variables is of even degree or simply an even-degree monomial if
∑
i ei is even;
that it is of odd degree or simply an odd-degree monomial otherwise. In contrast, a
monomial is of (homogeneous) even parity if all ei are even; it is of (homogeneous)
odd parity if all ei are odd. A monomial is of homogeneous parity if it is either of
homogeneous even or odd parity. Note that the definition of monomials of odd parity
depends on the total number of variables in the polynomial, which is not the case for
monomials of even parity because we regard 0 as even. For example, the monomial
x1x2 is a monomial of odd parity in a polynomial in x1 and x2 but not so in another
polynomial in x1, . . . , xn for n > 2.
By abuse of language, we say that a polynomial is of even or odd parity if it
is a linear combination of monomials of even or odd parity, respectively; that a
polynomial is of homogeneous parity if it is a linear combination of monomials of
homogeneous parity. The set of polynomials of evenparity is closedunder polynomial
addition andmultiplication and hence forms a subring. In contrast, a polynomial f in








, for ei j odd.Therefore,
if f is a polynomial of odd parity and g, a polynomial of even parity, then f g must
be of odd parity.
Theorem 2.1 Let E be a family of elliptic curves such that its 3rd summation poly-
nomial fE,3(X1, X2, X3) is of degree 2 in each variable Xi and of homogeneous
parity. Let gE,m be the polynomial corresponding to the PDP of mth order for E
as described in Sect.2.1.2.2. That is, gE,m(X1, . . . , Xm) = fE,m+1(X1, . . . , Xm, x),
where x is a constant depending on the point to be decomposed.
1. If m is even, then gE,m has no monomials of odd degrees.
2. If m is odd, then gE,m has some but not all monomials of odd degrees.
Among the four forms of elliptic curves that we investigated in this section, only the
(twisted) Edwards form satisfies the premises of Theorem 2.1. As we have seen in
Sect. 2.1.4, the PDP solving time for the (twisted) Edwards form is thus significantly
faster than that for the other forms.
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We will prove Theorem 2.1 in the rest of this section, for which we will need the
following lemmas.
Lemma 2.1 Let f1(T1, . . . , Tr , T ) = a0 + a1T + · · · + amTm and f2(T1, . . . ,
Tr , T ) = b0 + b1T + · · · + bnT n be two polynomials in r + 1 variables, where ai
and bi are polynomials in T1, . . . , Tr . Let f (T1, . . . , Tr ) = ResT ( f1, f2) be the resul-
tant of f1 and f2 regarded as two univariate polynomials in T . If both m and n are
even, then every monomial of f is a product of an even number or none of the odd-
degree coefficients of f1 and f2 and some or none of the even-degree coefficients
of f1 and f2. Specifically, the odd-degree coefficients a2k+1 and b2k+1 of f1 and f2,
respectively, appear in total an even number of times in each monomial of f .
Proof The resultant ResT ( f1, f2) of f1 and f2 is the determinant of the following
















am am−1 . . . a0
am am−1 . . . a0
. . .
. . .
am am−1 . . . a0
bn bn−1 . . . b0
bn bn−1 . . . b0
. . .
. . .

























We denote si j as the entry at the i th row and j th column of S for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m + n.
Because both m and n are even, an even-degree coefficient a2k or b2k will appear in
si j for which the sum of indices i + j is even. Similarly, an odd-degree coefficient
a2k+1 or b2k+1 will appear in si j for which the sum of indices i + j is odd. Now recall
that the determinant of S is defined as
∑
σ∈Sn+m
sgn(σ )s1,σ (1) · s2,σ (2) · · · sm+n,σ (m+n).
We note that the sum of the indices of any summand is
m+n∑
i
i + σ(i) = (m + n)(m + n + 1),
which is always even. Therefore, the odd-degree coefficients must appear an even
number of times, thus completing the proof.
Lemma 2.2 Let E be a family of elliptic curves such that its 3rd summation poly-
nomial fE,3(X1, X2, X3) is of degree 2 in each variable Xi and of homogeneous
parity. Then, any subsequent summation polynomial fE,m(X1, . . . , Xm) for m > 3
is of homogeneous parity.
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Proof As the summation polynomial fE,m+1 for m ≥ 3 is defined recursively from
fE,m and fE,3 by taking resultants
fE,m+1(X1, . . . , Xm+1) = ResX
(
fE,m(X1, . . . , Xm−1, X), fE,3(Xm, Xm+1, X)
)
,
we shall prove this lemma by induction on m. Let fE,m(X1, . . . , Xm−1, X) =
a2m−2X2
m−2 + · · · + a1X + a0 and fE,3(Xm, Xm+1, X) = b2X2 + b1X + b0. By the
premise that fE,3 is of homogeneous parity, b0 and b2 must consist only ofmonomials
(in Xm and Xm+1) of even parity. Furthermore, b1 = cXm Xm+1 for some constant c.
This is because fE,3 is of degree 2 in each variable, for which the only monomial of
odd parity is XmXm+1X .
Now consider a term ck Xkm+1 of
fE,m+1(X1, . . . , Xm, Xm+1) = c2m−1X2m−1m+1 + · · · + c1Xm+1 + c0
as a univariate polynomial in Xm+1. Again as fE,3 is of degree 2 in X , we have the















where αi a constant, βi , γi ∈ {0, . . . , 2m−2}, and δi , εi nonnegative integers such
that δi + εi + k = 2m−2. We will complete the proof by showing that ck Xkm+1 is a
polynomial in X1, . . . , Xm+1 of homogeneous parity for all k as follows.
1. If k is even, then by Lemma 2.1, βi and γi are both even or both odd in each
summand. In either case, the product aβi aγi is a polynomial in X1, . . . , Xm−1 of
even parity. It follows that each summand is a polynomial of even parity because
it is a product of polynomials of even parity. Hence, ck Xkm+1 is a polynomial of
even parity.
2. If k is odd, the situation is similar but slightly more complicated. By Lemma 2.1,
exactly one of βi and γi is odd in each summand, say βi . By induction hypothesis,
aβi is a polynomial in X1, . . . , Xm−1 of odd parity because it comes from aβi Xβi
in fE,m . It follows that each summand is a polynomial of odd parity because it is









m+1. Hence, ck X
k
m+1 is a polynomial of odd parity.
By Lemma 2.2, gE,m(X1, . . . , Xm) = fE,m+1(X1, . . . , Xm, x) is of homogeneous
parity. Obviously, the monomials of even parity will remain of even degree after x is
substituted. If m is even, then the monomials of odd parity in fE,m+1 will become of
even degree after x is substituted because an even number of odd numbers sum to an
even number. Similarly, if m is odd, then the monomials of odd parity in fE,m+1 will
become of odd degree after x is substituted. However, those odd-degree monomials
that are not of homogeneous parity, e.g., X21X2, cannot appear in gE,m by Lemma 2.2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
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2.1.5.3 What Price for a Highly Symmetric Factor Base?
Last but not least, we discuss the price needed to pay to have a highly symmetric
factor base F that is invariant under more group actions in addition to that of the
symmetric group Sm . As previewed in Sect. 2.1.2.6, we would expect that the effect
of the decrease in decomposition probability due to additional symmetry in F could
be offset by that of the increase in number of solutions. For example, let us reconsider
the group action of addition of T2 in Sect. 2.1.2.4. If we could get 2m−1 solutions, then
the loss of the factor of 2m−1 in decomposition probability would be compensated.
This way everything would be the same as if there were no such symmetry, and we
could exploit the additional symmetry at no cost.
Unfortunately, this proposition is false in general. Consider an example ofm = 4.
Let Qi = Pi + T2 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. We can write down all 2m−1 = 8 possible ways
of a point decomposition under this group action:
P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 =Q1 + Q2 + P3 + P4
= Q1 + P2 + Q3 + P4 =Q1 + P2 + P3 + Q4
= P1 + Q2 + Q3 + P4 =P1 + Q2 + P3 + Q4
= P1 + P2 + Q3 + Q4 =Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4.
It is easy to find that we have only five linearly independent relations from these
eight relations, as there are nontrivial linear combinations summing to zero, e.g.:
(P1 + P2 + P3 + P4) − (Q1 + Q2 + P3 + P4) − (P1 + P2 + Q3 + Q4)
+ (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4) = O.
As explained in Sect. 2.1.4.1, the factor bases for Montgomery and twisted Edwards
curves are invariant under addition of 2-torsion points. For m = 3, we achieve max-
imum rank of 2m−1 = 4. For m = 4, as we have explained above, we can only have
rank 5, which is strictly less than the maximum possible rank 2m−1 = 8.
Finally, we note thatwe have not exploited any symmetry forHessian curves in our
experiments. However, the rank for Hessian curves is always 1 in all our experiments.
This shows that the factor base we have chosen for Hessian curves is not invariant
under addition of small torsion points, as the rank would be > 1 otherwise.
2.1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this section, we experimentally explored index-calculus attack on ECDLP over
different forms such as twisted Edwards, Montgomery, Hessian, and Weierstrass
curves under the totally fair conditions as they are isomorphic to each other over
the same definition field Fpn and showed that twisted Edwards curves are clearly
faster than others. We investigated the summation polynomials of all forms in detail,
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found that big differences exist in the number of terms, and proved that monomials
of odd degrees in summation polynomials on twisted Edwards curves do not exist.
We showed that this difference causes less solving time of index-calculus attack on
ECDLP over twisted Edwards than others.
2.2 Analysis on Ring-LWE over Decomposition Fields
2.2.1 Introduction
The ring variant of learning with errors (Ring-LWE) based cryptography [15, 16] is
one of the most attractive research areas in cryptography. Ring-LWE has provided
efficient and provably secure post-quantum cryptographic protocols, which include
homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes [4, 5, 9]. The development of the efficiency
and security of both post-quantum cryptography and HE is strongly desirable. In
fact, the standardization of post-quantum cryptography is under development by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Moreover, HE schemes that enable
us to execute the computation on encrypted data without decryption have many
applications in cloud computing.
Ring-LWE is characterized by two probabilistic distributions, modulus param-
eters (integers) and number fields, as detailed in Sect. 2.2.2.4. Usually, cyclotomic
fields are used as the underlying number fields to increase efficiency and security
[17]. However, especially in the case of HE schemes, improving the efficiency of
the encryption/decryption procedures and homomorphic arithmetic operations on
encrypted data while ensuring security remain important tasks.
To construct an HE scheme that can simultaneously encrypt many plaintexts
efficiently, Arita and Handa proposed the use of a decomposition field, which is
contained in a cyclotomic field with prime conductors, as an underlying number
field for Ring-LWE [1]. (Sect. 2.2.3 presents the details of decomposition fields and
ofArita andHanda’s idea.) Arita andHanda’s HE scheme, which is called the subring
HE scheme, is indistinguishably secure under a chosen-plaintext attack if the decision
variant of Ring-LWE over the decomposition fields is computationally infeasible.
Arita andHanda’s experiments [1, Sect. 5] showed that the performance of the subring
HE scheme is much better than that of the FV scheme based on Ring-LWE over th
cyclotomic fields with prime numbers , as implemented in HElib [11].
As for the security of the subring HE scheme, Arita and Handa remarked that in
the case of decomposition fields, some of the security properties of Ring-LWE in the
case of cyclotomic fields are also satisfied. More concretely, there exists a quantum
polynomial-time reduction from the approximate shortest vector problem on certain
ideal lattices to Ring-LWE over decomposition fields, and the equivalence between
the decision and search variants of Ring-LWE over decomposition fields is satisfied.
However, solving Ring-LWE is reduced to solving certain problems on lattices,
such as the closest vector problem (CVP) and the shortest vector problem, and the
22 C.-M. Cheng et al.
difficulty of problems on lattices depends heavily on the structure and given bases
of the underlying lattices. For example, if the shortest vector is much shorter than
the second shortest vector in a certain lattice L, then the shortest vector problem
for lattice L would be easy. This means that the underlying number fields affect the
difficulty of lattice problems arising in Ring-LWE. Hence, to ensure the security
of the subring HE scheme, experimental or theoretical analyses of (lattice) attacks
should be performed. However, [1] does not provide any such analysis.
In this study, we provide an experimental analysis of the security of Ring-LWE
over decomposition fields. More precisely, we compare the security of Ring-LWE
over decomposition fields and of Ring-LWE over the th cyclotomic fields with
some prime numbers . In our experiments, we reduce the search Ring-LWE to the
(approximate) CVP on certain lattices in the same way as Bonnoron et al.’s analysis
[3] because the target of Bonnoron et al.’s analysis is Ring-LWE optimized for HE.
We use Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [2] and Kannan’s embedding technique [12]
to solve the CVP. We then compare the running times, success rates, and Hermite
root factors. (The root Hermite factor [10] is usually used to evaluate the quality of
lattice attacks.) We also compare the experimental results of lattice attacks against
Ring-LWE over various decomposition fields to find those fields that provide weak
Ring-LWE.
Our experimental results indicate that the success rates and Hermite root factors
for the decomposition fields are almost the same as those for the cyclotomic fields.
However, the running time for decomposition fields is longer than that for cyclotomic
fields. Moreover, the difference in running time increases as the rank of the lattices
increases.
Therefore, we believe that Ring-LWE over decomposition fields is more secure
against the above lattice attacks than that over cyclotomic fields because the ranks
of the lattices occurring in our experiments are much lower than the ranks of the
lattices used in practice. This means that to construct HE schemes (or schemes of
other types), fewer parameters are needed for Ring-LWE over decomposition fields
than for Ring-LWE over cyclotomic fields. Therefore, as a result of our analysis,
we believe that Ring-LWE over decomposition fields can be used to construct more
efficient HE schemes.
2.2.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the notation of lattices, Galois theory, number fields,
and Ring-LWE. Throughout this study, Z, Q, R, and C denote the ring of (rational)
integers, field of rational numbers, field of real numbers, and field of complex num-
bers, respectively. For a positive integer m ∈ Z, we suppose that any element of
Z/mZ is represented by an integer contained in the interval (−m/2,m/2] ∩ Z.
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2.2.2.1 Lattices
An m-dimensional lattice is defined as a discrete additive subgroup of Rm . It is
well known that for any lattice L ⊂ Rm , there exist R-linearly independent vec-
tors b1, . . . , and bn ∈ Rm such that L = ∑1≤i≤n Zbi := {
∑
1≤i≤n aibi | ai ∈ Z }.
In other words, for a matrix B = (b1, . . . ,bn) whose i th column vector is b j , we
have L = {Bx | x ∈ Zn}. Then, we say that {b1, . . . ,bn} is a lattice basis of L, and
B is the basis matrix of L with respect to {b1, . . . ,bn}. The value n is called the
rank of L, and it is denoted by rank(L). There are infinite bases for a lattice. In fact,
for any unimodular matrix U, all column vectors of UB also form a basis of L. An
important invariant of L is the determinant defined as det(L) := √det (BBt ). This
determinant is independent of basis.
There are various computationally hard problems on lattices. Here, we explain
the CVP, which is a well-known problem on lattices. Given a lattice L and target
vector t ∈ Rm  L, the CVP on (L, t) is the problem of finding a vector x ∈ L such
that for all vectors y ∈ L, we have ‖t − x‖ ≤ ‖t − y‖. For a real number γ > 1, the
approximate CVP on (L, t, γ ) is the problem of finding a vector x ∈ L such that
for all vectors y ∈ L, we have ‖t − x‖ ≤ γ ‖t − y‖. Babai’s nearest plane algorithm
and Kannan’s embedding technique are basic algorithms for solving the approxi-
mate CVP. Almost all known problems on lattices that are useful for constructing
cryptographic protocols become more difficult as the ranks of the underlying lattices
increase, and the quality of the two algorithms mentioned earlier depends on ranks
of input lattices.
Breaking some cryptographic protocols can be reduced to solving certain com-
putational problems on lattices, including the (approximate) CVP [3, 8]. To solve
such problems on lattices, we usually use lattice basis reduction algorithms, which
transform a given basis of a lattice into a basis of the same lattice that consists of
nearly orthogonal and relatively short vectors. In fact, an input of Babai’s nearest
plane algorithm is an (LLL) reduced basis, and Kannan’s embedding technique out-
puts an appropriate vector from the reduced basis. In our experiments, to solve CVP
using Babai’s nearest plane algorithm and Kannan’s embedding technique, we use
the LLL algorithm [13] andBKZalgorithm [7, 19], which arewell-known algorithms
for computing such bases.
The quality of basis reduction algorithms is usually estimated by the root Hermite
factor, which is defined as follows: Let b be the shortest vector of a basis of a lattice
L with rank n, which has been reduced by a basis reduction algorithmA. Then, the
root Hermite factor δA,L is defined as a constant satisfying δnA,L := ‖b‖/ det(L)1/n.
Better basis reduction algorithms provide smaller Hermite root factors.
2.2.2.2 Galois Theory
To describe decomposition fields, we need to describe Galois theory.
Let K be a field and L an extension field of K ; we denote this situation by L/K .
The field L is a K -vector space, and the degree of extension of L/K , denoted by
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[L : K ], is defined as the dimension of L as K -vector space. If M is a subfield of L
containing K as a subfield, i.e., K ⊂ M ⊂ L , then we call M an intermediate field
of L/K . If L/K satisfies [L : K ] < ∞, then L/K is called a finite extension of K .
If M is an intermediate field of L/K with [L : K ] < ∞, then we have [L : K ] =
[L : M][M : K ]. If for any α ∈ L , there exists a nonzero polynomial f (x) ∈ K [x]
such that f (α) = 0, then L/K is called an algebraic extension of K . It is known that
all finite extensions are algebraic extensions.
From now on, we suppose that L/K is a finite algebraic extension. For any
α ∈ L , the minimal polynomial over K of α is defined as the monic polynomial
f (x) ∈ K [x] with the lowest degree of all polynomials in K [x] that vanish at α. We
denote Irr(α, K )(x) as the minimal polynomial over K of α. Note that the minimal
polynomial over K of α coincides with the monic irreducible polynomial over K
that vanishes at α. For a subset S ⊂ L , we denote K (S) as the smallest subfield of L
among subfields containing K and S. We call K (S) the field generated by S over K .
If L is generated by one element θ ∈ L over K , i.e., L = K (θ), then we have an iso-
morphism L ∼= K [x]/ (Irr(θ, K )(x)) by θ → x (mod. (Irr(θ, K )(x)). This implies
that [K (θ) : K ] = deg Irr(α, K ).
Next, we describe separable, normal, and Galois extensions of fields. If
Irr(α, K )(x) for any α that has no multiple roots, then L/K is called a separable
extension of K . If L contains all roots of Irr(α, K )(x) for any α ∈ L , then L/K is
called a normal extension of K . If all algebraic extensions of K , including infinite
algebraic extensions, are separable, then K is called a perfect (field). It is known
that fields with characteristic zero and any finite field are perfect, and that any finite
separable extension field can be generated by one element. If L/K is a separable
and normal extension of K , then L/K is called a Galois extension of K . Let  be
a sufficiently large field containing K such that any ring-homomorphism φ fixing
K , i.e., φ(a) = a for any a ∈ K , to L satisfies φ(L) ⊂ . We define the set of all
ring-homomorphisms by fixing K to the range L to  as follows:
HomK (L ,) := {σ : L ↪→  | σ(a) = a,∀a ∈ K } .
(Note that any nonzero ring-homomorphism between fields is injective.) Let L/K
be separable with [L : K ] = n and L = K (θ). Let θ = θ1, . . . , θn be all roots
of Irr(θ, K )(x). For any σ ∈ HomK (L ,), we have σ (Irr(θ, K )(θ)) = Irr(θ, K )
(σ (θ)) = 0. This means that σ(θ) = θi for some i = 1, . . . , n. This then implies
#HomK (L) = n. (Any τ ∈ HomK (L ,) is completely determined by the image of
θ under τ because τ fixes K .)
Moreover, if L/K is normal, then σ induces an isomorphism L ∼= L . Note
that L = K (θ) ∼= K (θi ) for any i = 1, . . . , n because these fields are isomorphic
to K [X ]/ (Irr(θ, K )). Therefore, we may take L as  and can write AutK (L) =
HomK (L ,).
Now, we can describe the fundamental theorem of Galois theory (for finite
field extensions). Let L/K be a finite Galois extension of K . Then, we can write
Gal(L/K ) = AutK (L). For any subgroup H ⊂ Gal(L/K ) and an intermediate field
M of L/K , we define
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LH := {a ∈ L | σ(a) = a,∀σ ∈ H},
GM := {σ ∈ Gal(L/K ) | σ(a) = a,∀a ∈ M}.
We note that L/M is a Galois extension with Gal(L/M) = GM . It is not difficult
to see that LH is an intermediate field of L/K and that GM is a subgroup
of Gal(L/K ). We can define two maps with respect to L/K . One is a map 
from A := {M ⊂ L |M is an intermediate field of L/K } to B := {H ⊂ Gal(L/K ) |
H is a subgroup of Gal(L/K )} by M → GM . The other is a map  from B to A by
H → LH . The fundamental theorem of Galois theory is as follows:
Theorem 2.2 Let L/K, A, B,, and be as above. Then, the following statements
are true:
(1) There is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B. More precisely,  and
 are inverse maps of each other.
(2) If M1 and M2 are intermediate fields of L/K with M1 ⊂ M2, then we have
(M2) ⊂ (M1). Similarly, if H1 and H2 are subgroups of Gal(L/K ) with
H1 ⊂ H2, then we have (H2) ⊂ (H1).
(3) Let M1, M2, H1 and H2 be as in (2). Then, we have (H2 : H1) = #H2/H1 =
[(H1) : (H2)] and [M2 : M1] = ((M1) : (M2)).
(4) A subfield M of L/K is a Galois extension of K if and only if GM = (M) is
a normal subgroup of Gal(L/K ). Moreover, if GM = Gal(L/M) is a normal
subgroup of Gal(L/K ), then we have
Gal(L/K )/Gal(L/M) ∼= Gal(M/K ).
In particular, if Gal(L/K ) is an abelian group, then all subfields of L/K are
Galois extensions of K .
For a proof of Theorem 2.2, see [18] for example. (It is easy to prove (2) of
Theorem 2.2 from the definitions of  and .)
2.2.2.3 Number Fields
To describe Ring-LWE and decomposition fields, which play central roles in this
paper, we need some notations from algebraic number theory.
An (algebraic) number field is a finite extension field ofQ. Let K be a number field
with extension degree [K : Q] = n. An element a ∈ K is called an algebraic integer
if there exists a monic polynomial f ∈ Z[x] such that f (a) = 0. The ring of integers
OK of K is defined as a subring of K consisting of all algebraic integers of K . The ring
OK has an integral basis (Z-basis) {u1, . . . , un}, i.e., for any element u ∈ OK , there
exist integers a1, . . . , an such that u is uniquely written as u = ∑1≤i≤n aiui . It is well
known that any (integral) ideal I of OK is uniquely factored into products of some
prime ideals, i.e., there exist prime ideals P1, . . . ,Pm satisfying I = Pe11 · · ·Pemm for
ei ≥ 1. If I = pOK for a prime number p and K is a Galois extension of Q, then we
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have OK /Pi = Fpd for some d ∈ N and all ei ’s are mutually equal. Moreover, we
have med = n, where e := ei , and if all ei ’s are equal to 1 (resp. all ei ’s and d are
equal to 1), thenwe say that p is unramified (resp. splits completely) in K . Any prime
ideal of OK is amaximal ideal in OK , and thus we have Pi + Pj = OK for any i = j .
This induces an isomorphism of rings OK /P1 · · ·Pm ∼= OK /P1 × · · · × OK /Pm .
2.2.2.4 Ring-LWE Problem
Let K and OK be as above. Let χsecret and χerror be probabilistic distributions on OK
and let p be an integer. We denote by OK ,p the residue ring OK /pOK . For a proba-
bilistic distribution χ on a set X , we write a ← χ when a ∈ X is chosen according
to χ . We denoteU (X) as the uniform distribution on X . The Ring-LWE distribution
on OK ,p, denoted by RLWEK ,p,χerror,χsec , is defined as a probabilistic distribution that
takes elements of the form (a, as + e) with a ← U (OK ,p), s ← χsecret, and with
e ← χerror. The Ring-LWE problem has two variants. One is the problem of dis-
tinguishing RLWEK ,p,χerror,χsec from U (OK ,p × OK ,p), which is called the decision
Ring-LWE problem. The other is a problem of finding s ∈ OK ,p, given arbitrarily
many samples (ai , ai s + ei ) ∈ OK ,p × OK ,p chosen according to RLWEK ,p,χerror,χsec ,
which is called the search Ring-LWE problem.
The Ring-LWE problem is expected to be computationally difficult even with
quantum computers. It is proved that the decision Ring-LWE problem is equivalent
to the search problem if K is a cyclotomic field and if p is a prime number and
(almost) splits completely in K [16]. In addition, this equivalence is generalized to
the cases where K/Q is a Galois extension and where p is unramified in K [6].
Moreover, there is a quantum polynomial-time reduction from the search Ring-LWE
to the shortest vector problem on certain ideal lattices.
2.2.3 Ring-LWE over Cyclotomic and Decomposition Fields
In this section, we describe why Arita and Handa proposed the use of decomposi-
tion fields as the underlying number fields of Ring-LWE to construct efficient HE
schemes.
2.2.3.1 Cyclotomic Fields and Decomposition Fields
First, we briefly review cyclotomic fields. For a positive integer m, let ζm ∈ C be
a primitive mth root of unity and n = ϕ(m), where ϕ(·) denotes Euler’s totient
function. Then, K := Q (ζm) is called the mth cyclotomic field. The ring of integers
of K coincides with R := Z[ζm]. Any prime number p that does not divide m is
unramified in K , and if p ≡ 1 (mod. m), then p splits completely in K . Here, K/Q
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is a Galois extension of degree [K : Q] = n, and its Galois group Gal(K/Q) is
isomorphic to (Z/mZ)∗.
Next, we describe the decomposition fields of number fields. Let L be a number
field, and suppose that L/Q is a Galois extension and that its Galois group G :=
Gal(L/Q) is a cyclic group. Let p be a prime number that is unramified in L and
satisfies pOL = P1 · · ·Pg , where the Pi ’s are the prime ideals of OL . Let GZ be
a subgroup of G that consists of all elements ρ fixing all Pi , i.e., ρ(Pi ) = Pi for
1 ≤ i ≤ g, and Z is the fixed field of GZ . Then, we call Z the decomposition field
with respect to p. The field Z is a number field and the ring of integers of Z is OZ =
OL ∩ Z . Suppose pi := OZ ∩ Pi . Then, we have pOZ = p1 · · · pg . A generator σ
of GZ acts on OL/Pi ∼= Fpd as the pth Frobenius map, i.e., σ(x) ≡ x p (mod. Pi )
for all x ∈ OL and for 1 ≤ i ≤ g. Therefore, we have OZ/pi ∼= Fp and [Z : Q] = g,
i.e., p splits completely in Z .
2.2.3.2 Cyclotomic Fields Versus Decomposition Fields
Let K , L , and Z be as above and p be a prime number that is unramified in K
and splits completely in Z . Assume that L is the th cyclotomic field with a prime
number . As we mentioned in Sect. 2.2.1, cyclotomic fields are usually used as the
underlying number fields of Ring-LWE. From the viewpoint of the efficiency of
Ring-LWE based schemes, there are good Z-bases of the rings of integers of K and
Z [1, 17]. As for the security of the Ring-LWE, in the cases of K and Z , both the
equivalence and the reduction mentioned in Sect. 2.2.2.4 are satisfied because both
K/Q and Z/Q are Galois extensions.
The main difference between K and Z is the algebraic structures of their rings of
integers modulo p. Because p is unramified in K , we have OK ,p ∼= OK /P1 × · · · ×
OK /Pk and OK /Pi ∼= Fpd for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and for d > 1, where the Pi ’s are prime
ideals in OK lying over p, i.e., pOK = P1 · · ·Pk . The FV scheme [9], which is an
HE scheme based on Ring-LWE, uses OK ,p as its plaintext space, and thus, the FV
scheme (or any HE scheme with the same plaintext space) can encrypt and execute
several additions of dk = n = [K : Q] plaintexts in Fp simultaneously. However,
the FV scheme cannot execute the multiplication of the same number of plaintexts
in Fp simultaneously. To execute the multiplication of plaintexts in Fp, we can only
use Fp × · · · × Fp (the direct product of k finite fields) as the plaintext space.
In contrast, because p splits completely in Z , we have OZ ,p ∼= OZ/p1 × · · · ×
OZ/pg and OZ/pi ∼= Fp for any 1 ≤ i ≤ g, where the pi ’s are prime ideals in OZ
lying over p. This means that one can encrypt g = [Z : Q] plaintexts simultaneously.
Moreover, one can execute additions and multiplications of the same number of
plaintexts in Fp simultaneously. Because the extension degrees g and n are directly
related to the ranks of the lattices occurring in known lattice attacks, we should set
g ≈ n to compare the security of Ring-LWE over these fields. Therefore, the HE
scheme over Z can encrypt and operate d times as many plaintexts as the FV scheme
over K simultaneously.
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Remark 2.1 1. If p ≡ 1 (mod. m), then p splits completely in K (recall that K is
the mth cyclotomic field), and then there is no advantage to using decomposition
fields. However, for some cryptographic applications, we want to use a small p,
e.g., p = 2 [1]. Moreover, to avoid lattice attacks, the extension degree [K : Q]
must be large, as we discussed above. Thus, we cannot expect p ≡ 1 (mod. m)
for practical parameters in some applications.
2. By the Hensel lifting technique, for r > 1 and q := pr , we have OZ ,q ∼= Z/qZ ×
· · · × Z/qZ.
2.2.4 Our Experimental Analysis
In this section, we present our experimental results on lattice attacks against Ring-
LWEover decomposition fields and cyclotomic fields. First, we explain lattice attacks
in our experiments.
2.2.4.1 Lattice Attack in Our Experiments
In our experiments, we reduce the search Ring-LWE to a CVP (or approximate CVP)
in the same way as Bonnoron et al.’s analysis [3] because the target of Bonnoron
et al.’s analysis is Ring-LWE optimized for HE. We describe this approach briefly
in the case of decomposition fields. Let OZ and p be as in Sect. 2.2.3.1. Set q := pr
for r > 1. Let {μ1, . . . , μg} be a Z-basis of OZ , which is a good basis, as shown
in [1, Lemma 3]. We sample vectors a = (a1, . . . , ag), s = (s1, . . . , sg) and e =
(e1, . . . , eg) from U (Zg), DZg,σs , and DZg,σe , respectively, where DZg,σ denotes the
discrete Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2.
We put a := ∑1≤i≤g aiμi , s :=
∑
1≤i≤g siμi , e :=
∑
1≤i≤g eiμi , and b := as +
e = ∑1≤i≤g biμi (mod. q). Then, (a, b) is a Ring-LWE instance over Z . Note that
to use Ring-LWE to construct HE schemes, the value σs and σe should be suffi-
ciently small because the ∞-norm ‖s‖∞ directly affects the growth of noise after
multiplication. In our experiments, we set σs = 1 and σ 2e = 8 according to [14]. By
comparing all coefficients of both sides, we get As + e = (b1, . . . , bg)t = b, where
A is a matrix. (For any vector v, vt means its transpose.) If we set A′ as (A I), then
we have A′(s e)t = b (mod. q), where I denotes the g × g identity matrix. From
the choice of si ’s and ei ’s, our target vector (s e)t is a very short vector from among
all solutions to A′y = b, and thus, we can expect that our target vector can be found
by solving the (approximate) CVP on the lattice L = {x ∈ Z2g | A′x = 0 (mod. q)}
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as a basis matrix ofL, where 0g,g denotes the g × g zero matrix. We reduce the basis
matrix B using the LLL and BKZ algorithms with block size β = 10. (In practice,
β should be 10 or 20.) Let Bred be a reduced basis of B. We input Bred and w to
Babai’s nearest plane algorithm. The quality of the results of Babai’s nearest plane
algorithm depends on the quality of the basis reduction algorithms used to compute
the reduced input bases, and thus, we compute the root Hermite factor for Bred.






as input, and we set M = 1 according to the result of an experimental study on Kan-
nan’s embedding technique for LWE [20]. We also use the LLL and BKZ algorithms
with β = 10 to reduce the above basis matrix.
Remark 2.2 In the case of -cyclotomic fields with prime numbers , we use
{1, ζ, . . . , ζ −2 } as a Z-basis, which is also a good basis [17].
Remark 2.3 For 1 ≤ r ′ < r and q ′ := pr ′ , we can obtain samples of
RLWEK ,q ′,χerror,χsec from samples ofRLWEK ,q,χerror,χsec by a natural projectionOZ ,q →
OZ ,q ′ by a → a (mod. q ′). In our experiments, we use a small r ′ to reduce running
times. In our experimental results, we only show r ′.
2.2.4.2 Experimental Results
We used a computer with 2.00GHz CPUs (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4830 v4
(2.00GHz)x111) and 3TB memory to conduct the experiments. The OS was Ubuntu
16.04.4. We implemented the code for sampling Ring-LWE instances in SageMath
version 7.5.1. We also used Magma V2.23-1 to execute lattice attacks. We took 100
samples and performed lattice attacks on them.
We show our experimental results in Tables2.1 and 2.2 for p = 2. Table2.1 shows
that there is not a considerable difference between the experimental results of cyclo-
tomic fields and those for decomposition fields. In contrast, Table2.2 shows that
Kannan’s embedding technique is much faster than Babai’s nearest plane algorithm.
This implies that the behaviors of the basis reduction algorithms heavily depend
on the structure of the input lattices. This is a reason why experimental analyses
are necessary for ensuring the security of lattice-based schemes (or other problems).
Table2.2 also shows that the running times for the decomposition fields become
longer than those for cyclotomic fields as g (or  − 1) increases. Therefore, we can
expect that decomposition fields provide Ring-LWE that is more secure against the
lattice attacks described in Sect. 2.2.4.1 than th cyclotomic fields because the ranks
of the lattices occurring in our experiments are very low compared to the ranks of
lattices used in practice. This means that we can use decomposition fields with lower
extension degrees than would be needed for th cyclotomic fields, and the use of
such number fields makes Ring-LWE-based schemes more efficient. Therefore, as a
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Table 2.1 Experimental results on Babai’s nearest plane algorithm for p = 2
 59 16183 73 2089 83 4051 131 5419 173 14449 227 9719
g − 58 − 72 − 81 − 129 − 172 − 226
Lattice
rank
118 116 146 144 166 162 262 258 346 344 454 452




93 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 40 37 15 14
Success
rate (%)














− 123.2 − 109.0 − 102.9 − 91.8 − 105.7 − 102.6
The columns for which the values g are indicated show the results for decomposition fields; the
other columns show the results for cyclotomic fields
The “ratio of running times” is the ratio of the average of running time for a decomposition field to
that of a cyclotomic field for each g
Table 2.2 Experimental results on Kannan’s embedding technique for p = 2
 59 161831 73 2089 83 4051 131 5419 173 14449 227 9719
g − 58 − 72 − 81 − 129 − 172 − 226
Lattice
rank
119 117 147 145 167 163 263 259 347 345 455 453




100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 23 21
Success
rate (%)









− 103.5 − 112.7 − 105.7 − 117.9 − 129.7 − 116.6
We computed the root Hermite factor for the reduced bases, but we do not show them because the
success rates in these results are 100%
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Fig. 2.2 Average running times of Kannan’s embedding technique for cyclotomic and decomposi-
tion fields with respect to p = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11. The label “p = 2_cyclotomic” indicates the results of
the cyclotomic fields shown in Table2.2, and the other labels indicate the results for decomposition
fields with respect to the corresponding prime numbers p. We set modulus parameter q = pr ′ so
that these moduli have the almost same bit sizes. We only show the average results on at least 10
samples
result of our analysis, we believe that Ring-LWE over decomposition fields can be
used to construct more efficient HE schemes.
We also conducted experiments for decomposition fields with respect to p =
3, 5, 7, 11 to find decomposition fields that provide weak Ring-LWE instances
(Fig. 2.2). In these experiments, we could not find decomposition fields that pro-
vide weak Ring-LWE.
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Chapter 3
Secure Primitive for Big Data Utilization
Akinori Kawachi, Atsuko Miyaji, Kazuhisa Nakasho, Yiying Qi,
and Yuuki Takano
Abstract In this chapter, we describe two security primitives for big data utilization.
One is a privacy-preserving data integration among databases distributed in differ-
ent organizations. This primitive integrates the same data among databases kept in
different organizations while keeping any different data in an organization secret
to other organizations. Another is a privacy-preserving classification. This primitive
executes a procedure for server’s classification rule to client’s input database and
outputs only the result to the client while keeping the client’s input database secret to
the server and server’s classification rule to the client. These primitives can be exe-
cuted not only independently but also jointly. That is, after we integrate databases
from distributed organization by executing the privacy-preserving data integration,
we can execute a privacy-preserving classification.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Integration
3.1.1 Introduction
Medical organizations often store the data accumulated through medical analyses.
However, detailed data analysis sometimes requires separate datasets to be integrated
without violating patient or commercial privacy. Consider the scenario in which the
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occurrence of similar accidents can be attributed to a particular defective product.
Such defective products should be identified as quickly as possible. However, the
databases related to accidents are maintained separately by different organizations.
Thus, investigating the causes of accidents is often time-consuming. For example,
assume child A has broken her/his leg at school, but it is not clear whether the
accident was caused by defective equipment. In this case, information relating to A’s
injury, such as the patient’s name and type of injury, is stored in hospital database
S1. Information pertaining to A’s accident, such as their name and the location of the
swing at the school, is stored in database S2, which is held by the fire department.
Finally, information relating to the insurance claim following A’s accident, such as
the name and medical costs, is maintained in the insurance company’s database, S3.
Computing the intersection of these databases, S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S3, without compromising
privacy would enable us to combine the separate sets of information, which may
allow the cause of the accident to be identified. Let us consider another situation.
Several clinics, denoted as Pi , maintain separate databases, represented as Si . The
clinics wish to know the patients they have in common to enable them to share
treatment details; however, Pi should not be able to access any information about
patients not stored in their own dataset. In this case, the intersection of the set must
not reveal private information.
These examples illustrate the need for the Multiparty Private Set Intersection
(MPSI) protocol [1–4]. MPSI is executed by multiple parties who jointly compute
the intersection of their private datasets. Ultimately, only designated parties can
access this intersection. Previous protocols are impractical because the bulk of the
computation depends on the number of players. One previous study required the
size of the datasets maintained by the different players to be equal [1, 2]. Another
study [3] computed only the approximate number of intersections, whereas other
researchers [4] required more than two trusted third-parties.
In this section, we propose a practical MPSI with the following features:
1. The size of the datasets maintained by each party is independent of those main-
tained by the other parties.
2. The computational complexity for each party is independent of the number of
parties. This is accomplished by introducing an outsourcing provider, O. In fact, all
computations related to the number of parties are carried out byO. Thus, the number
of parties is irrelevant.
3.1.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we summarize the DDH assumption, Bloom filter, and ElGamal
encryption. We consider security according to the honest-but-curious model [5]: all
players act according to their prescribed actions in the protocol. A protocol that is
secure in an honest-but-curious model does not allow any player to gain information
about other players’ private input sets, besides that that can be deduced from the result
of the protocol. Note that the term adversary here refers to insiders, i.e., protocol
participants. Outsider adversaries are not considered. In fact, behavior by outsider
adversaries can be mitigated via standard network security techniques.
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Our protocol is based on the following security assumption.
Definition 3.1 (DDHAssumption) Let t be a security parameter.AdecisionalDiffie–
Hellman (DDH) parameter generator IG is a probabilistic polynomial time (ppt)
algorithm, a finite field Fp, and a basepoint g ∈ Fp with prime order q. We say
that IG satisfies the DDH assumption if |p1 − p2| is negligible (in κ) for all
ppt algorithms A, where p1 = Pr[(Fp, g) ← IG(1κ); y1 = gx1, y2 = gx2 ← Fp :
A(Fp, g, y1, y2, gx1x2) = 0] and p2 = Pr[(Fp, g) ← IG(1κ); y1 = gx1 , y2 = gx2 ,
z ← Fp : A(Fp, g, y1, y2, z) = 0].
A Bloom filter [6], denoted by BF, consists of m arrays and has a space-efficient
probabilistic data structure. The BF can check whether an element x is included in
a set S by encoding S with at most w elements. The encoded Bloom filter of S is
denoted by BF(S).
TheBF uses a set of k independent uniform hash functionsH = {H0, . . . , Hk−1},
where Hi : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} for 0 ≤ ∀i ≤ k − 1. The BF consists of
two functions: Const embeds a given set S into BF(S) and ElementCheck checks
whether an element x is included in S. SetCheck, an extension of ElementCheck,
checks whether an element x in S′ is in S′ ∩ S (see Algorithm 3.3). In Const (see
Algorithm 3.1), BF(S) is constructed for a given set S by first setting all bits in the
array to 0. To embed an element x ∈ S into the filter, the element is hashed using k
hash functions to obtain k index numbers, and the bits at these indexes are set to 1,
i.e., set BF[Hi (x)] = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. In ElementCheck (see Algorithm 3.2),
we check all locations where x is hashed; x is considered to be not in S if any bit at
these locations is 0; otherwise, x is probably in S.
Some false positive matches may occur, i.e., it is possible that all BF[Hi (y)]
are set to 1, but y is not in S. The false positive rate FPR is given by FPR ={
1 − (1 − 1m
)kw}k ≈ {1 − e−kw/m}k [7]. However, false negatives are not possible,
and so Bloom filters have a 100% recall rate.
Algorithm3.1Const(S)
Input: A set S
Output: A Bloom filter
BF(S)
1: for i = 0 to m − 1 do
2: BF(S)[i] ← 0
3: end for
4: for all x ∈ S do
5: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
6: j = Hi (x)
7: if BF(S)[ j] = 0
then









Output: 1 if x ∈ S and 0 if
x /∈ S
1: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
2: j = Hi (x)
3: if BF(S)[ j] = 0 then
4: output 0. stop.
5: end if
6: end for





Output: A set S∩(= S ∩ S′)
1: S∩ ← {}
2: for all x ∈ S′ do
3: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
4: j = Hi (x)
5: if BF[ j] = 0 then
6: go to next x .
7: end if
8: end for
9: add x to the set S∩
10: end for
11: output S∩. stop.
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Homomorphic encryption under addition is useful for processing encrypted data.
A typical homomorphic encryption under addition was proposed by Paillier [8].
However, because Paillier encryption cannot reduce the order of a composite group,
it is computationally expensive compared with the following ElGamal encryption.
Our protocol requires matching without revealing the original messages, for which
exponential ElGamal encryption (exElGamal) is sufficient [9]. In fact, the decrypted
results of exElGamal encryption can distinguish whether two messages m1 and m2
are equal, although the exElGamal scheme cannot decrypt messages itself. Further-
more, exElGamal can be used in (n, n)-threshold distributed decryption [10], where
the decryption must be performed by all players acting together. An exElGamal
encryption with (n, n)-threshold distributed decryption consists of three functions:
Key generation:
Let Fp be a finite field, g ∈ Fp, with prime order q. Each player Pi chooses xi ∈ Zq
at random and computes yi = gxi (mod p). Then, y = ∏ni=1 yi (mod p) is a public
key and each xi is a share for each player to decrypt a ciphertext.
Encryption: thrEnc[m] → (u, v)
Let m ∈ Z∗q be a message. Choose r ∈ Zq at random, and compute both u = gr
(mod p) and v = gm yr (mod p) for the input message m ∈ Zq and a public key y.
Output (u, v) as a ciphertext of m.
Decryption: thrDec[(u, v)] → gm
Each player Pi computes zi = uxi (mod p). All players then compute z = ∏ni=1 zi
(mod p) jointly.1 Finally, each player can decrypt the ciphertext as gm = v/z
(mod p).
ExElGamal encryption with (n, n)-threshold decryption has the following features:
(1) homomorphic under addition:Enc(m1)Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 + m2) formessages
m1,m2 ∈ Zp.
(2) homomorphic under scalar operations: Enc(m)k = Enc(km) for a message m
and k ∈ Zq .
3.1.3 Previous Work
This section summarizes prior works on PSI between a server and a client and MPSI
among n players. In PSI, let S = {s1, . . . , sv} and C = {c1, . . . , cw} be server and
client datasets, respectively, where |S| = v and |C | = w. In MPSI [1], we assume
that each player holds the same number of datasets.
PSI protocol based on polynomial representation: The main idea is to represent
the elements in C as the roots of a polynomial. The encrypted polynomial is sent
to the server, where it is evaluated on the elements in S, as originally proposed by
1The computational complexity of z for each player can be made independent of the number of
players in various ways. For example, set z = 1. P1 computes z = z · z1 and sends z to P2, P2
computes z = z · z2 and sends z to P3, and, finally, Pn computes z = z · zn and shares z among all
players. If we place all players in a binary tree, the communication complexity can be reduced, but
each player’s computational complexity is still independent of the number of players.
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Freedman [11]. This is secure against honest-but-curious adversaries under secure
public key encryption. The computational complexity is O(vw) exponentiations,
and the communication overhead is O(v + w). The computational complexity can
be reduced to O(v log logw) exponentiations using the balanced allocation technique
[12]. Kissner and Song extended this protocol to MPSI [1], which requires O(nw2)
exponentiations and O(nw) communication overhead. The MPSI version is secure
against honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries (in the random oracle model)
using generic zero-knowledge proofs.
PSI protocol based on DH-key agreement: The main objective here is to apply the
DH-key agreement protocol [13]: after representing the server and client datasets
as hash values {h(si )} and {h(ci )}, respectively, the client encrypts the dataset as
{h(ci )ri } using a random number ri and sends the encrypted set to the server. The
server encrypts the client set {h(ci )ri } and the server set {h(si )} using a random
number r , which gives {h(ci )rri } and {h(si )r }, respectively, and returns these sets
to the client. Finally, the client evaluates S ∩ C by decrypting to {h(ci )r }. This is
secure against honest-but-curious adversaries under the DDH assumption. The total
computational complexity is O(v + w) exponentiations, and the total communica-
tion overhead is O(v + w). The security of this approach can be enhanced against
malicious adversaries in the random oracle model [14] by using a blind signature.
However, no extensions toMPSI based on the DH-key agreement protocol have been
proposed.
PSI protocol based on BF: This protocol was originally proposed in [4]. As the
Bloom filter itself reveals information about the other player’s dataset, the set of
players is separated into two groups: input players who have datasets and privacy
players who perform private computations under shared secret information. In [15],
the privacy of each player’s dataset is protected by encrypting each array of theBloom
filter usingGoldwasser–Micali encryption [16]. In an honest-but-curious version, the
computational complexity isO(kw)hashoperations andO(m)public keyoperations,
and the communication overhead is O(m), where m and k are the number of arrays
and hash functions, respectively, used in the Bloom filter. The Bloom filter is used in
the Oblivious transfer extension [17, 18] and the newly constructed garbled Bloom
filter [19]. The main novelty in the garbled Bloom filter is that each array requires
λ bits rather than the single bit needed for the conventional Bloom filter. To embed
an element x ∈ S to a garbled Bloom filter, x is split into k shares with λ bits using
XOR-based secret sharing (x = x1⊕ · · ·⊕ xk). The xi are then mapped to an index
of Hi (x). An element y is queried by subjecting all bit strings at Hi (y) to an XOR
operation. If the result is y, then y is in S; otherwise, y is not in S. The client uses
a Bloom filter BF(C), and the server uses a garbled Bloom filter GBF(S). If x is
in C ∩ S, then for every position i it hashes to, BF(C)[i] must be 1 and GBF(S)[i]
must be xi . Thus, the client can compute C ∩ S. The computational complexity of
this method is O(kw) hash operations and O(m) public key operations, and the
communication overhead is O(m). The number of public key operations can be
changed toO(λ)using theOblivious transfer extension. This is secure against honest-
but-curious adversaries if the Oblivious transfer protocol is secure. Finally, some
researchers have computed the approximate number of multiparty set unions [3].
40 A. Kawachi et al.
3.1.4 Practical MPSI
This section presents a practical MPSI that is secure under the honest-but-curious
model.
3.1.4.1 Notation and Privacy Definition
In the remainder of this paper, the following notations are used.
• Pi : i th player, i = 1, . . . , n
• O: outsourcing provider with no knowledge of the inputs or outputs
• Si = {si,1, si,2, . . . , si,wi }: dataset held by Pi , where |Si | = ωi
• ∩Sj : intersection of all n players
• thrEnc and thrDec: (n, n)-threshold exElGamal encryption and decryption,
respectively
• m and k: number of arrays and hashes used in BF
•  = [, . . . , ] (1 ≤  ≤ n): an n-dimensional array, where all strings in the array
are set to 
• BF(Si ) = [BFi [0], . . . , BFi [m − 1]]: Bloom filter applied to a set Si
• IBF(∩Si ) = [∑ni=1 BFi [0], . . . ,
∑n
i=1 BFi [m − 1]]: integrated Bloom filter of n
sets {Si }, where∑ni=1 BFi [ j] is the sum of all players’ arrays
We introduce an outsourcing provider O to reduce the computational burden on
all players. The dealer has no information regarding the elements of any player’s set.
The privacy issues faced by MPSI with an outsourcing provider can be informally
written as follows.
Definition 3.2 (MPSI privacy) An MPSI scheme with an outsourcing provider O
is player-private if the following two conditions hold:
• Pi does not learn anything about the elements of other players’ datasets except for
the elements that Pi originally possesses.
• the outsourcing provider O does not learn anything about the elements of any
player’s set.
3.1.4.2 Proposed MPSI
Our MPSI comprises four phases: (i) initialization, (ii) Bloom filter construction and
the encryption of Pi data, (iii) the O’s randomization of thrEnc(IBF(∪Si ) − n), and
(iv) the computation of ∩Pi . The computation of ∩Pi consists of three steps: (a)
joint decryption of an (n, n)-threshold exElGamal among n players, (b) Bloom filter
check, and (c) output intersection.
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of our protocol after the initialization phase. The
system parameters of a finite field Fp and a basepoint g ∈ Fp with order q for an
3 Secure Primitive for Big Data Utilization 41
Fig. 3.1 Overview of our MPSI
(n, n)-threshold exElGamal encryption (thrEnc, thrDec) are provided to both Pi
and O. For the Bloom filter, Const(S) and SetCheck(BF, S′) are only provided to
Pi , where the array size is m and k independent hash functions are used.
To encrypt, randomize, or subtract a vector such as a Bloom filter BF = [a0, . . . ,
am−1], each location is encrypted, randomized, or subtracted independently:
thrEnc(BF) = [thrEnc(a0), . . . , thrEnc(am−1)],
rBF = [r0a0, . . . , rm−1am−1], or
BF − r = [a0 − r0, . . . , am−1 − rm−1]
for r = [r0, . . . , rm−1] ∈ Zmq .
Our protocol proceeds as follows.
Initialization:
1. Pi generates xi ∈ Zq , computes yi = gxi ∈ Zq , and publishes yi to the other play-
ers as a public key, where the corresponding secret key is xi .
2. Pi computes y = ∏i yi , where y is the n-player public key. Note that no
player knows the corresponding secret key x = ∑ xi before executing the joint
decryption.
Construction and encryption of BF(Si ) − 1:
1. Pi executesConst(Si ) −→ BF(Si ) = [BFi [0], . . . , BFi [m − 1]] (Algorithm3.1).
2. Pi encrypts BF(Si ) − 1 using thrEncy :
thrEncy(BF(Si ) − 1) = [thrEncy(BFi [0] − 1), . . . , thrEncy(BFi [m − 1] − 1)],
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where y is an n-player public key.
3. Pi sends thrEncy(BF(Si ) − 1) to O.
Randomization of thrEnc(IBF(∩Si ) − n):
1. O encrypts IBF(∩Si ) − n without knowing IBF(∩Si ) using an additive homo-
morphic feature and multiplying by thrEncy(BF(Si ) − 1) as follows:
thrEncy(IBF(∩Si ) − n) =
n∏
i=1
thrEncy(BF(Si ) − 1).
2. O randomizes thrEncy(IBF(∩Si ) − n) by r = [r0, . . . , rm−1] ∈ Zmq :
thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − n)) = (thrEncy(IBF(∪Si ) − n))r.
3. O broadcasts thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − n)) to Pi .
Computation of ∩Si :
1. All players decrypt thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − n)) jointly.
2. Pi computes SetCheck(r(IBF(∩Si ) − n), Si ) and obtains ∩Si .
The above protocol satisfies the correctness requirement. This is because each array
position of thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − n)) is decrypted to 1, where x ∈ ∩Si is embedded
by each hash function; however, each array position for which x /∈ ∩Si is embedded
by each hash function is decrypted to a random value.
3.1.4.3 Security Proof
The security of our MPSI protocol is as follows.
Theorem 3.1 For any coalition of fewer than n players, the MPSI is player-private
against an honest-but-curious adversary under the DDH assumption.
Proof The views of Pi and O, that is,
thrEncy(BFm,k(Si )) = [thrEncy(BFi [0]), . . . , thrEncy(BFi [m − 1])],
are shown to be indistinguishable from a random vector r = [r0, . . . , rm−1] ∈ Zmq .
Assume that a polynomial-time distinguisher D outputs 0 when the views are pre-
sented as a random vector and outputs 1 when they are constructed in MPSI,
thrEnc(BFi [0]), . . . , thrEnc(BFi [m − 1]). We show that a simulator SIM that
solves the DDH assumption can be constructed as follows.
Upon receiving a DDH challenge (g, gα, gβ, gγ), SIM executes the following:
1. Set n-player public key y = gβ and choose random numbers d0, . . . , dm−1 and
r1, . . . , rm−1 from Zq .
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2. Send [(gα, gd0 · gγ), ((gα)r1 , gd1 · (gγ)r1), . . . , ((gα)rm−1 , gdm−1 · (gγ)rm−1)] as
thrEncy(BFm,k(Si )) toD.
If (g, gα, gβ, gγ) is a DH-key-agreement-protocol element, i.e., γ = αβ, then
thrEncy(BFm,k(Si )) is distributed in the same way as when constructed by the
MPSI scheme. Thus, D must output 1. If (g, gα, gβ, gγ) is not a DH tuple, then
thrEncy(BFm,k(Si )) is randomly distributed, andD has to output 0. Therefore, SIM
can use the output of D to respond to the DDH challenge correctly. Therefore, D
can answer correctly with negligible advantage over random guessing. Furthermore,
as all inputs of each player are encrypted until the decryption is performed, and
decryption cannot be performed by fewer than n players, nothing can be learned by
any player prior to decryption.
As for the views of thrEncy(r(IBFm,k(∩Si ) − n)), the same argument holds.
Therefore, for any coalition of fewer than n players, MPSI is player-private under
the honest-but-curious model.
Next, we present d-and-over MPSI. The procedures of d-and-over MPSI are the
same as those of MPSI until O computes thrEncy(IBF(∩Si )). Thus, we describe the
procedure after O computes thrEncy(IBF(∩Si )).
Encryption of -subtraction of IBF(∩Si ): O executes the following:
1. Encrypt IBF(∩Si ) −  randomized by r = [r0, . . . , rm−1] ∈ Zmq (d ≤  ≤ n):
thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − )) = (thrEncy(IBF(∩Si )) · thrEncy(−))r.
2. Broadcast {thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − ))} (d ≤  ≤ n) to Pi .
d-and-over MPSI computation: Pi executes the following:
1. All Pi jointly decrypt {thrEncy(r(IBF(∩Si ) − ))}.
2. Let CBF be an m-array for d ≤  ≤ n, where an array is set to 1 if and only if
the corresponding array of rIBF(∩Si ) −  is 1, and others are set to 0.
3. Set CBF = CBF ∨ · · · ∨ CBFn .
4. Execute SetCheckm,k(CBF, Si ) −→ ∩≥d S[i] and output ∩≥d S[i].
The correctness of d-and-overMPSI follows from the fact that if an element x ∈ ∩S
for d ≤ ∃ ≤ n, the corresponding array locations in IBF(∩Si ) − j for  ≤ ∃ j ≤ n,
where x is mapped by k hashes, are an encryption of 0, which are decrypted to 1;
otherwise, it is an encryption of randomized value.
3.1.5 Efficiency
Although many PSI protocols have been proposed, to the best of our knowledge,
relatively few consider the multiparty scenario [1–4]. Our target is multiparty private
set intersection, and the final result must be obtained by all players acting together,
without a trusted third-party (TTP). Among previous MPSI protocols, the approach
in [3] computes only the approximate number of intersections, and that in [4] requires
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Table 3.1 Efficiency of [1] and the proposed protocol
[1] Ours
Computational complexity O(nω2) Pi : O(ωi ), O : O(nω)
Communication overhead O(nω) Pi : O(ω + n), O : O(nω)
Restriction on set size |S1| = · · · = |Sn | None
Protected values Si (∀i ∈ [1, n]) Si , |Si |(∀i ∈ [1, n])
more than two TTPs. In contrast, [2] follows almost the same method as [1] and thus
has a similar complexity. The only difference exists in the security model. Hence,
we only compare our scheme with that of [1].
The computational and communication efficiency of the proposed protocol and [1]
are compared in Table3.1. These approaches are secure against honest-but-curious
adversaries without a TTP under exElGamal encryption (DDH security) and Paillier
encryption (DecisionalCompositeResidue (DCR) security), respectively.TheBloom
filter parameters (m, k) used in our protocol are set as follows: k = 80 and m =
80ω/ ln 2, whereω is themaximum |Si | = ωi . Then, the probability of false positives
is given by p = 2−80.
Our MPSI uses the Bloom filter for the computations performed by Pi and the
integrations performed by the O. The use of a Bloom filter eliminates the restriction
on set size. Thus, in our MPSI, the set size of each player is flexible. However, Pi ’s
computations consist of Bloom filter construction, joint decryption, and Bloom filter
check. Neither the computations related to the Bloom filter nor the joint decryption
depends on the number of players, as shown in Sect. 3.1.2. In summary, the computa-
tional complexity of operations performed byPi is O(ωi ). All player-dependent data
are sent to O, who integrates ∏ni=1 thrEncy(IBF(∩Si )) without decryption. There-
fore, the computational complexity of operations performed by O is O(nω).
3.1.6 System and Performance
PSI or MPSI implicitly assumes that every attendee can provide data, any attendee
can retrieve data from the shared data, and all attendees can communicate with
each other. If PSI or MPSI is implemented straightforwardly, such implementation
should become a system like a peer-to-peer (P2P) network system. Although a fully
distributed system like P2P network has attractive features, such as high availability
and scalability, it incurs some unfavorable features.
The network address and port translation (NAPT) is a major obstacle for P2P
network systems. Modern P2P network systems take advantage of NAPT traversal
technologies to overcome NAPT, but it should be costly to make the architecture
complex. The absence of trusted node is also an obstacle for attendee or group
management. Making consensus on a P2P network system is difficult or highly
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Fig. 3.2 P2P and client server model
costly. Additionally, unpredictable node joining and leaving are reasons that make
the P2P network systems complex. To avoid the complexities of P2P networks, we
designed a system based on the client server model.
Then, we discuss the design of PSI or MPSI’s client server model. There are 2
main functionalities of PSI or MPSI: (1) First, the data sharing is a functionality for
sharing data among attendees. (2) Next, the data retrieving from the shared data is
a functionality. Any attendee can retrieve data from the shared data, but the retriev-
ing avoids correcting privacy sensitive data by using privacy preserving techniques
described above.
However, we do not assume that every attendee provides and retrieves data. Imag-
ine that an incident analysis situation in which data are provided by several orga-
nizations which employ labor and operate some machines, and a research institute
collects data from the organizations and analyzes it. In such a situation, data providers
do not need the data retrieving functionality, and data analysts do not need the data
sharing functionality.
Therefore, we define 3 roles for our MPSI application design as follows.
• Parties: entities for data providing
• Clients: entities for data retrieving
• Dealer: an entity for forwarding requests between parties and clients
From the perspective of privilege separation, defining and separating roles are signif-
icant. Figure3.2 shows a P2P network model and our client server model. As show in
this figure, every P2P network node is connected to each other and can provide and
retrieve data, but parties only provide data and clients only retrieve data in the client
server model. The dealer forwards requests from parties and clients and provides
other functionalities that are not specified by PSI or MPSI. For example, attendee or
group management, user authentication, and data logging should be performed by
the dealer.
Figure3.3 shows an example sequence diagram of our MPSI application. In this
figure, there are 2 parties, 1 client, and 1 dealer. First of all, parties 1 and 2 join
the dealer (join p1 and p2). A party must join before providing data, and it must be
performed only once at initialization. After that, the client sends a request of data
retrieval to the dealer (cl req), and parties send a request to confirmwhether the dealer
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Fig. 3.3 Sequence diagram of MSPI application
Fig. 3.4 Performance
received data retrieval requests by clients (new-req p1 and p2). Then, the parties and
the dealer generate keys, share the keys, encrypt data, and decrypt data (gpk p1 and
p2, enc p1 and p2, and dec p1 and p2). Finally, the client gets the result from the
dealer.
We measured performance of our MPSI application written in Python language
on an Amazon’s EC2 server (2.4GHz CPU, 1GB Memory). Figure3.4 shows the
results when there are from2 to 4 parties which provide data including 10,000 entries.
The results show that it takes approximately 280s to accomplish data retrieval and
that the computational amount does not depend on the number of parties.
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3.2 Classification
In this section, we present a secure classification protocol, a type of secure computa-
tion protocols. We assume two participants Alice and Bob of the protocol. Alice has
private data x , and Bob has a classification model C . The task is that Alice learns
C(x) at the end of the protocol while preserving the privacy of x and C . That is,
Alice can learn only C(x) and Bob can learn nothing. Our construction is based on
a code-based public-key encryption scheme called HQC [20], which is a candidate
of NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization [21].
3.2.1 Error-Correcting Code
We start with several fundamental notions for error-correcting codes.
Definition 3.3 (Linear code) A code C such that c1 + c2 ∈ C always holds for any
codeword c1, c2 ∈ C is called a linear code. The code C of code length n and infor-
mation bit number k is described as “a” code.
Definition 3.4 (Generation matrix) For matrices G ∈ Fk×n ,G that satisfy
C = {m · G|m ∈ Fk} (3.1)
is called a generator matrix. The generator matrix is the basis of linear codes and
generates all codewords.
Definition 3.5 (Parity check matrix) For a matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×n , H that satisfies
C = {x ∈ Fn|H · x = 0} (3.2)
is called a parity check matrix.
Definition 3.6 (Cyclic matrix) When x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn , the circulant matrix




x1 xn · · · x2









In addition, the multiplication of two polynomials x, y has the following
properties:
x · y = x × rot( y)
= (rot(x) × y)
= y × rot(x)
= y · x.
(3.4)
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Definition 3.7 (Cyclic shift) The operation of shifting (c0, . . . , cn−1) to the right by
one position with respect to n-dimensional vector ci (i = 0, . . . , n − 2) and moving
cn−1 to the beginning of the vector is called cyclic shift. That is, for any n dimensional
vector (c0, . . . , cn−1), it is a mapping σ : (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1) → (cn−1, c0, . . . , cn−2).
Definition 3.8 (Quasi-cyclic code) Let c = (c0, . . . , cs−1) ∈ (Fn2)s be an arbitrary
codeword of codeC and let σ be a cyclic shift operation. If (σ(c0), . . . ,σ(cs−1) ∈ C,
C is called the s-quasi-cyclic code. In particular, when s = 1, C is called a cyclic
code.
Definition 3.9 (Systematic quasi-cyclic code) An s-quasi-cyclic [sn, n] code is








0 · · · In As−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (3.5)
Here, A1, . . . , As−1 is an n × n circulant matrix.
3.2.2 Security Assumptions
As mentioned above, the security of the public-key cryptosystem HQC is based on
the computational difficulty of the quasi cyclic syndrome decoding problem. More
specifically, its security is provedunder the followingquasi cyclic syndromedecoding
decision assumptions.
Definition 3.10 (quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding assumption) The quasi-cyclic
syndrome decoding decision problem of a s-quasi-cyclic code in which n and w are
integers and the number of blocks is s ≥ 2 is (H, y) when the parity check matrix
H
$←− F(sn−n)×sn and the matrix y $←− Fsn−n of random systematic quasi-cyclic
code are given, every efficient algorithm distinguish only with negligible probability
whether it is quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding distribution or the uniform distribution
over F(sn−n)×sn × F(sn−n).
As will be described later, since the security of the secure computation protocol
proposed in this section is reduced to the security of HQC, the secure computation
protocol of this section is proved to be secure under this assumption as well as under
HQC.
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3.2.3 Security Requirements for 2PC
Secure two-party computation is a subproblem of multi-party secure computation.
The studies have been conducted by many researchers since it is closely related to
many cryptographic protocols. The purpose of 2PC is to construct a general-purpose
protocol so that arbitrary functions can be jointly computed without sharing the input
values of the two parties with the other. One of the best-known examples of 2PCs is
the millionaire problem [22] in Yao, where Alice and Bob do not reveal their money
and decide who is richer. Specifically, suppose that Alice has a yen, and Bob has b
yen. The problem is to decide whether a ≥ b or not while keeping each other secret.
Generally speaking, the security requirement of 2PC is that the computation of any
function is performed using a protocol without leaking the two inputs to the other,
and only the computation result is known.
A two-party linear function evaluation is a kind of 2PC that satisfies the 2PC
security requirements. In otherwords, the participants perform the evaluationwithout
notifying the other party of their input. In addition, the function of the protocol is
the evaluation of linear functions. Specifically, linear function secure computation
protocol computes f (m) = a · m + b. The participants in the protocol are called
Alice and Bob. Alice’s input ism, and Bob’s input is linear function parameters a, b.
Alice gets only the result of f (m) = a · m + b through the protocol, and Bob gets
nothing.
Below we define the security requirements for two-party linear function secure
computation.
Definition 3.11 (Security against semi-honest adversaries) Let f = ( f A, fB) be
the function that maps the input x of Alice(A) and the input y of Bob(B) to
f A(x, y), fB(x, y). A aims to obtain f A(x, y) and B aims to obtain fB(x, y).
Let f = ( f A, fB) be a function of probabilistic polynomial time, and π be a
two-way protocol for computing function f . Let the view of A with (x, y) exe-
cution π(x, y) and the security parameter n be viewπA(x, y, n) and the view of
B be viewπB(x, y, n). The output of A is output
π
A(x, y, n) and the output of B is
outputπB(x, y, n). In addition, the joint output of the two is denoted as output
π
(x, y, n) = (outputπA(x, y, n), outputπB(x, y, n)).
For semi-honest adversaries, we say that the protocol π(x, y) can securely com-
pute the function f if there are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms SA and SB
that satisfy the following equations. For any x, y that satisfy |x | = |y| = n, n ∈ N,
the following holds:
{(SA(1n, x, f A(x, y)), f (x, y))}x,y,n
c≡{(viewπA(x, y, n), outputπ(x, y, n))}x,y,n,
{(SB(1n, x, fB(x, y)), f (x, y))}x,y,n
c≡{(viewπB(x, y, n), outputπ(x, y, n))}x,y,n .
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3.2.4 HQC Encryption Scheme
The protocols proposed in this section are based on the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic
cryptosystem of Gaborit et al. First, we introduce the cryptosystem proposed by
Gaborit et al. [20], which is a public key cryptosystem based on the quasi-cyclic
syndrome decoding problem. In this cryptosystem, two kinds of codes quasi-cyclic
code and error-correcting codeC are used. The error-correcting codeC is an arbitrary
linear code (such as a BCH code) used for message encoding and decoding and
with sufficient error correction capability. A quasi-cyclic code is used for a security
requirement of this public key cryptosystem to generate noise that an adversary
cannot decrypt.
The participants of the HQC cryptosystem are Alice (A) and Bob (B), and B
aims to send the input message m securely to A. The cryptosystem is performed as
follows:
1. Global parameter settings:




A generates random h
$←− R.
Furthermore, (x, y)
$←− R2 is generated, and the Hamming weight of x, y is wx .
Secret information sk = (x, y) Public information pk = (h, s = x + h · y). A
sends public information pk to B.
3. Encryption:
B generates a random e
$←− R, (r1, r2) $←− R2.
The Hamming weight of e is we, and the Hamming weight of r1 and r2 is wr .
Then,we compute u = r1 + h · r2 and v = m · G + s · r2 + e on inputm. B sends
the ciphertext u, v back to A.
4. Decryption:
A uses the decoding function C.Decode(v − u · y) of the error-correcting code
C to recover the message m of B.
In theHQCcryptosystem, public information s is added to themessagem encoded
by the error-correcting code when it is encrypted. Since s is noise with a large
Hamming weight generated by the quasi-cyclic code, security is guaranteed by the
quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding decision assumption introduced above. In addition,
A can use the secret key for the encrypted error-protected ciphertext in the decryp-
tion stage, and can remove a large amount of noise from s. However, some noise of
x · r2 − r1 · y + e remains. If the weight of this noise is smaller than the maximum
number of correctable errors δ of the error-correcting code, correct decoding is pos-
sible. Hamming weights w,wr ,we = O(√n) are assumed and analyzed. Moreover,
the conclusion that the probability of becoming ω(x · r2 + e − y · r1) ≤ δ increases
as the code space n becomes larger is shown in the paper of Gaborit et al. In addi-
tion, the HQC cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure under the quasi-cyclic syndrome
decoding decision assumption.
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3.2.5 Proposed Protocol
3.2.5.1 Linear Function Evaluation
We introduce the secure evaluation protocol of the linear functions between two
parties.
We use two codes, quasi-cyclic code and arbitrary error-correcting code C, based
on Gaborit’s HQC cryptosystem. The participants in the protocol are Alice (A) and
Bob (B). A’s input is m ∈ F2, B’s input is a, b ∈ F2, B’s output is nothing, and A’s
output is a · m + b. The protocol is given in Protocol 3.2.5.1.
Protocol Linear function evaluation protocol
input A: m ∈ F2
B: a, b ∈ F2
output A: a · m + b
B: ⊥
1. Global parameter param = (n, k, δ,wx ,wr ,we) and the sign C generation matrix
G ∈ Fk×n are chosen.
2. A generates the random h
$←− R. Furthermore, (x, y $←− R2) is generated, and
the Hamming weight of x and y is w. Secret information sk = (x, y), Public
information pk = (h, s = x + h · y).
3. By padding the input m with 0, A makes m = (m, 0, . . . , 0) of dimension k. A
generates a random rA, ru, rv
$←− R. Here, the Hamming weight of rA, ru, rv
is wr . Then, we compute (u = h · rA + ru, v = m · G + s · rA + rv). A sends
public information h, s and ciphertext pair u, v to B.
4. Let B be b = (b, 0, . . . , 0). Generate rB $←− R and (eu, ev) $←− R2. Here, the
Hamming weight of rB is wr , and the Hamming weight of eu and ev is we. B
computes u′ = a · u + h · rB + eu and v′ = a · v + b · G + s · rB + ev. B sends
u′, v′ back to A.
5. A usesC. Decode(v′ − u′ · y) to decode the error-correcting codeC, and recovers
a · m + b by taking the first bit of the result.
First, we set global parameters. n is the code length of the code, k is the number
of information bits, δ is the maximum number of correctable errors in the error-
correcting code, and wx ,wr ,we are Hamming weights set in advance. For example,
it is half the weight of O(√n) assumed by Gaborit et al. The public parameterG is a
generator matrix of error-correcting code C, which maps messages and codewords
as Fk2 → Fn2.
A generates random h
$←− R and (x, y) $←− R2 and computes s = x + h · y.
Here,
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s = x + h· y
= x + y·rot(h)
= (x y)(In rot(h)).
(3.6)
It can be converted to and can be reduced to the quasi cyclic syndrome decoding
problem. Then, A sets secret information sk as (x, y) and public information pk as
(h, s).
A pads the input m with 0, making m = (m, 0, . . . , 0) with dimension k. A gen-
erates rA, ru, rv
$←− R, encodes the value of m with an error-correcting code, and
re-randomizes it. A generates a ciphertext pair of (u = h · rA + ru, v = m · G +
s · rA + rv) and send it to B. As for B, v has a noise s that cannot be decoded, and
has no secret information that can be removed, so B cannot learn m.
B sets b = (b, 0, . . . , 0) andgenerates rB $←− R and (eu, ev) $←− R2.Bproduces
u′ = a · u + h · rB + eu, v′ = a · v + b · G + s · rB + ev and re-randomize u and v




h · rB + eu (In the case of a = 0)
u + h · rB + eu (In the case of a = 1). (3.7)
v′ =
{
b · G + s · rB + ev (In the case of a = 0)
v + b · G + s · rB + ev (In the case of a = 1). (3.8)
Finally, A uses his secret information to decrypt v′ − u′ · y. The result is
v′ − u′ · y




bG + xrB − yeu + ev (in the case of a = 0)
(m + b)G + x(rA + rB) − y(ru + eu) + (rv + ev)
(in the case of a = 1).
(3.9)
As shown by the Eq. (3.9), the result of v′ − u′ · y is the result of removing h
and s. Taking the first bit makes a · m + b available to A.
3.2.5.2 Correctness and Security of the Proposed Protocol
The correctness of the two-way linear function evaluation protocol proposed in this
study obviously depends on the decoding ability of the codeC. Specifically, assuming
that C. Decode decodes v − u · y correctly, the following equation is satisfied:
Decrypt(sk,Encrypt(pk, a · m + b)) = a · m + b. (3.10)
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xrB − yeu + ev (In the case of a = 0)
x(rA + rB) − y(ru + eu) + (rv + ev)
(In the case of a = 1)
(3.11)
for the error correction capability of the code C. In the paper of Gaborit et al.,
C.Decode can work correctly when ω(x · r2 + e − y · r1) ≤ δ is satisfied, and wr
and we have the same value when actually evaluated. If the Hamming weight of
r0, r1, ru, rv, rB of the protocol proposed in this section is set to 1/2 ofwr of Gaborit
et al., then, the Hamming weight of eu, ev is set to 1/2 of we of Gaborit et al. The
Hamming weight of the error Eq. (3.11) is less than or equal to the Hamming weight
of errors inGaborit et al.’s setting. Therefore, the conclusion of the paper ofGaborit et
al. also holds for the proposed protocol. As the code length n increases, the decoding
failure rate of the error-correcting code decreases. If the appropriate code space size
n and noise Hammingweightswr andwe are set, the decoding failure rate approaches
0.
The security requirements of the proposed protocol are described above. In this
section, we prove the security against semi-honest adversaries.
Theorem 3.2 Under the quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding assumption, the 2PC pro-
tocol securely computes linear functions for semi-honest adversaries.
Proof First, consider the semi-honest adversary A. With the global parameter omit-
ted, the view of A is viewA = (m; h, x, y, r0, r1, ru, rv; u′, v′). We construct a
simulator SA(m, x, y) as follows:
1. Generate ˜h, r̃0, r̃A, r̃u, r̃v, ˜u′, ˜v′
$←− R randomly.
Here, the Hamming weight of r̃A, r̃u, r̃v is wr .
2. Output (m, x, y; ˜h, r̃A, r̃u, r̃v; ˜u′, ˜v′).
Since, h, rA, ru, rv and ˜h, r̃A, r̃u, r̃v follow the same distribution, the following
equation holds:
(m, x, y; ˜h, r̃A, r̃u, r̃v; ˜u′, ˜v′)
≡s (m, x, y; h, rA, ru, rv; ˜u′, ˜v′).
(3.12)
At viewA, u′ = a · u + h · rB + eu, v′ = a · v + b · G + s · rB + ev, and it holds
[
h · rB + eu













Therefore, the adversary of probabilistic polynomial time cannot distinguish
between (h · rB + eu, s · rB + ev) and uniform random numbers under the assump-
tion of 3-quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding of quasi-cyclic code. Since u and v are
also under the 3-quasicyclic syndrome decoding decision assumption, they cannot
distinguish between u and v and uniform random numbers. Thus, the distribution
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of u′ and v′ also approaches uniform random numbers and satisfies the following
equation:
(m, x, y; h, rA, ru, rv, ˜u′, ˜v′)
≡c (m, x, y; h, rA, ru, rv, u′, v′).
(3.14)
Thus, the distributions of the view viewA of A and the simulator SA are indistin-
guishable against polynomial-time adversaries:
SA(m, x, y)
≡c viewA(m, x, y; h, rA, ru, rv; u′, v′). (3.15)
Next, consider the semi-honest adversary B. With the global parameter omit-
ted, the view of B is viewB = (a, b; h, s, u, v, rB, eu, ev). Configure the simulator
SB(a, b) as follows:
1. Randomly generate ˜h, s̃, ũ, ṽ, r̃B, ẽu, ẽv
$←− R. Here, the Hamming weight of
r̃B is wr , and the Hamming weight of ẽu and ẽv is we
2. Output (a, b; ˜h, s̃, ũ, ṽ, r̃B, ẽu, ẽv).
Since, h, rB, ru, rv and ˜h, r̃B, r̃u, r̃v follow the same distribution, the following
equation holds:
(a, b; ˜h, s̃, ũ, ṽ, r̃B, ẽu, ẽv)
≡s (a, b; h, s̃, ũ, ṽ, rB, eu, ev).
(3.16)
Note that s can be reduced to 2-cyclic syndrome decoding decision, and the
distribution cannot be distinguished from uniform random numbers for the adversary
in polynomial time. Therefore, the following equation is satisfied.
(a, b; h, s̃, ũ, ṽ, rB, eu, ev)
≡c (a, b; h, s, ũ, ṽ, rB, eu, ev). (3.17)
Moreover, since u and v are indistinguishable between (h · rB + eu, s · rB + ev)
and uniform random numbers based on the assumption of quasi-cyclic syndrome
decoding and the adversary of probabilistic polynomial time cannot be distinguished,
the following holds:
(a, b; h, s, ũ, ṽ, rB, eu, ev)
≡c (a, b; h, s, u, v, rB, eu, ev). (3.18)
Therefore, the distributions of the view viewB of B and the simulator SB cannot
be distinguished against the adversary of polynomial time:
SB(a, b)
≡c viewB(a, b; h, s, u, v, rB, eu, ev). (3.19)

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The above protocol works over F2, but one can see that this can be easily extended
to a larger field Fq by using appropriate error-correcting linear codes over Fq .
3.2.5.3 Secure Comparison
Two-party secure comparison protocol proposed in this section is based on the size
comparison method used in the secure decision tree classification protocol of Wu et
al. [23]. In this section, we used the following criteria given in Proposition 3.1 for
comparison.
Proposition 3.1 For a t-bit x, y, if there is an i ∈ [t] such that the following expres-
sion holds, then x < y.
xi − yi + 1 + 3
∑
j<i
(x j ⊕ y j ) = 0.
In this section, we introduce the proposed protocol for two-party secret com-
parison protocol. The proposed protocol for two-party secret comparison protocol
uses a quasi-cyclic code and an arbitrary error-correcting code (For example, Reed-
Solomon code) on Fq . The participants in the protocol are Alice (A) and Bob (B).
The input of A is c ∈ N, and the input of B is d ∈ N. The output of A is the result of
the comparison between c and d, and the output of B is none.
The flow of two-party secret comparison is shown as follows:
Protocol Two-party secret comparison protocol
Input A : c ∈ N
B : d ∈ N
Output A : Comparison result of c and d
B : ⊥
1. A and B perform binary expansion of c and d for each input so that c =
c1c2 . . . cl , d = d1d2 . . . dl . Then, each bit ci , di is padded to make ci, di , i ∈ [l]
of k bits. In addition, they set the global parameter param = (n, k, δ,wx ,wr ) and
the generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nq of code C.
2. Agenerates random h
$←− R. Furthermore, (x, y $←− R2)withHammingweight
wx is generated. Private key sk = (x, y), and public key pk = (h, s = x + h · y).
3. Agenerates a random rAi , rui , rvi
$←− R, i ∈ [l]withHammingweightwr . Then,
A computes ui = h · rAi + rui and vi = ci · G + s · rAi + rvi for l pairs and
sends l pairs of ciphertext ui, vi to B.
4. B generates (rBi , eui , evi )
$←− R3 with Hamming weight w∗r and computes
the expression ci − di + 1 + 3∑w<i (cw ⊕ dw) for ci . Specifically, B substitutes
plaintext di for i ∈ [l] in the above formula and sets appropriate a1i , a2i , . . . , ali ,
bi . B computes ui ′ = a1i · u1 + · · · + h · rBi + eui and vi ′ = a1i · v1 + · · · + bi ·
G + s · rBi + evi for l pairs. Then, the order of (ui ′, vi ′) of l pairs is randomly
replaced and sent to A in a random order.
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5. A computes vi ′ − ui ′ · y for each i ∈ [l] and decrypts the result. If there is 0 in
the first bit of the decoded results, c < d is output. Conversely, if there is no 0,
c ≥ d is output.
Protocol Description
1. In step 1, A and B expand c and d of each input to l-bit binary input, so that
c = c1c2 . . . cl and d = d1d2 . . . dl . Where ci , di , i ∈ [l] is the i th digit of c, d,
and l is the bit length. To encode, pad each input to ci, di , i ∈ [l] with bit length
k.
In addition, set global parameters. n is the code length, k is the number of infor-
mation bits, δ is the maximum number of errors that can be corrected by the
error-correcting code, and wx and wr are the Hamming weights set in advance.
The public parameter G is the generator matrix(For example, the Reed-Solomon
code generator matrix) of the error-correcting code C, which maps the message
and code length as Fkq → Fnq .
2. In step 2, A generates a private key and public key for HQC encryption scheme.
3. In step3,Auses the public key and encrypts eachof the ci pieces. Send (ui , vi ), i ∈
[l] of the encrypted result to B.
4. Step 4 uses Proposition 3.1 for the evaluation of ci − di + 1 + 3∑w<i (cw ⊕ dw).
In other words, c < d if i ∈ [l] exists such that
ci − di + 1 + 3
∑
w<i
(cw ⊕ dw) = 0. (3.20)
In particular, since B has plaintext di and encrypted ci , Eq. (3.20) can be regarded
as an equation with ci as an unknown and can be computed. In addition, for XOR
operations, B can transform xi ⊕ yi into
xi ⊕ yi =
{
xi (yi = 0)
1 − xi (yi = 1). (3.21)
Therefore, the XOR operation requires only the additive homomorphism of HQC
encryption scheme.
That is, B substitutes plaintext di , i ∈ [l] into the above equation, sets the appro-
priate a1i , a2i , . . . , ali , bi , and computes as follows:
ui ′ = a1i ·u1+· · ·+ali ·ul+h·rBi +eui . (3.22)
vi ′ = a1i ·v1+· · ·+ali ·vl+bi ·G+s·rBi +evi . (3.23)
Here, the Hamming weight of rBi , eui , evi , i ∈ [l] is w∗r .
Furthermore, to not leak the information about which bits are different to A, B
needs to replace the order of each (ui ′, vi ′) computed at random.
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5. In step 5, A computes vi ′ − ui ′ · y, i ∈ [l]. The result is
vi ′ − ui ′ · y
= (a1i · m1 + · · · + ali · ml) · G
+ x · (a1i · rA1 + · · · + ali · rAl + rBi )
− y · (a1i · ru1 + · · · + ali · rul + eui )
+ (a1i · rv1 + · · · + ali · rvl + evi ).
(3.24)
Then, the evaluation result is decoded by the error-correcting code. A takes out
the first 1 bit of each of l decoding results, and outputs c < d if there is 0 in it. If
there is no 0, c ≥ d is output.
3.2.5.4 Correctness and Security of the Proposed Protocol
Correctness
First, we explain step 4 w∗r . The Hamming weight of the polynomial coefficient
vector x, y is wx , and the Hamming weight of rAi, rui, rvi , i ∈ [l] is wr . Since each
is selected uniformly and independently, the probability of each bit value of the vector
is expressed as follows:
xi = yi =
{
0 w.p. 1 − p
1 w.p. p = wxn .
(3.25)
Similarly,
rAi, j = rui, j = rvi, j =
{
0 w.p. 1 − pr
1 w.p. pr = wrn .
(3.26)
Let L be the set of a1i , a2i , . . . , ali = 0 in each a1i · rA1 + a2i · rA2 + · · · + ali ·
rAl for the expression i ∈ [l].
L = {aki |aki = 0}
Let |L| be the number of elements in set L . Set the Hamming weights w∗r for
rBi, eui, evi be as follows:
w∗r = (n − |L| + 1)wr .
Thus, the value of each w∗r can be determined based on the nonzero numbers in
ai and i ∈ [l].
Next, we analyze the validity of the proposed protocol.
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The legitimacy of the proposed bilateral linear function secure computation pro-
tocol clearly depends on the decoding ability of C. Set the v′ − u′ · y error to ε. For
the error correction capability of code C, the error is
ε = x · (a1i · rA1 + · · · + ali · rAl + rBi )
− y · (a1i · ru1 + · · · + ali · rul + eui )
+ (a1i · rv1 + · · · + ali · rvl + evi ).
(3.27)
In other words, if ε < δ, decoding is successful. Here, δ is the maximum number
of errors that can be corrected by error-correcting code C. In addition, in order to
analyze the validity of the proposed protocol, we generalize the validity of the HQC
encryption scheme proved by Gaborit et al. [20].
The following proposition holds for the Hamming weight of the error.
Proposition 3.2 There are polynomial coefficient vectors x = (X1, . . . , Xn) and
r = (R1, . . . , Rn), and y = x · r = (Y1, . . . ,Yn). The probability that the sum of
the random variables Yi , i ∈ [n] on Fq is 0 is
Pr[Y1 + · · · + Yn = 0] = 1
q
{1 + (1 − q
q − 1 p)
n · (q − 1)}. (3.28)




0 w.p. p0 = 1 − p
1 w.p. p1 = pq−1
2 w.p. p1 = pq−1
...
q − 1 w.p. p1 = pq−1 .
(3.29)
Proof For Yi , the following equation holds:







i0! · · · iq−1!
)
pi00 · · · piq−1q−1, (3.30)
where i0, . . . , iq−1 is the number of times the corresponding 0, . . . , q − 1 appears.
From the polynomial theorem, the following equation holds:
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{p0+ p1+. . .+ pq−1}n + {p0+(ωq)p1+· · ·+(ωq−1q )pq−1}n






i0! · · · iq−1!
)
pi00 · · · piq−1q−1
{1 + (ωq)i1(ω2q)i2 · · · (ωq−1q )iq−1 + · · ·






i0! · · · iq−1!
)
pi00 · · · piq−1q−1
{1 + ωi1+2i2+···+(q−1)iq−1q + · · ·
+ ω(q−1){i1+2i2+···+(q−1)iq−1}q }.
(3.31)
Where ωq is the q root of 1 and has the following properties:
1 + ωq + ω2q + · · · + ωq−1q = 0 (3.32)
Substituting i0 · 0 + i1 · 1 + · · · + iq−1 · (q − 1) = 0 into Eq.3.31 can be trans-
formed as follows:
{p0 + p1 + · · · + pq−1}n
+ {p0 + (ωq)p1 + · · · + (ωq−1q )pq−1}n + · · ·







i0! · · · iq−1!
)
pi00 · · · piq−1q−1 · q.
(3.33)
Substituting Eq. (3.33) into Eq. (3.30), the proposition holds:
Pr[Y1 + · · · + Yn = 0]
= 1
q
{(p0 + p1 + · · · + pq−1)n + · · ·
+ (p0 + (ωq)q−1 p1 + · · · + (ωq−1q )q−1 pq−1)n}
= 1
q
{1n + (1 − p + p
q − 1 (ωq + ω
2







q − 1 p
)n
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In addition, the following analysis is the same as the validity analysis in Gaborit
et al. [20]. According to the analysis result of [20], in the case of F2, the decoding
failure rate can be controlled by setting an appropriate code space size n and noise
Hamming weights wx and wr . Therefore, in the case of Fq , it can be expected that
the decoding failure rate can be controlled by setting the appropriate parameters.
Security
This section describes the security of the proposed secret comparison protocol.
First, consider semi-honest adversariesA and outputA = (c < d). Omitting global
parameters, A’s view is viewA = (c, x, y; h, {rAi }li=1, {rui }li=1, {rvi }li=1, {ui ′}li=1,{vi ′}li=1). However, the first bit is 0 only for ui∗′ − vi∗′ · y with index i∗. The simu-
lator SA(c, x, y) is configured as follows:
1. Generates ˜h, {r̃Ai }li=1, {r̃ui }li=1, {r̃vi }li=1, {ũi ′}li=1, {ṽi ′}li=1 $←− R at random.
Here, the Hamming weight of {r̃Ai }li=1, {r̃ui }li=1, {r̃vi }li=1 is wr . It also selects
random i∗ ∈ [l], the first bit of ũi∗′ − ṽi∗′ · y is 0, and the first bit of other
{ũi ′ − ṽi ′ · y}li=1,i =i∗ is non-zero.
2. This replaces {ũi ′}li=1, {ṽi ′}li=1 at random to make {ũ j ′}lj=1, {ṽ j ′}lj=1 in random
order.
3. This outputs (c, x, y; ˜h, {r̃Ai }li=1, {r̃ui }li=1, {r̃vi }li=1, {ũ j ′}lj=1, {ṽ j ′}lj=1).
Since h, {rAi }li=1, {rui }li=1, {rvi }li=1 and ˜h, {r̃Ai }li=1, {r̃ui }li=1, {r̃vi }li=1 follow the
same distribution, the following equation holds:
(˜h, {r̃Ai }li=1, {r̃ui }li=1, {r̃vi }li=1)
≡s(h, {rAi }li=1, {rui }li=1, {rvi }li=1).
(3.35)
From the assumption of quasi-cyclic syndromedecoding of quasi-cyclic codes, the
probabilistic polynomial time adversary cannot distinguish between u j ′, v j ′, j ∈ [l]
and uniformly random ones. Furthermore, since {ũi ′}li=1 and {ṽi ′}li=1 are replaced
randomly, the first bit is 0, and the index of ũi∗ − ṽi∗ · y where the index i∗ is a
uniformly random one satisfying the following expression:
({ũ j ′}lj=1, {ṽ j ′}lj=1
) ≡c
({ui ′}li=1 {vi ′}li=1
)
. (3.36)
Therefore, the distribution of the view viewA and simulator SA when A is
outputA = (c < d) is indistinguishable against polynomial time opponents.
Semi-honest adversary A and outputA = (c ≥ d) are the same as the security
proof in the case of outputA = (c < d), so details are omitted.
Next, we consider semi-honest adversary B. Omitting the global parameters,
B’s view is viewB = (d; h, s, {ui }li=1, {vi }li=1, {rBi }li=1, {eui }li=1, {evi }li=1). Config-
ure simulator SB(d) as follows:
1. Generates ˜h, s̃, {ũi }li=1, {ṽi }li=1, {r̃Bi }li=1, {ẽui }li=1, {ẽvi }li=1 $←− R at random.
Here, the Hamming weight of {r̃Bi }li=1, {ẽui }li=1, {ẽvi }li=1 is w∗r .
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2. This outputs (d; ˜h, s̃, {ũi }li=1,{ṽi }li=1,{r̃Bi }li=1,{ẽui }li=1,{ẽvi }li=1).
Since h, {rBi }li=1, {eui }li=1, {evi }li=1 and ˜h, {r̃Bi }li=1, {ẽui }li=1, {ẽvi }li=1 follow the
same distribution, the following equation holds:
(h, {rBi }li=1, {eui }li=1, {evi }li=1)
≡s(˜h, {r̃Bi }li=1, {ẽui }li=1, {ẽvi }li=1).
(3.37)
s can be reduced to a 2-quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding decision assumption, and
the distribution is indistinguishable from uniform random numbers for probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries. Thus, s̃ ≡c s holds.
In addition, since ui , vi , i ∈ [l] are based on the assumption of quasi-cyclic syn-
drome decoding, an adversary in probabilistic polynomial time cannot distinguish
between ui , vi , i ∈ [l] and uniform random numbers.
({ũi }li=1, {ṽi }li=1) ≡c ({ui }li=1, {vi }li=1). (3.38)
Therefore, the distribution ofB’s viewviewB and simulator SB is indistinguishable
against polynomial time adversaries.
3.2.6 Support Vector Machine from Secure Linear Function
Evaluation and Secure Comparison
We can construct a code-based protocol for a support vector machine from the proto-
cols for evaluation of linear functions and comparison described above. Note that the
result of secure evaluation of linear function is inFq while that of secure composition
is a bit string. Therefore, we need to provide secure bit-decomposition protocol. The
bit-decomposition protocols have been already studied well in the research area of
secure computation, and indeed, we can use the bit-decomposition protocol given
in [24] with secure computation protocol from a threshold homomorphic encryption
[25]. (It is straightforward to construct a threshold version of HQC scheme by setting
skA = (x1, y1) and skB = (x2, y2) as distributed decryption keys for A and B. Then,
the encryption key is (h, (x1 + x2) + h · ( y1 + y2)).
We describe the overview of the protocol below. For simplification, we denote
[m] as the ciphertext for m under HQC encryption scheme over Fq .
Protocol
Input A : m ∈ Fq
B : a, b, t ∈ Fq
Output A : a · m + b > t or not
B : ⊥
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1. A and B perform the secure linear evaluation protocol over Fq . Then, B sends A
[a · m + b] at step 4 in the original protocol.
2. A and B start the secure bit-decomposition protocol on [a · m + b].
3. From the result of the bit-decomposition protocol, B obtains the binary represen-
tation [(a · m + b)1], . . . , [(a · m + b)].
4. A and B perform the secure comparison protocol from step 4.
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Chapter 4
Secure Data Management Technology
Tomoaki Mimoto, Shinsaku Kiyomoto, and Atsuko Miyaji
Abstract In this chapter, we introduce data anonymization techniques for several
types of datasets. Data anonymity of anonymized datasets is an index for estimat-
ing the (maximum) reidentification risk from anonymized datasets and is generally
defined as a quantitative index based on adversary models. The adversary mod-
els are implicitly defined according to the attributes in the datasets, use cases, and
anonymization techniques. We first review existing anonymization techniques and
the adversary models behind the data anonymity definitions for anonymization tech-
niques; then, we propose a common anonymity definition and its adversary model,
which is applicable to several types of anonymization techniques. Furthermore, some
extensions of the definition, which is optimized for specific types of datasets, are pre-
sented in the chapter.
4.1 Introduction
Secure data management is a key issue in personal data distribution and analysis.
Anonymization techniques have been used to harmonize the utility of data and their
privacy risks. These techniques transform personal data into anonymized data to
reduce the success probability of reidentification of data principals from the data. If
the data are well anonymized, they cannot be connected to a person; thus, the privacy
of the person is protected by anonymization techniques.
Secure computation is sometimes a realistic solution for commercial services
due to its cost for data of very large size. Some anonymization techniques work
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on commercial services as a “practical” solution, even though the size of the data
is very large. Thus, anonymization techniques have been applied for personal data
distribution and data analysis. For example, k-anonymization was first proposed as a
practical solution to reduce the reidentification risks of public data; since then, it has
been considered to be able to be used for the secure management of personal data.
Quantitative measures for anonymity are required for estimating privacy risks and
assessing the feasibility of privacy requirements. In several studies on anonymization,
privacy notions providing quantitative measures for anonymity have been defined for
each anonymization technique; however, no common notion for all anonymization
techniques has been presented to date, which means that each privacy notion is not
universal but is localized, and heuristic approaches are still used to harmonize the
usability of data and privacy risks through whole processes or services. A common
notion is required for consistent secure data management for the whole process.
In this chapter,1 we discuss a new common privacy notion based on an adver-
sary model, which is applicable to several anonymization techniques, and intro-
duce a novel anonymization technique and implementation of the technique. In
Sect. 4.2, we revisit adversary models on several anonymization techniques and
review anonymization techniques.We propose a common adversarymodel and quan-
titative measures using the adversary model are presented in Sect. 4.3. An extension
is discussed in Sect. 4.4. Our implementation of an anonymization tool is introduced
in Sect. 4.5. We conclude this chapter in Sect. 4.6.
4.2 Anonymization Techniques and Adversary Models,
Revisited
The related work presented below is grouped under k-anonymization and noise addi-
tion as anonymization methods.
4.2.1 k-Anonymization
k-anonymity [4–6] is a well-known privacy model. The property of k-anonymity is
that eachpublished record is such that every combinationof values of quasi-identifiers
can be matched to at least k respondents.
1This chapter is reprinted from [1–3].
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4.2.1.1 Adversary Model
k-anonymized datasets are assumed to be in public domains. An adversary can obtain
all the attribute values in a dataset and execute arbitrary operations on the attribute
values.
There are few formal definitions or models for the adversary that aim to identify
the attributes of a certain individual in a k-anonymized dataset. Kiyomoto andMartin
modeled an adversary [7] for k-anonymized datasets based on two query functions
as follows:
Let d be an index of the dth record, qx be a set of m attribute values in T q∗, and
s be a value for the sensitive attribute. The two query functions are defined as:
• read. For the input of an index value d, the function outputs the dth record. That
is, f (T ∗, query = {read, d}) → {d, qdx , sd}, where qdx and sd are values of the
quasi-identifier and the sensitive attribute in the dth record, respectively. If the dth
record does not exist, then the function outputs f ailed.
• search. For input qx and/or s, the function outputs the number u of records
and index values that have a quasi-identifier qx and/or sensitive attribute s. That
is, f (T ∗, query = {search, qx , s}) → u, D, where u and D are the number of
records and a sequence of index values that have the same quasi-identifier and/or
sensitive attribute, respectively. If s or qx do not exist, then the function outputs
f ailed.
4.2.1.2 k-Anonymization Algorithm
This idea is easy to understand, and many types of k-anonymization algorithms
have been proposed. The Incognito algorithm [8] generalizes the attributes using
taxonomy trees, and theMondrian algorithm [9] averages or replaces the original data
with representative values and achieves k-anonymization. In this paper, we use a k-
anonymization algorithm based on clustering and denote Ak(D) as k-anonymization
for dataset D. The algorithm finds close records and creates clusters such that each
partition contains at least k records. For details of the algorithm, see [10].
4.2.2 Noise Addition
Noise addition works by adding or multiplying stochastic or randomized numbers to
confidential data [11]. The idea is simple and is also well known to be an anonymiza-
tion technique.
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4.2.2.1 Adversary Model
One objective of an adversary against noise-added datasets is to remove the noise
or estimate the original values from the noise-added attribute values. One potential
scenario is a probabilistic approach in which an adversary estimates the distribution
of noise and chooses an attribute value with high probability. There is no formal
adversary model on static noise-added datasets, but Differential Privacy settings
assume data include dynamically added noise, and their adversary simulations are
defined as query-based.
4.2.2.2 Anonymization Algorithm by Noise Addition
The first work on noise addition was proposed by Kim [12], and the idea was to
add noise ε with a distribution ε ∼ N (0, σ 2) to the original data. Additive noise is
uncorrelated noise and preserves themean and covariance of the original data, but the
correlation coefficients and variance are not retained. Another variation of additive
noise is correlated additive noise, which keeps the mean and allows the correlation
coefficients in the original data to be retained [13]. Differential privacy is a state-of-
the-art privacy model that is based on the statistical distance between two database
tables differing by atmost one record. The basic idea is that, regardless of background
knowledge, an adversary with access to the dataset draws the same conclusions,
irrespective ofwhether a person’s data are included in the dataset. Differential privacy
ismainly studied in relation to perturbationmethods in an interactive setting, although
it is applicable to certain generalization methods.
In this paper, we use Laplace noise as a noise addition and add noise ε ∼
Lap(0, 2φ2) to each attribute. We denote Aφ(D) as noise addition for dataset D.
4.2.3 K-Anonymization for Combined Datasets
We introduce an adversary model for a combined dataset from datasets produced by
two service providers and anonymization methods [14].
4.2.3.1 Adversary Model
If we consider the existing adversary model and assume that the anonymization
tables produced by the service providers satisfy k-anonymity, the combined table
also satisfies k-anonymity. However, we have to consider another type of adversary
in our new service model. In our service model, the combined table includes many
sensitive attributes; thus, the adversary candistinguish a data owner usingbackground
knowledge of combinations of sensitive attribute values of the data owner. If the
adversary finds a combination of known sensitive attributes on only one record, the
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adversary can obtain information; the record is a data owner that the adversary knows,
and the adversary also knows the remaining sensitive attributes of the data owner.
We model the above type of new adversary as follows:
π -knowledge AdversaryModel.An adversary knows certainπ sensitive attributes
{si1, ..., sij , ..., siπ } of a victim i . Thus, the adversary can distinguish the victim with
an anonymization table in which only one record has any combinations (maximum
π -tuple) of the attributes {si1, ..., sij , ..., siπ }.
4.2.3.2 Modification of Quasi-identifiers
The first strategy is to modify the quasi-identifiers of the combined table. The data
user generates a merged table from two anonymization tables as follows: First, the
data user simply merges the records in the two tables as |qgC |shAB |siA|s jB |. Then, the
data user modifies qqC to satisfy the following condition, where θ is the total number
of sensitive attributes in the merged table.
4.2.3.3 Modification of Sensitive Attributes
The second approach is to modify the sensitive attributes in the combined table for
the condition. If a subtable |shAB |siA|s jB | that consists of sensitive attributes is required
to satisfy k-anonymity, some sensitive attribute values are removed from the table
and are changed to ∗ to satisfy k-anonymity. Note that we do not accept that all
sensitive attributes are ∗ due to having no information record.
4.2.3.4 Algorithm for Modification
One algorithm that finds a k-anonymized combined dataset is executed as follows:
1. The algorithmgeneralizes quasi-identifiers to satisfy the condition that each group
of the same quasi-identifiers has at least π × k records.
2. The algorithm generates all the tuples of π sensitive attributes in the table.
3. For each tuple, the algorithm finds all the records that have the same sensi-
tive attributes as the tuple or has ∗ for sensitive attributes and makes them a
group. We define the number of sensitive attributes in the group which is θ . The
algorithm generates a partial table that consists of θ − π sensitive attributes and
checks whether the partial table has at least k different combinations of sensitive
attributes.
4. If the partial table does not satisfy the above condition, the algorithm chooses a
record from other groups that have different tuples of π sensitive attributes and
changes the π sensitive attributes to ∗. The algorithm executes this step until the
partial table has up to π different combinations of sensitive attributes.
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5. The algorithm executes step 3 and step 4 for all the tuples of π sensitive attributes
in the table.
4.2.4 Matrix Factorization for Time-Sequence Data
Some studies have used matrices for time-sequence datasets. Zheng et al. [15, 16]
proposed predicting a user’s interests in an unvisited location. They assumed users’
GPS trajectory as a user-location matrix where each value of the matrix indicates the
number of visits of a user to a location. The matrix is very sparse because each user
visits only a handful of locations, so a collaborative filtering model is applied to the
prediction. Zheng et al. [17] built a location-activity matrix, M , which has missing
values. M is decomposed into the two low-rank matrices U and V . The missing
values can be filled by X = UV T  M , and locations can be recommended when
some activities are given. Chawla et al. [18] constructed a graph from the trajectories
of taxis and transformed the graph into matrices. The authors of [19] proposed a
method of identifying traffic flows that cause an anomaly between two regions.
4.2.5 Anonymization Techniques for User History Graphs
In this subsection, we introduce two anonymization techniques for user history
graphs, which are proposed in [1].
4.2.5.1 Adversary Model
Privacy leakage from a merged history graph is the disclosure of the actions of a
particular person from the graph. Attacks against user history graphs are intended
to obtain the private information of a particular user from the graph. We assume
that the merging process is executed on a trusted domain and that only the merged
history graph is published; thus, the adversary can only obtain the merged graph.
Furthermore, we assume that the adversary has the following knowledge about the
user: The history of the user is included in the merged graph and the user performs
an action t . The adversary tries to discover other actions of the user to be able to
guess which edges connecting to node t can be assigned to the user.
We summarize the adversary model as follows:
Adversary against a Merged History Graph. It is assumed that an adversary knows
that a victim A executed an action t . The objective of the adversary is to obtain the
actions that A executed before or after the action t . Thus, the adversary searches the
merged history graph, which includes actions of other people and finds the actions
of A using the knowledge that action t was executed.
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We define privacy notions to use with the above adversary model in a later sub-
section.
4.2.5.2 Notions for the Untraceability of a Graph
We consider two levels of privacy notions: partial k-untraceability and complete k-
untraceability. Partial k-untraceability accepts the leakage of some partial actions of
a user but prevents all the actions of the user from being revealed. The definition
of complete k-untraceability involves meeting the requirement that no action of the
user is leaked. The symbol Act ANx→y for user A denotes the sequence of all the actions
of user A from action x to action y. For example, the sequence of actions from the
first action to action x and the sequence of actions from action x to the final action
are denoted as Act ANstart→x and Act
A
Nx→end , respectively.
Definition 4.1 (Partial k-untraceability) We assume that an adversary knows an
action t of a user A, andwe consider all the possible adversaries defined for any action
t of the user in the merged graph. If at least k sequences of actions are potentially
associated with user A and k − 1, other users exist as candidates for all actions
Act ANstart→t and Act
A
Nt→end , the digraph satisfies k-untraceability for A. If the digraph
satisfies the above condition for all users, then the digraph is said to satisfy partial
k-untraceability.
Definition 4.2 (Complete k-untraceability) We assume that an adversary knows an
action t of a user A andwe consider all the possible adversaries defined for any action
t of the user in the merged graph. If at least k actions are potentially associated with
user A and k − 1 other users exist as candidates for each action in Act ANstart→t and
Act ANt→end , the digraph satisfies k-untraceability for A. If the digraph satisfies the
above condition for all users, the digraph satisfies complete k-untraceability.
Generally, many trivial actions are performed by many users. It is not important
for privacy purposes where we keep the information about such actions. Thus, we
relax the above definitions to produce an anonymized graph that includes much of
the information needed to analyze a user’s history. Let v be the threshold value for
the number of performing users that establishes that an action is trivial; that is, we
judge the actions x → y to be trivial if the label L(x → y) ≥ v. Both definitions are
modified as follows:
Definition 4.3 (Partial (k, v)-untraceability) We assume that an adversary knows
an action t of a user A, and we consider all the possible adversaries defined for any
t in the merged graph. If at least k sequences of actions are potentially associated
with user A and k − 1 other users exist as candidates for all actions Act ANstart→t and
Act ANt→end except trivial actions x → y that have a label L(x → y) ≥ v, then the
digraph satisfies partial (k, v)-untraceability for A. If the digraph satisfies the above
condition for all users, then the digraph satisfies partial (k, v)-untraceability.
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Definition 4.4 (Complete (k, v)-untraceability) We assume that an adversary knows
an action t of a user A, andwe consider all the possible adversaries defined for any t in
themerged graph. If at least k actions are potentially associatedwith user A and k − 1
other users exist as candidates for each action in Act ANstart→t and Act
A
Nt→end except trivial
actions x → y that have a label L(x → y) ≥ v, then the digraph satisfies complete
(k, v)-untraceability for A. If the digraph satisfies the above condition for all users,
then the digraph satisfies complete (k, v)-untraceability.
In a complete (k, v)-untraceable graph, each action t except trivial actions has k
outgoing edges and incoming edges; thus, an action of user A that connects to action t
cannot be identified from k candidates. Thus, the graph satisfies untraceability for an
adversarywhoknowsaction t of theuser. It is trivial that a complete (k, v)-untraceable
graph satisfies partial (k, v)-untraceability; all actions except trivial actions are con-
nected to k potential actions in a complete (k, v)-untraceable graph. A graph that
satisfies partial (k, v)-untraceability generally produces much more information than
a complete (k, v)-untraceable graph, where the partial (k, v)-untraceable graph and
the complete (k, v)-untraceable graph are generated from a user history graph. How-
ever, the (k, v)-untraceable graphmay reveal partial actions of users due to the relaxed
definition of the privacy notion; an attack is successful when an adversary obtains all
the actions of a user. To trace all the actions of the user, the adversary has to select a
sequence of actions from k sequences of actions; thus, all the actions of the user are
untraceable, even though some actions are traceable by the adversary. The parameter
k means that an action (or a sequence of actions) is potentially associated with a
user and k − 1 other users in the untraceable graph, and the parameter vmeans that v
users perform the same action in the graph. Generally, we should select the parameter
v = k with regard to the privacy requirement for a merged graph. The actions of a
user are hidden in the actions of a group that consists of k members including the
user. A privacy notion for the graph should be selected from the above two notions
according to a use case of the graph and its privacy requirements.
4.2.5.3 Algorithm Generating a Partial (k, V )-Untraceable History
Graph
The details of the algorithm are denoted as Algorithm 4.1, where oet and iet are
defined as the number of outgoing edges and incoming edges of a node t , respectively.
The algorithm for generating a partial (k, v)-untraceable history graph is as follows:
1. This step consists of a part of the detailed algorithm, from line 1 to line 3. For
the input of a user history graph G, the algorithm adds a virtual incoming edge
(sr → r) to each node r ∈ start until the number of incoming edges is the same
as the number of outgoing edges. Then, the algorithm adds a virtual outgoing edge
(q → uq) to each node q ∈ end until the number of outgoing edges is the same
as the number of incoming edges. A label of a virtual incoming edge L(sx → x)
denotes the number of users who first perform the action, and a label of a virtual
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outgoing edge L(y → uy) denotes the number of users who perform the action
at the end.
2. This step consists of a part of the detailed algorithm, from line 4 to line 12. The
algorithm searches for a node t that has fewer outgoing edges than k and for which
all its lower nodesNt→end\t have fewer outgoing edges than k. Then, the algorithm
removes all the outgoing edges (t → ∗) that satisfy L(t → ∗) < v. Next, the
algorithm searches for a node t ′ that receives incoming edges numbering less
than k and all upper nodes Nstart→t ′\t ′ that receive fewer incoming edges than k.
Then, the algorithm removes all the incoming edges (∗ → t ′) that satisfy L(∗ →
t ′) < v. The algorithm repeats this step until no node that meets the conditions is
found.
3. This step is the same as line 13, line 14 and line 15 in the detailed algorithm.
The algorithm removes virtual incoming and outgoing edges, removes nodes that
have no edges, and outputs the modified graph.
Algorithm 4.1 Generation of a Partial (k, v)-Untraceable History Graph
Input: User History Graph G, parameters k and v
Output: Anonymized Graph Gα(G, k, v)
1: Gα(G, k, v) ← G
2: Add virtual incoming edges to start nodes
3: Add virtual outgoing edges to end nodes.
4: T ← all nodes t , where oeNt→end < k and all of its edges do not have L(ti → ∗) ≥ v
5: T ′ ← all nodes t ′, where ieNstart→t ′ < k and all of its edges do not have L(∗ → t ′j ) ≥ v
6: while T 
= ∅ or T ′ 
= ∅ do
7: Choose ti from T
8: Remove all outgoing edges of ti where L(ti → ∗) < v from Gα(G, k, v)
9: Choose t ′j from T ′
10: Remove all incoming edges of t ′j where L(∗ → t ′j ) < v from Gα(G, k, v)
11: Update T and T ′
12: end while
13: Remove virtual edges
14: Remove all nodes t ′′ where oet ′′ = 0 and iet ′′ = 0 from Gα(G, k, v)
15: return Gα(G, k, v)
4.2.5.4 Algorithm Generating a Complete (k, V )-Untraceable History
Graph
The details of the algorithm are denoted as Algorithm 4.2. The algorithm for gen-
erating a complete (k, v)-untraceable history graph is as follows:
1. The algorithm first executes Algorithm 4.1 except line 13 and line 15.
2. This step consists of a part of the detailed algorithm, from line 3 to line 11. The
algorithm searches for a node t that has fewer outgoing edges than k and removes
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all the outgoing edges (t → ∗) that satisfy L(t → ∗) < v, until no node is found.
Then, the algorithm searches for a node t ′ that receives fewer incoming edges than
k and removes all the edges (∗ → t ′) that satisfy L(∗ → t ′) < v. The algorithm
repeats this step until no node that meets the conditions is found.
3. This step consists of line 12, line 13, and line 14 in the detailed program. The
algorithm removes virtual edges, removes nodes to which no edge is connected,
and outputs the modified graph.
4.2.6 Other Notions
Differential Privacy [20, 21] is a notion of privacy for perturbative methods based on
the statistical distance between two database tables differing by, atmost, one element.
The basic idea is that, regardless of background knowledge, an adversary with access
to the dataset draws the same conclusions whether a person’s data are included in
the dataset. That is, a person’s data have an insignificant effect on the processing of a
query. Differential privacy is mainly studied in relation to perturbation methods [22–
24] in an interactive setting. Attempts to apply differential privacy to search queries
have been discussed in [25]. Li et al. proposed a matrix mechanism [26] applica-
ble to predicate counting queries under a differential privacy setting. Computational
relaxations of differential privacy were discussed in [27–29]. Another approach for
quantifying privacy leakage is an information-theoretic definition proposed byClark-
son and Schneider [30]. They modeled an anonymizer as a program that receives two
inputs: a user’s query and a database response to the query. The program acted as a
noisy communication channel and produced an anonymized response as the output.
Hsu et al. provides a generalized notion [31] in decision theory for making a model
of the value of personal information. An alternative model for the quantification of
personal information is proposed in [32]. In the model, the value of personal infor-
mation is estimated by the expected cost that the user has to pay for obtaining perfect
knowledge from given privacy information. Furthermore, the sensitivity of different
attribute values is taken into account in the average benefit and cost models proposed
by Chiang et al. [33]. Krause and Horvitz presented utility-privacy tradeoffs in online
services [34, 35].
4.2.7 Combination of Anonymization Techniques
A combination of anonymization methods leads to the construction of datasets that
are useful and that preserve privacy. Some countries publish census data, and they
combine several anonymization methods, such as generalization, noise addition, and
sampling [36, 37]. However, some problems remain. One problem is that it is difficult
to evaluate the privacy risks of anonymizeddatasetswhen anonymizationmethods are
combined. Some research is available about the relationships among anonymization
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methods. Chaudhuri et al. proposed (c, ε, δ)-privacy [38] and studied the relationship
among sampling and differential privacy [39]. Li et al. proposed (β, ε, δ)-differential
privacy and studied the relationship among sampling, differential privacy, and k-
anonymity. Soria-Comas et al. proposed a k-anonymized algorithm for differential
privacy using an insensitive algorithm [40].
4.3 ( p, N)-Identifiability
4.3.1 Common Adversary Model
Existing privacy measures are supposed to protect against idealized attackers, and it
is difficult to maintain their utility and assess their reidentification risk. We designed
adversary models to describe more realistic attackers by structuring a real setting
for the attackers. In the case of exchanging anonymized datasets between compa-
nies, for instance, a data-providing company first anonymizes and encrypts datasets
for transmission to a receiver company via a secure channel. The receiver com-
pany locates the dataset in a secure room and allows only authorized employees to
access the anonymized dataset. This process can reduce the reidentification risk in
the anonymized dataset, and it specifies the attacker and limits the ability to access
datasets so that the attacker must know the quasi-identifiers of the neighbors or
acquaintances. For example, it seems to be quite rare for an attacker to know all the
quasi-identifiers of a target because the target is a neighbor of the attacker. Thus, a
more stringent analysis of the reidentification risk can be achieved when we assume
a more realistic situation, such as that the attacker has only limited knowledge of the
victim.
Access rights to an anonymized dataset may be given to attackers, and attackers
may acquire some information about the original dataset or obtain the anonymization
algorithm used to generate the anonymized dataset. Information about the original
dataset is categorized into three parts as follows: information on a specified record
such as a neighbor; the original dataset; and any other information except the target
information that the attacker is seeking. The case ofWilliamWeld, whowas governor
of Massachusetts [41], is a typical example of reidentification, and an attack on the
Netflix Prize dataset was carried out by a strong attacker who gained access to the
Internet Movie Database [42].
We can consider the abilities of an attacker in two areas: knowledge about the
dataset and the ability to simulate anonymization algorithms. Many previous studies
such as [43, 44] assumed that an attacker has all the information required except
knowledge of the target of the attack. In this paper, we consider an attacker who has
knowledge of only the target record and can simulate anonymization algorithms to
obtain anonymized records that may correspond to the target record.
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4.3.1.1 Definitions of Actual Attackers
Generally, when an anonymized dataset is published on the Web, anyone who can
access the dataset is a potential attacker; thus, the adversary model should be ideal
because we cannot assume there is only a limited-knowledge adversary, and we have
to assume all possible adversaries are present. On the other hand, when the dataset
is managed under strict controls, the model adversary is not considered to be an
unlimited-knowledge adversary. We design two realistic adversary models under the
assumption that the dataset is managed in a restricted area (not public) and only a
limited set of attackers can access the dataset; and then, we propose a privacy metric
for privacy risk analysis.
Definition 4.5 (Anonymization Simulator fsim) Let D0 with n0 records, D1 with n1
records, r xi [QI ], and r xi [SI ] be an original dataset, an anonymized dataset generated
from the original dataset, the quasi-identifiers of a record r xi ∈ Dx , and sensitive
information from the record r xi ∈ Dx , respectively. An anonymization simulator fsim
simulates an anonymization algorithm used to generate an anonymized dataset as an
oracle and outputs r1i [QI ] ∈ D1 for the input r0i [QI ] ∈ D0. That is, fsim : r0j [QI ] →{
r1[QI ],⊥}, where r1[QI ] is a set of r1i [QI ] and no output is produced in the case
of ⊥.
The simulator is a deterministic process for deterministic anonymization, such
as top-coding and bottom-coding, and a probabilistic process for probabilistic
anonymization, such as random sampling. The simulator can provide access to D0
to simulate the anonymization algorithm, even though no adversary can access D0.
Next, we define two adversary models.
Definition 4.6 (Deanonymizer for Anonymized Datasets, DA) When ∃1r0j [QI ] ∈
D0, ∀r1i [QI ||SI ] ∈ D1 and fsim are given, a deanonymizer DA lines up poten-
tial candidates r1i corresponding to r
0
j by executing the simulator fsim ; then, the
deanonymizerDA outputs a list of candidates r1i [QI ||SI ] for r0j , where the number
of records in the list is nq , the number of sensitive information items in the list is ns
and 0 ≤ ns ≤ nq ≤ n0.
If an attacker knows the actual anonymization function f , the attacker can use f
as fsim , and the evaluation result should be more credible.
Definition 4.7 (Reidentifying Adversary versus Anonymized Datasets) When
∃1r0j [QI ] ∈ D0, ∀r1i [QI ||SI ] ∈ D1 and fsim are given, a reidentifying adversary
executes the deanonymizer DA and can identify r1i , which is a record of the same
person in the record r0j , from the records in a dataset D0, where r
0
j ∈ D0 is given.
The success probability of the attack is calculated as 1/nq when r1j is included in the
output by DA; otherwise, it is 0.
Assuming an attacker who has ∃1r0j [QI ] ∈ D0 is the same as assuming |D0|
attackers who have r0j ( j = 1, ..., |D0|) ∈ D0.
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Definition 4.8 (Revealing Adversary versus Anonymized Datasets) When
∃1r0j [QI ] ∈ D0, ∀r1i [QI ||SI ] ∈ D1 and fsim are given, a revealing adversary exe-
cutes the deanonymizerDA and finds a r0j [SI ] from r1i [SI ] such that r1i is a record
of the same person as the record r0j . The success probability of the attack is calculated
as 1/ns when r1j is included in the output of DA; otherwise, it is zero.
Arevealing adversary does not try to identify the record but tries to access sensitive
information. In other words, the attacker seeks only to obtain sensitive information
from the record in question. More precisely, the success probability of the revealing
adversary can be calculated as [ns]/nq , where the correct number of sensitive items
in the list is [ns], but the probability itself may be uncertain. Assume that when
the probability is 0.99, some attackers are convinced that the target should be the
majority. Furthermore, in the case that the deanonymizerDA is leaked and the fsim
used in the deanonymizer is a deterministic process, an attacker can infer the sensitive
information of r0j . On the other hand, when the fsim used in the deanonymizer is a
probabilistic process, even ifDA is leaked, outputting the result should not involve
uncertainty.
4.3.1.2 ( p, N)-Identifiability
Here, we assume that anonymized datasets are strictly controlled and that the attacker
has knowledge of a specific record and the anonymization algorithms. We assume
that the attacker is the strongest type of attacker and has knowledge of the most
characteristic record. Nevertheless, it is difficult to quantify this characteristic, so we
assume that each attacker has an original record. In other words, we assume there
are as many attackers as there are original records.
Definition 4.9 ((p, N )-identifiability) Let p be the success probability for an adver-
sary who has ∃1r0[QI ] ∈ D0, ∀r1i [QI ||SI ] ∈ D1 and fsim , and N be the number of
adversaries whose attack success probability is p.
The probability p is the conditional probability that the adversary can select the
correct record from the list produced by the deanonymizer DA when the collected
record is included in the list. The probability that the deanonymizer successfully
produces the list, including the correct record, depends on the anonymization algo-
rithms.
Our model can extend to an adversary who has knowledge of two or more records.
For simplicity, we use an adversary model that knows a single record and consider N
single knowledge adversaries in our risk analysis. The idea of (p, N )-identifiability
is studied in [2].
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4.3.2 Success Probability Analysis Based on the Common
Adversary Model
In this section, we assume the attackers described in the previous section and
explain the calculation to obtain the success probability of attacks on representa-
tive anonymization methods: generalization, noise addition, and sampling. We con-
sider that fsim is constructed as a typical combined algorithm selected from three
anonymization algorithms, fgenerali zation, fsampling and fnoise. We explain the above
three anonymization algorithms and show combined anonymization using an exam-
ple dataset.
4.3.2.1 Generalization
We include deletion of records or cells and top- or bottom-coding as steps in gen-
eralization. One step of fgenerali zation is similar to k-anonymity in checking the
number of identical combinations of quasi-identifiers. When an anonymized dataset
has k-anonymity, p equals 1/k. k-anonymity is an intuitive privacy metric, but the
greater the number of attributes, the more difficult it is for the datasets to achieve
k-anonymity. If an attacker has generalization trees for each attribute, the attacker
adds records which satisfy the requirements of the trees of the list of candidates.
When there is a record whose address attribute is Tokyo, for instance, an attacker
who has the generalization tree adds records whose addresses are in the Kanto region
as well as records whose addresses are in Eastern Japan to the list of candidates. It is
appropriate that an attacker can infer the generalization tree and in our experiment,
fsim can be considered capable of accessing the generalization trees of each attribute.
4.3.2.2 Random Sampling
When an attacker who has one original record is assumed, the privacy risk differs
greatly among the original datasets. Consider an original dataset with many unique
records, and assume that random sampling is implemented. Let M be the number of
unique records and α be the sampling rate. The probability that unique records will
not appear is (1 − α)M . Even when α = 0.1 and M = 44, the probability is less than
0.1%. When a large dataset is anonymized, it is possible that there will be more than
44 unique records, which shows that if sampling is implemented, a characteristic
record may be identified or suspected.
We evaluate sampling as follows: For simplicity, we consider the case where the
anonymization method is only random sampling. When a unique record is sampled,
an attacker who knows the person is certain that the record is for that person. Thus,
the probability p does not change. On the other hand, sampling reduces the number
of unique records, and N decreases accordingly. When unique records are very few
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and do not appear in an anonymized dataset, p decreases. We apply this approach to
the case of combining different anonymization methods.
The approaches to sampling vary, and we can also consider fsampling in various
ways. For instance, the probability of disclosing the identity of any individual is
evaluated by using the posterior probability of population uniqueness [45].
4.3.2.3 Noise Addition
There are two cases of noise addition: One is adding noise to the numerical data itself,
and the other is adding noise to its quantity. In the former case, the data consist of
original numerical data or data anonymized by a process, such as microaggregation,
and in the latter case, the data are original quantity data or anonymized data, such as
11–20 in the age attribute.
In the former case, we can consider fnoise as follows. Noise is added based on
a probability distribution, such as normal, Laplace, and exponential distributions.
In particular, it has been mathematically proven that adding Laplace noise to the
output of some queries achieves differential privacy [39], so this type of noise is
widely used. Therefore, when an anonymized record is included in the 90 or 95%
confidence interval, the record is added to the list of candidates. More simply, when
original data and anonymized data have small differences such as 10 or 20% for each
attribute, the attacker may consider the possibility that they are the same.
In the latter case, we cannot use the same method. When a record has 72 and is
anonymized to 95, for instance, the attacker whose target is a specific person may
not regard the target to be that person. However, the attacker can link them after the
top-coding is executed and change the value to 70-. On the other hand, when a record
is 19, is anonymized to 20 and is generalized to 20–29, the attacker may not link
them. One of the ideas of fnoise is that a group with each attribute can be changed to
next group and such records are output as candidates. As in the generalization step,
an attacker can infer the next group for each group and fnoise can be thought of as
defining the distance of each classification.
The description above shows that when the order of anonymization is changed,
fsim will also be changed.
4.3.2.4 Combination of Anonymization Methods
The principles of each anonymization can be combined by evaluating each
anonymization stepby step. Stateddifferently, an attacker has fgenerali zation, fsampling ,
and fnoise as fsim . We show examples of combined cases by using a sample
dataset (Fig. 4.1). An attacker should change his or her approach when the order
of anonymization is changed if he or she knows this fact. We assume five attacker
models, A1 to A5, in the following example, and the candidates of each attacker
model are represented as C1 to C5. We denote Ci of r j in the following figures as the
candidates of an attacker Ai who has r j as a target. The adversary model for A1 to
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Fig. 4.1 Sample dataset
A4 is the reidentifying adversary defined in Definition 4.3, and the adversary model
in Fig. 4.4 is the revealing adversary defined in Definition 4.4.
Let the conditions of attackers be as follows: A1 and A3 do not consider noise-
adding and generalization but simply compare r1i ∈ D1 with r0j ∈ D0. This is one
approach to fnoise and fgenerali zation . On the other hand, A2, A4, and A5 do consider
the added noise and generalization. We define the noise addition shown in Fig. 4.2
as follows: the classifications of each attribute change to the next classification with
a certain probability. We assume A2 knows the rule of noise addition and that fnoise
of A2 outputs candidates that have a different classification in one attribute from an
original record. On the other hand, let a small amount of noise be added in step (a)
of Figs. 4.3 and 4.4. We assume the attackers A4 and A5 know the rule and that fnoise
of A4 and A5 outputs candidates whose values of AT T R1 are different but within 2
from the original record and whose values of AT T R2 are different but within 4 from
the original record. In the figures, the boldface sections show that the classifications
are not correct but are within the permissible range for fnoise of A2, A4, and A5:
The red boldface sections show that there are substantial distances from the original
values and that attackers who have the record cannot link them.
4.3.2.5 Examples of Analyses
The Case of A1
Fig. 4.2 Sample anonymization and the result of simulation attack 1
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Fig. 4.3 Sample anonymization and the result of simulation attack 2
(a)  Noise Addition (b)  Generalization (c) sampling
Fig. 4.4 Sample anonymization and the result of simulation attack 3
Generalization, noise addition, and sampling are executed as anonymizing
methods in Fig. 4.2. In the generalization step (a), all records are generalized to
be divisible into equal parts. As a result, only r2 is unique, and this dataset has
(1, 1)-identifiability.
In step (b), r1, r4, and r6 are changed by the addition of noise. As a result, r1 and r2
are indistinguishable. r3, r4, and r7 are also indistinguishable, but r5 and r6 become
unique. We define A1 as not considering the addition of noise, so that an attacker
who has r6 cannot link the original record but an attacker who has r5 can. Therefore,
identifiability becomes (1, 1)-identifiability.
After sampling, in step (c), r2, r4, and r5 do not appear. Then, r3 and r7 become the
focus are focused and identifiability becomes (1/2, 2)-identifiability. This attacker
simply checks howmany of the same records there are in the dataset. Even if various
anonymization methods are implemented, some records may not be affected. There-
fore, it is important to assume such attackers. When we can say that a dataset has a
certain level of privacy from such attackers, it means that an attacker cannot link the
target with the original record by accident.
The Case of A2
Weomit the explanation of step (a) because noise is not added. In step (b), the attacker
with r1, for example, chooses r1, r2, r5, and r6 as candidates because one or more of
their attributes match r1 = {-30, 175-}. On the other hand, an attacker with r4 cannot
output candidates because both attributes of r4 are changed. Hence, identifiability is
(1/4, 2)-identifiability. In step (c), r5 does not appear, and identifiability becomes
(1/4, 1)-identifiability.
The Case of A3
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In Fig. 4.3, the dataset is anonymized by the addition of noise, generalization, and
sampling.
In the case of A3, the dataset with added noise is safe enough from attackers
who do not consider the added noise and we omit this case; however, this does
not mean that noise addition is safe, and when another attacker, such as A4, is
considered, the result should be different. In step (b), we focus on the attacker with
r3. This is the strongest attacker, and this attacker suspects that r2 and r3 are the
candidates. More specifically, the scope is r3 = {38, 165} = {31-, -174} and r2, r3
meet the requirement. The attacker with r2 seems to have the same risk but cannot
identify the actual target r2 is a possible candidate because the noise of AT T R2 is
great enough. Hence, the identifiability becomes (1/2, 1)-identifiability. In step (c),
r3 does not appear, and the privacy risk is (1/3, 1)-identifiability.
The Case of A4
Next, we show the case of A4. In step (a), every record but r1 and r7 has enough added
noise, and attackers cannot infer which is the correct record. The attacker with r7
regards the records within {33 ± 2, 173 ± 4} as candidates. Only r7 satisfies the con-
dition, and the privacy risk is (1, 1)-identifiability. In step (b), the effect of noise addi-
tion becomes weak, and the number of attackers who should be considered increases.
The attacker with r6, for instance, regards the records within {29 ± 2, 171 ± 4} = {(-
30, 31-), (-174, 175-)}, namely, all records, as candidates. The privacy risk becomes
(1/2, 1)-identifiability after generalization is finished. In step (c), similar to the pre-
vious steps, the privacy risk becomes (1/3, 1)-identifiability.
The Case of A5
Finally, we show an example of a revealing adversary.
An attacker can claim to succeed when the sensitive information AT T RS of the
target can be correctly identified. Step (a) is similar to that of the case of A4. In
step (b), the attacker with r3 suspects r2 and r3 are the candidates. Their AT T RS are,
however, “Office” and the attacker claims to identify the person. Thus, the privacy risk
is (2/2 = 1, 1)-identifiability, which is similar to l-diversity. In step (c), the attacker
with r1 suspects r1, r4 and r6 are the candidates; the AT T RS of r1 is “Hospital,” and
that of the others is “Shop.” Therefore, the probability of reidentification is 1/2.More
precisely, the probability is 1/3 because there are three candidates and one is correct,
but the probability may be important information for the attacker with r1. The same
can be said of the attacker with r7; therefore, the risk according to our definition is
(1/2, 2)-identifiability.
As described above, when the adversary model is different, the result of the risk
is also different. Assuming attackers who disregard noise, we consider the risk to the
records whose fluctuations are due to anonymization to be small. On the other hand,
assuming attackers who do consider the actual added noise, we consider the risk to
the dataset as a whole. Moreover, strong attackers can be assumed to use the inverse
function of the actual noise or anonymization method. In the case that noise based on
a normal distribution is added, for instance, an optimal distance-based record linkage
can be performed [46].
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It is important to consider the various types of attackers in this way, because the
most important factor of privacy is the inability to definitely link an anonymized
record X ′ and original record X . Our metrics ensure that the attackers considered
can neither identify a record nor make an identification by chance, by considering
many attackers.
4.3.2.6 Implementation of the Analysis Algorithm
Processing time is a problem when our metric is applied to a large dataset. In this
section, we discuss this problem.
First, we have to evaluate the risk from attackers with each record, and when
sampling is implemented, the candidates in each record need to be preserved across
the sampling. However, we do not need to store the candidates for every record or
the records that have certain risks because the metric does not consider attackers
who have knowledge of a record that does not have the highest risk. Moreover,
when anonymization and evaluation are performed repeatedly, it takes a long time to
evaluate the risk because the same number of attackers as the number of records are
assumed. Thus, a threshold risk can be introduced to resolve the problem. When the
risk of an attack does not exceed the threshold, attackers do not need to be evaluated.
It is possible, however, that the risk may increase depending on the situation (see
r5, r6 in Fig. 4.2). Therefore, when a threshold is introduced, the accuracy of the
privacy risk may worsen. We describe the pseudocode of risk analysis as follows:
Algorithm 4.5 (D0, D1, A, fsim): Risk analysis.
Input: Original dataset D0, Anonymized dataset D1, Adversary model A, and attack simulator
fsim
1: while ∀r0i ∈ D0 do
2: pi ← simulation attack(r0i , D1, A, fsim)
3: end while
4: p ← max(pi )
5: N ← count(max(pi ))
6: return p, N
Second, the attackers do not have to compare their records with every record
because the method of evaluation is similar to that of k-anonymity, and the attackers
only need to compare a representative of each group. The attackers need to com-
pare their records with {-30, 175-}, {31-,-174}, and {31-, 175-} in (b) of Fig. 4.3, for
instance. However, when the levels of generalization are different, such methods
cannot be applied, and every record should be checked. To solve the problem, we
first count the number of values of each attribute and then compare each attribute of
r0j with that of each record of D1 in accordance with the large number of varieties.
Finally, when the procedure for anonymization is known in advance, it is possible
to perform the evaluation more quickly by considering the effect of the initial part of
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the anonymization. For instance, in Fig. 4.3a, we only have to consider cells whose
values do not exceed 30 in AT T R1 or fall short of 174 in AT T R2.
4.3.3 Experiment
4.3.3.1 Experimental Environments
We conducted experiments to evaluate the validity of the proposed metrics. We mea-
sured the time to output the risk and confirmed that the privacy metric was appropri-
ate. We used three parameters, k, β, ε, for comparison and verified the relationships
among k-anonymity, sampling, and noise addition.We implemented our risk analysis
method on a PC with an Intel Core i7-4790 3.6-GHz CPU and a 16.0-GB memory.
4.3.3.2 Dataset and Adversary Model
We used a pseudomedical dataset based on an actual medical dataset. The dataset
had 10,000 records and two attributes, total cholesterol (TC) and HbA1c, and the
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distribution of each attribute is shown in Figs. 4.5 and 4.6.We first measured the com-
putation time while changing the number of records and then evaluated the validity
of our metrics while changing the parameters of each anonymization method. Noise
addition, generalization, and sampling were used as representative anonymization
methods, and we adopted the Mondrian algorithm [9] for k-anonymization, Laplace
noise for noise addition, and random sampling for sampling. We assumed reiden-
tifying adversary A1 to A4. The conditions of the attacker models are the same as
those of Sect. 4.3.2.4 except for noise addition. We define the fnoise of the A2 and
A4 output records, whose value for each attribute differed by 5% from the original
value, to be candidates.
4.3.4 Results
4.3.4.1 Computational Complexity
Our proposed privacy metrics are intended to be able to applied to large datasets.
We measured the execution time by changing the number of records (Table4.1) and
parameters (Table4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).
It takes little time to evaluate the risk when simple attackers, such as A1 and
A3, are considered. On the other hand, when reflective attackers are assumed, the
number of calculations increases and more time is required for evaluation. However,
some of the processing described above reduces the time. For instance, the number
of combinations of attributes increases with increasing numbers of records, and once
an attacker has checked the risk of a record, that attacker does not have to calculate
the risk of other records that have the same values. Therefore, the analysis algorithm
is appropriate for large datasets.
Table 4.1 Execution time
# of records A1 (ms) A2 (ms) A3 (ms) A4 (ms)
1000 1.8 699.6 131.8 569.0
5000 2.6 17,005.6 751.2 8,920.8
10000 4.7 32,764.2 1,361.6 12,925.5
Table 4.2 The case of ε = 0.5, k = 2
β A1 (ms) A2 (ms) A3 (ms) A4 (ms)
0.05 2.6 17,005.6 751.2 8,920.8
0.10 1.2 18,950.8 512.8 5,084.8
0.30 2.0 26,715.4 139.2 8,285.4
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Table 4.3 The case of β = 0.05, k = 2
ε A1 (ms) A2 (ms) A3 (ms) A4 (ms)
0.5 2.6 17,005.6 751.2 8,920.8
1.0 1.4 17,002.4 628.6 9,256.4
3.0 1.6 16,894.8 945.0 8,968.2
Table 4.4 The case of β = 0.05, ε = 0.5
k A1 (ms) A2 (ms) A3 (ms) A4 (ms)
2 2.6 17,005.6 751.2 8,920.8
3 2.9 16,828.6 744.2 8,788.4
4 2.8 17,211.9 755.8 9,013.1
Table 4.5 Relationship among parameters and our metrics (p, N)
k = 2 β
0.05 0.1 0.3
ε 0.1 (0.0196, 1) (0.0303, 2) (0.0909, 1)
0.5 (0.0204, 1) (0.0250, 1) (0.1000, 1)
1.0 (0.0208, 1) (0.0278, 1) (0.1000, 1)
When the sampling rate is changed, the computation time differs depending on
the attacker. This is because there are two loop processes, one for sampled records
and one for nonsampled records, and the calculation methods of each process differ
depending on the attacker.
The effect of noise addition on computation time is not different in this experiment,
but when a very large amount of noise is added, the distribution of the records is
uniform and the different kinds of records increase; as a result, the computation time
may increase.
The effect of k-anonymity also seems minimal, but when k is large the number
of different types of records decreases and the computation time may decrease.
Validation
We observed p and N by changing the sampling rate β and the noise parameter ε to
verify the validity of our metrics.We evaluated the attacker model A4 while changing
the parameters k, β, and ε. The evaluation result is shown below (Table4.5, 4.6).
The risk to privacy decreases as k increases and as β and ε decrease, and the
risk is a valid privacy metric. Sampling rates are the key factor that reduces the risk
in this experiment. There are some outliers in the datasets, and they are the cause
of the risk. In fact, if such records are not sampled, the privacy risk decreases. We
conducted this experiment multiple times, and the result was different each time.
Table4.7 presents a sample of the evaluation results. Some outliers were included in
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Table 4.6 Relationship among parameters and our metrics (p, N)
k = 4 β
0.05 0.1 0.3
ε 0.1 (0.0154, 1) (0.0270, 2) (0.0667, 2)
0.5 (0.0192, 1) (0.0227, 2) (0.0625, 3)
1.0 (0.0200, 1) (0.0238, 2) (0.0625, 1)
Table 4.7 Case of β = 0.05, ε = 1.0
Times A1 A2 A3 A4
1 (1.0000,3) (0.0035,1) (0.0083,1) (0.0049,1)
2 (1.0000,2) (0.0013,4) (0.0108,1) (0.0035,1)
3 (1.0000,4) (0.0217,1) (0.1667,1) (0.0204,1)
4 (0.5000,5) (0.0030,1) (0.0667,1) (0.0050,1)
5 (1.0000,5) (0.0032,1) (0.0294,1) (0.0051,1)
the third operation, and the risk was higher than that of other operations. Therefore,
the key factor may change when outliers are removed in advance.
4.4 Extension to Time-Sequence Data
4.4.1 Privacy Definition
We define two types of attack models for time-sequence datasets. The first, a reiden-
tification attack, is a general attack model where an attacker has information on the
original dataset M and tries to reidentify it in an anonymized dataset A(M). This
model assumes that an attacker has maximal information about the original dataset.
This model is the same as that of k-anonymization, where even if an attacker has an
original dataset, the probability of the reidentification of a k-anonymized dataset is
1/k.
Definition 4.10 (Reidentification attack) Let an attacker have a matrix Mt1 ∈ Rn×m
and an anonymizedmatrix A(Mt1) ∈ Rn×m . A reidentification attack against a record
ri succeeds if record ri ∈ Mt1 is linked to record r ′j ∈ A(Mt1), where ri and r ′j are
the same user.
A linkage attack, which is an attack on a valid user, is one in which an attacker
tries to obtain information from the given datasets A(Mt1) and A(Mt2). A(Mt1) and
A(Mt2) are assumed to include the same users, but the primary keys are different.
An attacker in this model has only anonymized datasets, so a valid user is assumed
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Fig. 4.7 Example of a risk
evaluation
to be an attacker in this model. There are few studies concerning this problem, and
we evaluate the risk using actual datasets in this paper.
Definition 4.11 (Linkage attack) Let an attacker have two anonymized matrices,
A(Mt1) ∈ Rn×m and A(Mt2) ∈ Rn×m . Mt1 and Mt2 include the same users and items,
where each user and item ofMt2 are the same as those ofMt1 . A linkage attack against
a record ri succeeds if record r ′i ∈ A(Mt1) is linked to record r ′′j ∈ A(Mt2), where r ′i
and r ′′j are the same user.
We next define the privacy metric as follows:
Definition 4.129 (Privacy metric) Let n be the total number of users of a dataset M
and n′ be the number of users that are successfully attacked. The privacy risk of M
is defined as n
′
n .
We consider the attacks to be the same as the previous ones to solve an assignment
problem. An assignment problem is to find an appropriate task assignment when
there are n users and tasks, and the Hungarian algorithm [47] solves the assignment
problem in such a way that the entire cost is minimal.
We apply the same algorithm as used for reidentification and linkage attacks and
assume that when an attacker assigns a record to the correct user, the attack succeeds.
When a dataset is k-anonymized, there are at least k − 1 of the same records. Hence,
when a record is assigned to the cluster to which the correct record belongs to,
we regard the record as being assigned correctly even if the assigned record is not
actually correct. Furthermore, we define the privacy metric as the result obtained by
multiplying the probability, and we define 1/k because the probability is the ratio of
correctly assigned clusters (Fig. 4.7).
Figure4.1 shows an example of a risk evaluation. The dataset on the left is the
original dataset and that on the right is the anonymized dataset. The arrows indicate
the assignment result. User 2 of the original dataset, for instance, is assigned to user
3 of the anonymized dataset, so the attack on user 2 fails. When noise addition is
used as the anonymization method, users 2, 3, 4, and 5 are assigned to the wrong
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users and the privacy risk is 3/7. On the other hand, when k-anonymization is used,
in this case, k = 2, users 4 and 5 are assigned to the wrong users (blue arrows) but
are assigned to the clusters that are the same as those of the correct users. Therefore,
we consider the attacks on users 4 and 5 to be successful. The failed attacks are only
for users 2 and 3 (red arrows), and the privacy risk is 5/7 × 1/2 = 5/14.
4.4.2 Utility Definition
We define the utility metric here. In previous research, most utility metrics are based
on either the distance between the original dataset and the anonymized dataset, or the
amount of information loss [48, 49]. However, the utility depends on the situation
(i.e., context and use case), and these metrics do not necessarily match the actual
utility. Therefore, we consider a use case scenario and present a utility definition that
matches the scenario. Specifically, we consider a use case in which an anonymized
dataset is used as training data for a machine learning algorithm. In the case of a
Web access log dataset, for example, a client, who is a developer of an anti-virus
software, may generate a machine learning model from an anonymized dataset and
predict whether their user will access a phishing Web site.
Definition 4.13 (Utility metric) Let F(M, E) be the F-measure of a machine learn-
ing model, where the training data are M and the test data are E . The utility metric
is defined as follows:
Uti(A(M)) = F(A(M), E)
F(M, E)
. (4.1)
Figure4.8 gives an overview of the utility evaluation. We first generate two
machine learning models: One is from an original dataset, and the other is from
its anonymized dataset. An item is randomly chosen as an objective variable, and the
remaining items are explanation variables. Then, we use these models and predict an
attribute of each record of an evaluation dataset that has the same attributes as those
of the original dataset. This operation is performed several times while an objective
variable is changed. The utility is defined as the average of the ratio of the F-measure
of a model of the anonymized dataset to that of a model of the corresponding original
dataset. In this paper, we apply logistic regression as the machine learning algorithm
and predict fifty attributes.
4.4.3 Matrix Factorization
Matrix factorization is a fundamental task in data analysis, and the technique is used
in various scenarios, such as text data mining, acoustic analysis, and product recom-
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Fig. 4.8 Overview of utility
evaluation
mendation by collaborativefiltering.Weusematrix factorization as an anonymization
technique, so we present an overview of matrix factorization in this section.
4.4.3.1 SGD Matrix Factorization
We consider an unknown rank-r matrix M ∈ Rn×m and assume that we know a set
of elements 
 ⊂ [n] × [m]. P








The goal of matrix factorization is to find two matrices U ∈ Rr×n and V ∈ Rr×m
which approximate the original matrix Mi j ≈ Xi j s.t. ∀Mi j ∈ 
(M) with lower
dimensionality r << min(n,m). Here, X = UTV .






(Mi j − uTi v j )2 + λ(||ui ||2 + ||v j ||2), (4.3)
whereui is a vector of user factors and v j is a vector of item factors.Whenui and v j are
variables, this function is not a convex set, so the problem described above cannot be
solved. Some techniques are proposed to solve the problem, andgradient descent [50],
for example, is a fundamental technique to find a local minimum value. However,
gradient descent needs to update vectors iteratively to obtain an optimal solution and
using gradient descent is computationally expensive, so stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) is widely used, for example, in the KDD Cup 2011 [51] and the Netflix
Prize [52].
There has been some research to speed up SGD-based matrix factorization, such
as [53–56], and each algorithm updates the matrices in parallel or in a distributed
manner.
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In this paper, we apply a simple SGD technique to optimize formula (2) and denote
Update(A) as the update of a matrix A using the SGD technique.
4.4.4 Anonymization Using Matrix Factorization
We consider matrix factorization to be an anonymization method, and rank r
contributes to the accuracy of the matrix approximation. Moreover, we propose
combining matrix factorization with another anonymization method ano, such as
k-anonymization or noise addition. We denote p as a parameter of the anonymiza-
tion method, and p is k or φ in this paper. A basis matrix U and weighting matrix
V can be assumed to be the characteristics of the rows and columns, respectively,
and U is a characteristic matrix of users in our dataset. Therefore, we propose to
anonymizeU and maintain V so that the characteristics of the domain are preserved.
In our algorithm, we first divide the dataset M into U and V , and anonymize U .
Then, we optimize V once and recombine it with the anonymized U . The algorithm
is described below.
We indicate that Ar (D) applies matrix factorization to matrix D and that
A(ano,r)(D) combines matrix factorization and the anonymization method ano by:
A(ano,r)(D)=(A(ano)(U ))TV,whereU ∈Rr×n, V ∈Rr×m . (4.4)
Algorithm 4.6 (M, r, I, ano, p): Anonymization using Matrix Factorization
Input: Original dataset M , rank r , and the number of iterations I .
1: t = 0
2: Construct Ut ∈ [0, 1]n×r and Vt ∈ [0, 1]m×r randomly
3: while t < I do
4: Ut+1 = Update(Ut )
5: Vt+1 = Update(Vt )
6: t = t + 1
7: end while
8: U ′t+1 = A(ano)(Ut+1)
9: return X = U ′Tt+1Vt+1
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Table 4.8 Dataset format
ID (= i) Date URL (= j)
xt1 (= 1) 2016-12-01 16:13:48 www.google.com (= 1)
yt1 (= 2) 2016-12-01 16:15:14 www.mail.google.com (= 2)
xt1 2016-12-01 16:17:13 www.youtube.com (= 3)
zt1 (= 3) 2016-12-01 16:19:01 www.facebook.com (= 4)
xt2 (= 1) 2016-12-01 16:21:15 www.youtube.com
xt2 2016-12-01 16:22:42 www.google.com
zt2 (= 3) 2016-12-01 16:25:01 www.youtube.com
4.4.5 Experiment
4.4.5.1 Dataset
We use an actual Web access log dataset as a time-sequence dataset. The dataset
consists of an ID, a time stamp, and the access domain, as shown in Table4.8. We
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Here, T is the observation time.
We say ri j = 1 if a user whose ID is i accesses domain j during time T , and
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1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
⎤
⎦ (4.7)
Here, t1 is the 10-min span between 2016-12-01 16:10:00 and 2016-12-01
16:19:59, and t2 is the similar 10-min span between 2016-12-01 16:20:00 and 2016-
12-01 16:29:59. The IDs are different between t1 and t2, but xt1 and xt2 , and zt1 and
zt2 represent the same users.
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Table 4.9 Linkage attack against a non-anonymized dataset




In the following experiments, we chose randomly 200 users and 1,000 domains
from an actual Web access log and let the pseudonymous ID be changed at each
designated time T .
4.4.5.2 The Privacy Risk Against a Linkage Attack
First, we evaluate whether a linkage attack is possible. We set the observation time
t1 as 2, 4, and 8 h from 16:00 on a weekday and the observation time t2 as the same
time on another weekday. The probability of a linkage attack between Mt1 and Mt2
is shown in Table4.9.
Thematrix only includes information onwhether a domain has been accessed, and
even if the observation time is 2 h, the linkage attack probability, i.e., risk, is very high
(over 50%). Moreover, the risk increases as the observation time increases because
when the observation time increases, the trend of a user becomes noticeable. The
result shows that the pattern of Web access for people has consistent characteristics.
Hence, we need to consider not only reidentification attacks but also linkage attacks
to avoid privacy leakages.
4.4.5.3 Effects of Matrix Factorization
Observation times t1 and t2 are fixed as 8 h from16:00 h on aweekday in the following
experiments. The inputs ofmatrix factorization are the original datasetM , the number
of iterations I , and the rank r . Furthermore, λ and γ and are the hyperparameters.We
fix I = 100, which is enough to converge, γ = 0.05, and λ = 0.01. The convergence
result is shown inFig. 4.9. The rank r canbe treated as the parameter of anonymization
by matrix factorization because the accuracy of dataset X = UV T depends on the
rank r , so r is the parameter of our algorithm; we set r = 10, 20, 30, 40.We set larger
values in the experiments in [3], but the results of the case r > 40 are saturated. The
probabilities of reidentification and linkage attacks are shown in Table4.10.
The results show that matrix factorization itself does not have much effect on
reidentification attacks. Note that matrix factorization can preserve the relative posi-
tional relationship among the records so that the privacy risk of the reidentification
attack does not decrease much by using a matching algorithm. When the rank is
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Fig. 4.9 Convergence result
Table 4.10 Attacks against matrix factorization





Fig. 4.10 Overview of the
experiment
small enough, r = 10, the positional relationship is broken, and the privacy risk is
lowered.
On the other hand, comparedwith the reidentification attackpresented inTable4.9,
the linkage attack probability between Ar (Mt1) and Ar (Mt2) is better. This is because
the relationship between the records of Mt1 and Mt2 is weaker than that between Mt1
and Ar (Mt1). In our experiment, the dataset of the observation time is 8 h and r = 30
has almost the same privacy level as when the observation time is 2 h (Fig. 4.10).
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Table 4.11 Experiment 1








Weevaluate our anonymizationmethod,Algorithm4.1, in the following experiments.
We apply the method described in [10] as k-anonymization and Laplace noise as the
noise addition. When noise addition is applied, noise ε ∼ Lap(0, 2φ2) is added to
each element, and the parameter is φ.
1. Evaluate the privacy risk of a reidentification attack between Ak(Mt1) and Mt1
and a linkage attack between Ak(Mt1) and Ak(Mt2).
2. Evaluate the privacy risk of a reidentification attack between Aφ(Mt1) and Mt1
and a linkage attack between Aφ(Mt1) and Aφ(Mt2).
3. Evaluate the privacy risk of reidentification attacks between Ak(Ut1)
TV and Mt1
and linkage attacks between Ak(Ut1)
TV and Ak(Ut2)
TV .
4. Evaluate the privacy risk of reidentification attacks between Aφ(Ut1)
TV and Mt1
and linkage attacks between Aφ(Ut1)
TV and Aφ(Ut2)
TV .
The evaluations of the reidentification attacks in experiments 1 and 2 are almost
the same as those conducted in many previous studies. The difference is the privacy
metric (see 4.4.1), and these results are used for comparison with experiments 3 and
4, which are evaluations of our algorithm. There are few studies on linkage attacks,
and evaluations of this type of attack are one of our contributions.
The evaluation of the reidentification attack in experiment 1 (Table4.11) is simple,
and the result is almost the same as for k-anonymization. However, our privacymetric
is slightly different from that for k-anonymity, so the result is also slightly different
from 1/k. The result of the linkage attack also shows that k-anonymization can
greatly improve the privacy of linkage attacks and that 2-anonymization can reduce
the privacy risk by 77%(0.8 → 0.185).
The evaluations of experiment 2 are shown in Table4.12. The privacy of the
reidentification attack is improved from φ ≥ 0.9, and when φ is large, for example,
φ = 1.5, the score appears to be good. However, almost half of the records are
changed by more than 1 by the added noise, and each original value of M is 0 or 1,
namely, Mi j ∈ {0, 1}, so that the noise is too large to preserve utility. Therefore, we
conclude that simple noise addition is not good, in terms of utility preservation, as an
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Table 4.12 Experiment 2






Table 4.13 Experiment 3: reidentification attack
k r = 10 r = 20 r = 30 r = 40
2 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50
4 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.25
6 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16
8 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Table 4.14 Experiment 3: linkage attack
k r = 10 r = 20 r = 30 r = 40
2 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.15
4 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07
6 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
8 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
10 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
anonymization method. On the other hand, we obtain an interesting result for linkage
attacks. The privacy for linkage attacks is improved even if the noise is very small
and adding even a small amount of noise is an effective countermeasure against a
linkage attack.
In experiment 3, we evaluate the effect of our proposed algorithm, which is a
combination of matrix factorization and k-anonymization. Table4.13 presents the
result of the reidentification attack. In the experiment, we cannot find the effect of
the matrix factorization very well, but the privacy slightly improves as r increases.
This is because k-anonymization has a large effect on the reidentification risk, and
the effect of the matrix factorization does not appear.
The results of the linkage attack in experiment 3 are shown in Table4.14. In the
experiment, we cannot obtain newknowledge about the effect ofmatrix factorization.
When the datasets, which are observed at different time periods, are sufficiently
anonymized by k-anonymization, there is no relationship among the same users of
each dataset and only outliers can be linked.
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Table 4.15 Experiment 4: reidentification attack
φ r = 10 r = 20 r = 30 r = 40
0.05 0.75 0.95 0.97 1.00
0.10 0.42 0.72 0.85 0.86
0.15 0.25 0.50 0.61 0.70
0.20 0.18 0.28 0.40 0.49
Table 4.16 Experiment 4: linkage attack
φ r = 10 r = 20 r = 30 r = 40
0.05 0.21 0.34 0.34 0.50
0.10 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.20
0.15 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10
0.20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Fig. 4.11 Reidentification
risk of the combination of
matrix factorization and
noise addition
In experiment 4, we evaluate the impact of our method, which is a combination of
matrix factorization and noise addition. The evaluation results of the reidentification
attack are presented in Table4.15. Noise is added to U , which is the user’s charac-
teristics, and then,UT is multiplied by V . Therefore, we cannot simply compare the
results with those of experiment 2, but the impact of the matrix factorization is high.
This result shows that using matrix factorization can help to construct anonymized
datasets flexibly from the viewpoint of privacy. For example, the privacy risk of
A(φ=0.15,r=20)(Mt1) and A(φ=0.20,r=40)(Mt1) is almost the same as that of A(k=2)(Mt1)
and A(φ=1.5)(Mt1).
The results of the linkage attack in experiment 4 are presented in Table4.16. The
trend is the same as that of the reidentification attack, and the matrix factorization is
compatible with noise addition. We present the details of the results of the reidenti-
fication attack and the linkage attack in Figs. 4.11 and 4.12.
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Fig. 4.12 Linkage risk of
the combination of matrix
factorization and noise
addition
Table 4.17 Utility evaluation 1
Dataset D Precision Recall F-measure Uti(D)
A(k=2)(Mt1 ) 0.780 0.720 0.749 0.981
A(k=4)(Mt1 ) 0.741 0.688 0.714 0.936
A(k=6)(Mt1 ) 0.755 0.691 0.721 0.946
A(k=8)(Mt1 ) 0.737 0.659 0.696 0.913
A(k=10)(Mt1 ) 0.748 0.677 0.711 0.932
4.4.6.2 Utility Evaluation
We next evaluate the utility of anonymized datasets. We evaluate the utility of
datasets by applying amachine learning algorithm.Logistic regression (https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.linear_model.LogisticRegression.html)
is applied in the following experiment, and the parameters are those of the default
setting. One of the applications of an access log dataset is to predict a malicious site
and inform the web browser’s users. Therefore, we use a machine learning algorithm
and predict whether each user will access a malicious site. We generate learning
models using the original (non-anonymized) dataset and the anonymized datasets
and input the test dataset to these models. The utility score is defined in Definition
4.13, and the F-measure of the model of the original dataset is 0.763. Each result of
the evaluation is shown in Tables. 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20.
1. Evaluate the utility of A(k)(Mt1) for k = 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.
2. Evaluate the utility of A(φ)(Mt1) for φ = 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, 1.2, and 1.5.
3. Evaluate the utility of A(k=2,r)(Mt1) for r = 10, 20, 30, and 40.
4. Evaluate the utility of A(φ,r)(Mt1) for φ = 0.1 and 0.15 and r = 10, 20, 30, and
40.
In experiment 1, each element is Mi j ∈ {0, 1} and the matrix is sparse, even when
k-anonymization is effective. However, when the dataset is more complex, the utility
of k-anonymizationwill decrease; this iswidely knownas the curse of dimensionality.
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Table 4.18 Utility evaluation 2
Dataset D Precision Recall F-measure Uti(D)
A(φ=0.3)(Mt1 ) 0.780 0.664 0.717 0.941
A(φ=0.6)(Mt1 ) 0.738 0.610 0.668 0.876
A(φ=0.9)(Mt1 ) 0.719 0.541 0.618 0.810
A(φ=1.2)(Mt1 ) 0.652 0.507 0.571 0.748
A(φ=1.5)(Mt1 ) 0.625 0.520 0.567 0.744
Table 4.19 Utility evaluation 3
Dataset D Precision Recall F-measure Uti(D)
A(k=2,r=10)(Mt1 ) 0.686 0.735 0.710 0.930
A(k=2,r=20)(Mt1 ) 0.699 0.767 0.731 0.959
A(k=2,r=30)(Mt1 ) 0.695 0.773 0.732 0.960
A(k=2,r=40)(Mt1 ) 0.712 0.786 0.747 0.980
Table 4.20 Utility evaluation 4
Dataset D Precision Recall F-measure Uti(D)
A(φ=0.10,r=10)(Mt1 ) 0.742 0.650 0.693 0.909
A(φ=0.10,r=20)(Mt1 ) 0.752 0.688 0.719 0.943
A(φ=0.10,r=30)(Mt1 ) 0.736 0.703 0.719 0.943
A(φ=0.10,r=40)(Mt1 ) 0.737 0.735 0.736 0.965
Table 4.21 Utility evaluation 5
Dataset D Precision Recall F-measure Uti(D)
A(φ=0.15,r=10)(Mt1 ) 0.718 0.614 0.662 0.868
A(φ=0.15,r=20)(Mt1 ) 0.748 0.655 0.698 0.915
A(φ=0.15,r=30)(Mt1 ) 0.704 0.680 0.692 0.907
A(φ=0.15,r=40)(Mt1 ) 0.716 0.711 0.713 0.935
The results of experiment 2 show that the utility of the dataset decreases as noise
increases. As stated in the risk evaluation section, each element of the original dataset
is 0 or 1, and the utility drastically worsens when the noise parameter is large, such
as φ = 1.5.
When k-anonymization andmatrix factorization are combined, the effect ofmatrix
factorization is small, as is the case for the privacy risk. In this experiment, the effect
of k-anonymization is large, and the effect of matrix factorization is relatively small.
The evaluation results of the combination of noise addition and matrix factor-
ization show a good performance (Tables4.20 and 4.21). A dataset generated by
combining matrix factorization and noise addition has more utility than a dataset
generated by noise addition when each dataset has the same privacy level.
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Fig. 4.13 Anonymization and privacy risk evaluation tool 1
4.5 Anonymization and Privacy Risk Evaluation Tool
In this section, we introduce an anonymization and privacy risk evaluation tool. So
far, we have shown how to evaluate the privacy and utility of several datasets. We
focus on static datasets and apply the theory we have described in the tool. First,
we explain the outline of the tool. The tool requires a dataset that is the target of
anonymization and privacy risk evaluation. At this time, the data type is defined for
each attribute (see Fig. 4.13). Numerical, qualitative, set, code, and sensitive types
can be defined. Age, height, and weight are defined as numerical types, and a user
can assign a range of values. For instance, a user may want to divide age into groups
of two years or five years depending on the situation. Qualitative-type records have
nonnumerical value, such as gender and occupation. The set type is an extended
numerical or qualitative type, and attributes that include multiple data correspond
to this type. The code type is defined when every value is the same digit, such as a
postcode. The sensitive type corresponds to sensitive information. The privacy risk
is evaluated using quasi-identifiers in our tool, and the attributes that are sensitive
do not effect the privacy risk. However, it is known that sensitive information may
cause privacy leakages, and the tool can cover the risk for sensitive information such
as l-diversity.
After the type of each attribute is decided, a user defines the noise and sampling
parameters. Our tool can evaluate datasets that are anonymized by the combined
method. Then, the user generates a hierarchical tree for each attribute, and the tool
anonymizes the values in accordance with the tree. The user can generate and change
the construction of hierarchical trees by using a UI (see Fig. 4.14.).
After these preparations are finished, the user can define the conditions and gen-
erate a dataset flexibly. A sample operation screen is shown in Fig. 4.15. Let us
introduce a method commonly used as an example. First, a user searches records that
do not achieve k-anonymity. Namely, the user searches records that do not include
more than k copies of the same record, and then the user changes the level of an
attribute of the records. The records that are secure enough are not processed, so the
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Fig. 4.14 Anonymization and privacy risk evaluation tool 2
Fig. 4.15 Anonymization and privacy risk evaluation tool 3
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Fig. 4.16 Anonymization and privacy risk evaluation tool 4
utility of the dataset can be maintained. The conditions can be more complex. For
example, the records that have a value of “age” over 80 and a value of “occupation”
that is not “self-employed” are identified and anonymized. The ranks of the records
are “balanced” according to the hierarchical tree. The privacy risk can be seen in
real time (in Fig. 4.16), and the user can anonymize a dataset by trial and error. The
operation procedure can be output as a setting file, and once the operation is decided,
the procedure can be performed automatically, such as in batch processing.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered the importance of data and privacy. Several anonymiza-
tion techniques, including k-anonymization, are introduced in Sect. 4.2, and the pri-
vacy and adversary model for static data are shown in Sect. 4.3. We focused on static
data and time-sequence data in this project, and we discuss time-sequence data in
Sect. 4.4. Finally, in Sect. 4.5, we introduce an anonymization and privacy risk eval-
uation tool. The tool is partly developed in this project, and we are proactive in using
it commercially.
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Chapter 5
Living Safety Testbed Group
Koji Kitamura and Yoshifumi Nishida
Abstract Safety technology for everyday activities is strongly needed for children,
the elderly, and persons with disabilities. However, it is difficult to understand prob-
lems related to everyday life from injury data, medical data, and so on because
such data are distributed over multiple organizations and cannot easily be shared or
integrated due to privacy protection concerns. To address this issue, our project is
developing technologies for integrating and utilizingmulti-organizational distributed
big data based on security technology. The authors research school safety based on
the developed technologies. In this chapter, the authors describe a trend analysis tech-
nology for time series injury data, a cliff analysis technology for extracting serious
injury situation, and child behavior prediction technology as the necessary functions
for finding and predicting serious injuries and evaluating the effectiveness of an
intervention. We also present some analysis examples using the developed function.
Furthermore, we describe some social implementation projects for injury prevention
for the serious injuries found by analyzing injury data using our developed system.
5.1 Necessity of Living Safety
Community safety is highly desirable for children, the elderly, persons with disabil-
ities, and others with special needs for functional support in daily life. People with
variances in the functions of daily life experience insufficiencies in bodily or cognitive
function under conditions or environments that had previously been problem-free.
Risk arises at certain times, and maintenance of their safety through their own care
or the care of people around them is thereafter difficult. It is accordingly important
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to seek out data that will serve as a basis for identification of states of risk and related
conditions, implement effective corrective measures, and verify the results.
In the realm of community safety, historical data on the past accidents and thera-
pies commonly exist in a state of dispersion amongmany different organizations, and
it is therefore difficult to determine the total number of accidents that have occurred
and gain an overall perspective extending from cause of accident to resulting injury.
If relevant data held at many different organizations can be integrated and utilized,
this may then lead to problem identification and effective solution based on the data.
In actuality, sharing and integration of data across institutions is difficult because
of the need to protect information on individuals, maintain privacy, prevent infor-
mation leakage, and other needs. So long as non-engagement in active sharing and
integration of such data remains blameless, it will tend to discourage advancement of
community safety. In this light, we are now engaged in advancing the development
of technology for utilization and application of multi-organizational dispersed data
using security-based technology, in a Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST)
CREST (systemization of the security base technology for expediting/accelerating
of/for big data integration and utilization) project. The research group of the authors
is working in collaboration with data-holding medical/therapy organizations and
with product design and other data-user sites to develop technology for effective
utilization of organizationally dispersed data. To date, in collaboration with Fire and
Disaster Management Agency, Japan Sport Council, multiple medical institutions,
nursery, elementary, and junior high schools, and other entities, we have advanced the
development of technology for integration and utilization of dispersed injury-related
data.
With school safety as a specific field of application, we are engaged in proof
of concept and system by demonstration. So far, we have compiled medical cost
and other KPI-bearing big data from accident data dispersed in multiple elemen-
tary schools, performed presumed integration without specifying the schools, and
conceived and developed a serious injury accident analysis system using the multi-
party private set intersection (PSI) protocol privacy-preserving information-sharing
technique and severity cliff analysis technology, for analysis of the main accidents
causing severe injury, and verified the system effectiveness by applying it to actual
data. With this system, the analyst identifies the task to be performed at the school
site and presumably has it applied as a preventive measure.
In the present report, we describe the on-site use of the proposed system for task
identification focused on temporal changes that becomes necessary and function
expansion and application to actual data in intervention results evaluation. We also
report on actual utilization of the system and on identified tasks as we engaged in
acquisition and analysis of fine data necessary for injury prevention.
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5.2 Overview of Test Bed System for Living Safety
For problem identification and solution, a system of privacy preservation is nec-
essary to permit sharing and integration of data held by multiple organizations. It
also requires an analytical method of obtaining useful information from the shared
and integrated data. One method for this purpose is embodied in the JST CREST
(systemization of the security base technology for expediting/accelerating of/for big
data integration and utilization) project in which the authors participate, have devel-
oped the dataset (PSI: private set intersection) computation technology that preserves
privacy, and have proposed a system including the severity cliff analysis technology.
PSI technology enables extraction of intersections in relation to specified data
items left uncoded and held by multiple organizations. With its utilization, accident
information meeting conditions specified by the user can be provided to the user
in an integrated state while leaving concealed the identity of the school where the
accident occurred.
The severity cliff analysis technology provides a means of analyzing the cause
of severe injury accidents by seeing medical cost as severity. It enables analysis of
the severity of accidents occurring in similar circumstances, location of the point of
departure between cases of high and low severity, and differences between accidents
with severe and slight injury, thus enabling causal analysis of accidents involving
severe injury.
Fig. 5.1 System for sharing and analyzing life-safety-related data with secure function
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In combination, these two technologies can be used to integrate information
on accidents in multiple school environments while preserving privacy, identify
severe injury accidents from the integrated accident data, and analyze their causes.
More specifically, we have conceived and developed a system as shown in Fig. 5.1.
Accident-related information (e.g., grade, sex, and accident and injury categories)
desired by the user is entered and criteria-meeting injury data from multiple schools
are acquired and integrated. Severity cliff analysis is then applied to the accident
circumstances described by textual data accompanying the acquired injury data, thus
enabling determination of the severe injury accidents for the specified accident cir-
cumstances and analysis of the cause.
5.3 Severity Cliff Analysis of School Injury
5.3.1 Development of Severity Cliff Analysis System
5.3.1.1 System Overview
As shown schematically in Fig. 5.2, the developed severity cliff analysis system
comprises four functions: accident circumstance registration, similar accident cir-
cumstance search, severe injury accident search, and severity cliff analysis. These
functions are described in detail in the following corresponding subsections.
Fig. 5.2 System configuration for cliff analysis
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5.3.1.2 Accident Circumstance Registration
The accident circumstance registration function assigns the accident circumstance
feature values to the accident circumstances present in the accident database. The
accident database is first subjected to morphological analysis of text representing
accident circumstances in order to extract the nouns and verbs. In this analysis, the
Japanese concept dictionary (Japanese WordNet) is used to consolidate the noun
and verb orthographic variants. Important words are next extracted with TF-IDF
weighting of each. In the present study, words with high TF-IDF values were selected
as representing accident circumstance feature values. These accident circumstance
feature values are assigned to the accident samples in order to construct the accident
database with assigned feature values.
5.3.1.3 Similar Accident Circumstance Search
With this second function, the accident circumstances registered by the first func-
tion for their assigned feature values are sorted into similar accident circumstance
groups. Clustering is performed using the Euclidean distance of the accident circum-
stance feature value vectors assigned in the accident database. The optimum cluster
number is determined with the gap statistic value resulting from the cluster number
assessment. Figure5.3 shows the results of sorting the accident database into similar
accident circumstances.
Fig. 5.3 Clustering of injury
cases
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Fig. 5.4 Example of severe injury analysis of injuries occurring under similar situations
5.3.1.4 Severe Injury Accident Search
The medical costs included in the accident database were used to identify severe
injury accidents, with medical cost presumed high for severe injury accidents.
Figure5.4 showsmedical cost in decreasing order for injuries occurring under similar
circumstances. As shown, medical cost may differ substantially even for accidents
occurring in similar circumstances, and cliffs marked by specific changes may exist.
This indicates that severe injury accidents can be identified by focusing on specific
differences in medical cost.
5.3.1.5 Severity Cliff Analysis
Figure5.5 shows the relation between degree of circumstance similarity and medical
cost in similar states of accident, where the degree of circumstance similarity is the
degree of cosine similarity in comparison with the highest medical cost accident
cases (severe injury accident cases). Figure5.6 shows the three-dimensional graph
obtained on addition of frequency to the graph. Similarity 1.0 denotes the highest
similarity. With these graphs, comparison of severe injury and slight injury accidents
under similar circumstances enables performance of severity cliff analysis focused
on the difference between severe injury and slight injury accidents.
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Fig. 5.5 Relationship
between similarity and cost
Fig. 5.6 Relationships
among similarity, risk, and
frequency
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5.3.2 Severity Cliff Analysis
To test the effectiveness of the developed method when applied to investigating the
causes of actual severe injury accidents, we used the accident data of 19,948 cases
from the Injury and Accident Mutual Aid Benefit System for multiple junior high
schools gathered by the Japan Sport Council.
We performed the cliff analysis for similar accident circumstances with the rela-
tion shownbetween similarity degree andmedical cost as shown inFig. 5.7. Figure5.8
shows the graph of Fig. 5.7 with frequency added.
The severe injury accidents in the similarity range of 1.0–0.6 in Fig. 5.8 were as
follows:
• Strongly impacted and injured right shoulder in fall on contact with opponent
during soccer match. (first-year junior high school, bone fracture, Y=174,504)
• In competing for ball with opponent, on contact with that opponent fell from the
left side, impacting with the ground and injuring the left clavicle. (third-year junior
high school, bone fracture, Y=154,475)
• In competing for the ball with an opponent, encountered strong contact and fell
over from the right shoulder, thereby strongly impacting the right shoulder on the
ground and fracturing the right clavicle. (3rd year junior high school, Y=147,297)
In the same similarity range, the slight injury accidents were as follows:
Fig. 5.7 Relationship
between similarity and cost
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Fig. 5.8 Relationships
among similarity, risk, and
frequency
• At afternoon homeroom starting time, in carrying a bag from a locker and returning
to a seat, the student tripped over the extended leg of a nearby student and fell,
impacting his/her jaw on the leg of a desk and injuring a finger on the left hand.
(second-year junior high school, contusion/bruise, Y=3,452)
• In recess from third class hour, while walking and conversing with a friend, tripped
and fell at entrance to classroom with hands in pockets and therefore impacting
jaw on floor. (second-year junior high school, dislocation, Y=3,152)
• In noon recess,whilewalking in a corridor, trippedona friend’s leg and fell, impact-
ing right eye on wall. (first-year junior high school, contusion/bruise, Y=2,984)
• In classroom before start of class, collided with a friend and fell, impacting face
on floor. (first-year junior high school, bone fracture, Y=2,476)
• While cleaning, engaged in shoving match with friend and fell with left elbow
impacting floor. (third-year junior high school, contusion/bruise, Y=2,256)
In summary, it was found that severe injury accidents occurred in a soccer match
in contacting an opponent and falling, in competing with an opponent for the ball and
contacting the opponent and falling, and in competing for the ball with an opponent
and encountering strong contact and falling over and thus, all during soccer matches
in contact with an opponent and falling, whereas slight injuries occurred in tripping
over someone’s leg and falling, tripping and falling at an entrance, tripping on a
friend’s leg and falling, colliding with a friend and falling, and engaging in a shoving
match and falling and thus were all in tripping on or colliding with something or
someone and falling. Taken together, the results show that among similar instances in
a circumstance of tripping and falling, severe injuries more readily occur in colliding
with an opponent and falling in a soccer match.
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Fig. 5.9 Relationship
between similarity and cost
Fig. 5.10 Relationships
among similarity, risk, and
frequency
Let us next consider the severe injury accidents in the similarity range of 1.0–0.7
in the clusters shown in Figs. 5.9 and 5.10, which were as follows.
• In a “soft tennis” club morning practice session, a ball came flying unseen and
unevaded, directly striking a student in the right eye. (first-year junior high school,
contusion/bruise, Y=48,740)
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• In a “soft tennis” club morning practice session, while throwing ball on the tennis
court for a two-step hit, a student was struck in the left eye by a ball hit by an oppo-
nent, suffering a bruised left eyeball, left retinal tear, and left eye conjunctivitis.
(first-year junior high school, contusion/bruise, Y=42,416)
• In a softball club activity, a student playing catch with a third-year student on the
school ground was struck in the face by the ball after losing sight of it and having
it hit his/her own glove. (second-year junior high school, bone fracture, Y=18,112)
In the same similarity range, the slight injuries were as follows:
• While a student was playing handball in a physical education class on the school-
yard in the fourth school period, during the match, the ball came flying toward
the student, who tried to catch it but mistakenly was struck by the ball on the ring
finger of the left hand. (second-year junior high school, bone fracture, Y=6,304)
• In a volleyball activity, when boys and girls were practicing hitting serves over
the net, the ball hit by a boy struck a student on the left thumb, breaking a bone.
(second-year junior high school, bone fracture, Y=4,484)
• During a volleyball club tournament in a seaside region, in a practice serve at a
gymnasium before a match, a hit ball from the opposite side of the court struck
and injured the right hand of the student. (third-year junior high school, contu-
sion/bruise, Y=3,492)
• During dribbling practice in a club activity at a gymnasium, a ball bounced off
the leg of a club member and struck the right hand and sprained the thumb of the
student. (second-year junior high school, sprain, Y=2,164)
• During bunting practice of the baseball club after class, in a bunting attempt, the
bat was mispositioned and the ball struck the thumb of the right hand. (third-year
junior high school, sprain, Y=2,032)
Concerning these severe and slight injury accidents, in summary, it was found
that the severe injury accidents involved a tennis ball that came flying and struck
the right eye, a tennis ball hit by an opponent that struck the eye, and softball a ball
striking the eye, and thus, all involving an eye being struck by a ball, whereas that the
slight injury accidents involved a handball striking a finger, a hit volleyball striking
a thumb, a basketball striking the right hand, and a baseball striking the right thumb,
and thus, all involving a ball striking a hand or leg. These findings clearly show
that, for accident circumstances in which a ball similarly strikes the body, those in
which the ball strikes an eye tend to result in severe injury. This in turn indicates the
existence of certain parts of the body and types of sports for which injuries tend to
be serious and for which a preventive measure such as an eye protector is seldom
implemented but necessary.
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5.4 Trend Analysis of School Injury
5.4.1 Trend Analysis for Evaluating Intervention
Annual trends can provide an effective perspective in the search for problems that
need to be solved. Examples include accidents that have sharply increased in recent
years and cases that have been large in number with no change over many years,
which may represent problems requiring consideration of preventive measures. It is
also important to focus on annual trends when assessing the effects of measures or
interventions. In this light, we have developed a trend analysis function that can be
integrated and applied in combination with the previously developed severe injury
accident analysis system. It has thus become possible to analyze changes in trends
focused on circumstances and on verbal words characteristic of accident occurrence.
5.4.2 Analysis of Judo Accident
We have applied this trend analysis function to analyze data on 60,300 senior high
school cases among 152,695 cases of judo-related injury included in the Injury and
Fig. 5.11 Analysis of judo accident trends relative to judo techniques
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Fig. 5.12 Analysis of trends in injuries in judo accidents
Accident Mutual Aid Benefit System data of the Japan Sport Council from 2008 to
2015.
Figure5.11 shows the results of an analysis of trends in judo techniques as related
to accidents, and Fig. 5.12 shows the results of an analysis of trends in injuries due to
judo accidents. A publication on judo accidents was issued in 2013, leading to their
recognition as a social problem, issuance of a related alert, and notification of the
risks of shoulder throwing and major outer reaping in particular. A manual on safe
teaching methods was also produced and on-site initiatives were implemented. All
of these apparently had considerable effect.
A marked decrease from 2013 in instances of accident-related shoulder throwing
was confirmed by the authors, but they also found that no clear reduction occurred in
major outer reap accidents. With this trend analysis, it is thus possible to assess the
effects of intervention important for injury prevention. Application of the analysis to
moderate injuries showed sharp reductions in contusion and bruise, sprain, and bone
fracture, but sharp increases in ligament injury and rupture occurred in 2011 and
high levels of their occurrence continued thereafter. It has thus been found possible
to sharply reduce the occurrence of some injuries for which sharp increases had
preceded, by investigating their cause followed by actions such as intervention for
their prevention.
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5.5 Childhood Home-Injury Simulation
5.5.1 Background of Simulation
Most accidents involving children below the age of five occur within their homes.
Since it is important tomaintain a safe home environment for children, it is imperative
to be able to predict what kinds of accidents may occur in a particular environment
and then to findways to improve that environment.However, the various and scattered
statistical data sources and scientific knowledge related to accident prediction have
not been structured for integrative utilization. In this section, the authors report on
the development of a new simulation technology that can be used to predict the
kinds of accidents that may occur in a particular environment by means of a hybrid
memory- and model-based approach. The system consists of a graph-structuralized
accident database created from large-scale accident data (which enables thememory-
based approach) and a development behavior model which describes the statistical
relationship between a body interaction abilities and the age of children.
5.5.2 Home-Injury-Situation Simulation System
In this study, in order to predict child-related accident situations which may occur
in an individual environment, we propose a home-injury-situation simulation sys-
tem which consists of three functions: a development-related behavior prediction
function, an accident situation search function, and a function for classifying prod-
ucts involving similar risks. The configuration of the proposed system is shown in
Fig. 5.13.
The development-related behavior prediction function is used to estimate the area
that can be reached by a child’s hands and then visualize that area in 3D space on a
computer.
The accident situation search function is used to look for specific accident situa-
tions that involve a product extracted from accident situation structure data. These
accident situation structure data reports describe time series changes of the accident
situation in a graph-structuralized form by utilizing text mining technique.
The similar-risk-product classification function uses a clustering method to iden-
tify products that involve similar risks. In the clustering, shape features and the
accident types are used as feature vectors.
With these functions, when a user inputs target environment and child age infor-
mation, the system calculates possible interactions such as “grasping object” using
the developmental behavior model by considering the range of products which exist
in the target environment. The system also locates accident data related to such
products using the graph-structuralized accident database and then outputs possible
accidents corresponding to the target child’s development stage. In addition, the sys-
tem attempts to determine the potential product risks using the third function even
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Fig. 5.13 System configuration of Home-injury-situation simulation
if there are very few or no past reports of accidents involving the products in the
target environment. This case-based prediction facilitates accident forecasting even
if product and children interaction knowledge is insufficient.
In this study, we select accidental ingestion and burn/scald injury as concrete
example injuries in order to confirm the effectiveness of the system.
5.5.3 Development Behavior Prediction Function
Since child behavior changes significantly as development progresses, it is neces-
sary to consider developmental stages when predicting child-related accidents. The
development-related behavior prediction function visualizes the behavior of children
in a virtually constructed environment using the development behavior and semantic
3D models described below.
Touch and climbing behaviors are among the primary causes of accidental inges-
tion and burn/scald injuries. One example reads, “When an electric cooking plate
was being used on the table, a boy climbed onto a chair and touched the edge of
the plate, thus burning his finger.” This example shows that even if an object is not
placed on a floor, it can burn a child if he or she is capable of climbing. Therefore, in
the current system, we implemented a function for predicting climbing and reaching
behaviors based on body measurement and behavior characteristics collected from
more than 2,000 Japanese children.
The statistical data using this database were published as a book for a product
designer in 2013. Using this database, we created a behavior model that describes
the probabilistic relation between the height of a pedestal that a child can climb to
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Fig. 5.14 Statistical data on reachable area
and the reachable horizontal distance from the edge of a pedestal. This model allows
the system to calculate the probability that the child might touch an object placed at
one of a variety of heights. Figure5.14 shows the relationship between the reachable
horizontal distance from the edge of a pedestal and the pedestal height.
When a user inputs information on a target environment, such as a furniture
arrangement, as shown in Fig. 5.15, the system can predict the range of child behav-
ior that can occur within the target environment. The user inputs environmental
information by constructing and arranging 3D object models in a virtual environ-
ment. The system utilizes the 3D game engine Unity to achieve a function suitable
for constructing a target 3D environment on a computer. Each 3D object model has
semantic information such as the object name and child-related interaction behavior.
Figures5.15 and 5.16 show visualization examples.
Figure5.15 shows that the child can touch yellow objects and that whether the
object is touchable depends on the pedestal height, the horizontal distance from the
edge, and child’s age. For example, although two-year-old children cannot touch the
object put at a height of 800mm, four-year-old children can touch the object put at
a height of 800mm and a distance of 100mm from a edge. Figure5.16 shows that,
depending on age, the child can climb to the red top faces.
5.5.4 Accident Situation Search Function
Conventional accident data contain detailed information in a free descriptive sentence
format. However, it is difficult to utilize free descriptive data for situation predictions.
Recently, our research group has been developing a graph-structuralization-based
data mining technique [1] to provide a useful tool for obtaining knowledge on causal
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Fig. 5.15 Visualization of reachable objects
Fig. 5.16 Visualization of climbable places
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relationships arising from interactions between objects and humanbeings. The graph-
structuralization-based technique allows data mining by first converting the free
descriptive sentence into graph-structured data and then applying a graph analyzing
method to the data. Using our software, a user can transform free descriptive data
into graph-structured data that express time series relationship changes between
agents such as a child and a parent, a product, and interaction behavior with the
product. We have also collected over 30,000 childhood injury case data reports in
cooperation with hospitals, with which we created an accident situation structure
database which consists of the data on 681 burn/scald accidents and 1,221 accidental
ingestion incidents. The accident situation search function can be used tofindpossible
accidents from the accident situation structure database by taking into consideration
both the child’s behavior development stage and the past accident data.
5.5.5 Similar-Risk-Product Classification Function
Objects that cause similar accidents often show shape and characteristic resem-
blances. For example, objects related to hot water, such as electric kettles and electric
pots, can cause burn injuries. Therefore, classification of products from the viewpoint
of product characteristics is important for predicting potential risks from products.
Such risk predictions allow us to find potential risks even if a new product has not
been responsible for any previous injuries. To implement the similar-risk-product
classification function, the authors conduct hierarchical clustering using the features
of the objects.
5.5.6 Simulation Example of the Accident Situation
Figure5.17 shows examples of behavior visualization in a target 3D environment.
Each simulation was performed using the functions stated above. By visualizing a
child’s behavior by age, it is possible to check changes in child behavior on the input
environment. For example, in Fig. 5.17, although neither a desk nor a chair can be
reached at when a child is less than 1year old, they can both be reached when the
child is more than 2years old.
Figure5.18 shows an example of similar objects found when an accident situation
is input. In this example, the system simulated not only accidents related to tobacco
and soup, which exists in the environment, but also those resulting from objects
similar to soup, such as boiling water, tea, and heated baby food.
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Fig. 5.17 Comparison of accident situation simulations by child age
Fig. 5.18 Search for potential risks from objects having similar features
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Fig. 5.19 Search for potential risks from objects having similar features
5.5.7 System Verification
To demonstrate the validity of the developed simulation, we reproduced actual ordi-
nary home environments in which accidents had occurred and compared the incident
reports with the simulation results predicted by the system. Actual injury data and
environmental information were collected during home visit investigations. To date,
we have collected such data from 21 ordinary homes where children were injured. At
this stage of the evaluation, we selected four environments where burn/scald injuries
occurred and one where an accidental ingestion occurred.
The evaluation process proceeded as follows: First, we input environmental infor-
mation such as the house layout, furniture placement, and the accident situation and
conduct a simulation of injury prediction. Figure5.19 shows the simulated home
floor plans and the 3D environmental models created using the information provided
in the investigation.
Table5.1 compares actual data with simulated results. In Table5.1, the “Product”
column indicates a the type of product related to an accident. “Age in accident
data” indicates the age of the children when the accident occurred. “Minimum age”
indicates theminimumage set in the simulation that children could touch the products
that could cause burn/scald and/or accidental ingestion. “Number of accident cases”
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Table 5.1 Comparison between actual data and simulation result







Internal medicine 17 12 10
Pot 57 36 25
Detergent 17 12 21
Stove 50 12 5
Fan heater 11 0 0(8)
indicates the number of accident cases, and the number in the parenthesis indicates
the number of accidents due to similar products found by the similar risk product
classification function. The minimum age in the simulation is always less than the
ages given in the accident data. This suggests that the minimum age set by the
simulation was appropriate.
It should also be noted that the simulation succeeded in finding 13 out of 14
accident cases that actually occurred in the environment used for verification in
this study. This confirms that the developed simulation works for finding various
accident types. The single incident that the simulation failed to identify involved a
parent holding a child who grasped an electrical pot located at a high level. Since
this incident relates more to the parent’s behavior than to the child’s, we believe that
the simulation is capable of replicating all incidents that a child might cause by his
or herself.
5.6 Social Impact Engagement Based on Big Data Analysis
in Cooperation with Multiple Stakeholders
5.6.1 Engagement for Preventing Soccer Goal Turnover
The developed system was applied to the Injury and Accident Mutual Aid Benefit
System data compiled by the Japan Sport Council, to analyze 1,921 cases of injury
involving soccer goals that occurred at elementary and junior and senior high schools
in AY2014. Accident circumstances included injury suffered from colliding with a
soccer goal, tripping on a soccer goal or net and falling, or transporting, installing,
cleaning, hanging from, or jumping into a soccer goal, by a soccer goal overturning
bywind, from fallingwhile climbing or sitting on a soccer goal, or by tools or weights
used to secure a soccer goal. Some of these accidents were fatal, and in analysis for
accidents involving soccer goal overturn, we found 29 [2]. More specifically, the
circumstances were as follows:
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• A student acting as goalkeeper on the school grounds in a soccer match during a
physical education class was overjoyed when a shot flew wide of the goal frame
and then hung from the goal, fell, and became pinned under the goal and had one
or more teeth knocked out by the goal.
• While playing soccer in a tournament, the goalkeeper was struck in the neck by a
goal tipped over by strong wind.
• In the lunch-hour break, a student was playing tag at an outlying area of the sports
ground when several other children pulled on the net of a mini-soccer goal, which
fell over and happened to hit the student, who was passing by, in the right side of
his/her face, bruising the student in the head.
In the analysis, it was possible to roughly identify the circumstances of accidental
overturning of the soccer goal, but quantitative determination of the size of the
risk in analysis with these data alone was difficult, and it was therefore difficult to
quantitatively assess the importance and specific method of preventive measures. In
our attempt to determine means of prevention, we therefore measured the impact of
the overturning soccer goal and the force required to overturn it. Because a soccer
goal overturning accident had occurred when someone hung from the crossbar, we
also measured the force on the soccer goal when an individual hung and swung
from it.
For two aluminum goals and one steel goal, we overturned each by ropes attached
to the crossbar andmeasured the resulting impact with an impact force gauge holding
a load cell sensor mounted on the crossbar where it hit the ground.
In each case, the ropes were pulled gently to avoid imparting a shock load and
the pulling was stopped when the soccer goal began to tip over, and the goal was
thereafter left to turn over under its ownweight. The pulling forcewas simultaneously
measured by a small load cell sensor attached between the ropes.
As shown in Fig. 5.20, for the measured impacts when each goal overturned, the
maximum value was 9,521 N for one aluminum goal, 18,980 N for the other, and
29,283 N for the steel goal. The impact of the steel goal was thus found to be 1.5–3
times those of the aluminum goals. Consideration of the relation between impact and
injury indicates that the human skull will fracture under an impact of 3,000–5,000 N
[3], and the results thus showed that impact by any one of these goals would be
sufficient to pose a risk of skull fracture.
As noted above, we measured the force required to overturn a goal in the exper-
iment with a small load cell sensor mounted between the ropes used to pull on the
goal. The measurement was performed for an aluminum goal alone and with one of
the various weights (from 20 to 80kg in 20kg increments) attached to its lower rear
bar, with the results shown in Fig. 5.21. With no weight attached, the goal was found
to be overturned by the small minimum force of 242.2 N (24.7 kgf), and the pulling
force required to overturn the goal was found to increase in an approximately linear
correlation with the increase in the attached weight, with a slope of 0.94 when the
pulling force was expressed in kilograms. This was approximately equal to the 0.89
ratio of the 223cm length of the rearward-directed bar relative to the goal post height
of 250cm, thus indicating that the goal post lower end functioned as the fulcrum in
the principle of the lever.
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Fig. 5.20 Impact of overturning soccer goal
Fig. 5.21 Force required to overturn soccer goal
The most common circumstance of soccer goal accidents at schools is that of
a child hanging and swinging forward and rearward from the goal crossbar. The
horizontal load required to overturn the goal in such circumstances was simulated
and measured in an experiment with a constructed steel-post assembly in which a
biaxial load sensor was attached to each of the two ends of the horizontal bar and the
horizontal and vertical loads were measured. The experiment was performed as one
of 10 cooperating junior high school students hung and swung. Figure5.22 shows the
maximum horizontal loads found in the trials. Overall, the maximum applied force
found for any of the forward and rearward swinging was 405.4 N (41.4 kgf).
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Fig. 5.22 Horizontal load with forward and rearward swinging
Taken together, the results indicated that the force of crossbar impacts near ground
level when the goal overturned ranged from a minimum of 3,887 N to a maximum
of 29,283 N and thus posed a high risk of causing skull fracture. It was found that
an aluminum goal was overturned by a small force of 242.2 N (24.7 kgf) and that
a child hanging and swinging forward and rearward imparted a horizontal force of
405.4 N (41.4 kgf) on the crossbar, and thus, it was found that a soccer goal will be
readily overturned by the swinging action of just one student if not securely fastened
down or having movement curtailed by a mounted weight.
These results have been presented at symposia, and the specific data have been
shown and led to consciousness-raising activities.
5.6.2 Engagement for Preventing Vaulting Box Accidents
Analysis of 97,716 accidents relating to elementary school exercise activities recorded
in the Injury and Accident Mutual Aid Benefit System data of the Japan Sport Coun-
cil in AY2014 showed that vaulting box exercise accidents were most numerous [4].
They numbered 14,715 and thus accounted for approximately 15% of the total acci-
dent number. Among injuries suffered in vaulting box accidents, bone fractures were
most numerous and accounted for approximately 37% of all injuries. The circum-
stances of vaulting box accident occurrence include run-up, takeoff, time from start
to end of hand contact, landing, and forward somersault on platform, with accidents
occurring in the largest number during the time from start to end of hand contact.
Data analysis showed that many bone fractures occurred in the vaulting box exercise,
again with most occurring during the time from start to end of hand contact. Further
details are lacking, however, and in the present state of data on accident circumstances
or child movements, application to injury prevention would be difficult.
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We therefore performed observation and pattern classification of the relationship
between vaulting box vaulting, and the risks involved in actual classes, in collab-
oration with Toshima Ward Fujimidai Elementary School and physical therapists.
The patterns found included low momentum in takeoff, incorrect arm support, and
insufficient center of gravity movement resulting in contact of buttocks with hand
on vaulting box and leading to wrist sprain or failure to vault from vaulting box and
impact of buttocks on vaulting box, and concentration on forward movement alone
leading to loss of balance and falling on landing. Based on this analysis, we have
developed a system that shows vaulting with risk of accident, vaulting action check-
points, and practice methods for correction of ineffective moves (Fig. 5.23) and will
proceed with its evaluation and modification through actual utilization at elementary
schools.
Fig. 5.23 Software supporting guidance on vaulting box safety
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5.7 Conclusion
In this report, we have described trend analysis functions important for advancement
of school safety in application to multi-organizational dispersed data utilizing basic
security technology and performance analysis of actual judo accidents at schools.
In problems elucidated through use of the system under development in this study,
we have engaged in acquisition and analysis of detailed data necessary for injury
prevention and described our engagement in studies on accidents in soccer goal
overturning and vaulting box activities.
We will further apply our system currently under development to actual sites of
activity while further advancing verification and investigate ecosystems for perfor-
mance of injury prevention in actual on-site utilization of the system.
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Chapter 6
Health Test Bed Group
Katsuya Tanaka and Ryuichi Yamamoto
Abstract Under the new law for the secondary use of medical information, which
was activated in May 2018, the future expected secondary use with information
anonymization may contribute to research and development in the medical field of
integrated medical research and public health. On the other hand, under the revised
Personal Information Protection Law and the revised ethical guidelines in medical
research, privacy protection and patient consent management is a crucial issue for the
management of researches. Our JST CREST project, which started in March 2014,
has issued the development of technological elements and synthesized the developed
methods for real-world system for the secondary use and privacy protection of big
data on cloud infrastructure, including safe clinical information management, com-
mercial cloud utilization, and privacy risk evaluation. In this paper, assuming the
utilization of the Standardized Structured Medical Record Information Exchange
version 2 storage, the following target issues are described: (1) effective utilization
of existing standardized storage, (2) secure data collection across medical institu-
tions, (3) privacy risk evaluation in analysis, and (4) traceability while secondary
use.
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6.1 Overview of Legislation and Standardization for the
Secondary Use of Electronic Medical Records
6.1.1 Personal Information Protection Act and
Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act
The Personal Information Protection Act [1] was revised in September 2015 and was
fully enforced inMay 2017. Prior to the revision, the Personal Information Protection
Act was established in 2003 and fully enforced in 2005. At the time that the previous
law was established, both Houses of Councilors recognized that it was insufficient,
with the establishment of separate laws being required in multiple fields, including
medicine, and it was not actually reviewed. This situation remained for a decade
or more. It is now high time for it to be revised. Consequently, several problems in
the previous law were improved; however, a few problems still exist, and some new
concerns have emerged. These include fears that secondary use, which is essential
in the medical treatment field, will become problematic.
To avoid a negative impact on innovation, including drug discovery and medical
equipment development, the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act (official
name: Act on Anonymously Processed Medical Information to Contribute to Med-
ical Research and Development) [2], specializing in the secondary use of medical
data, was enacted in April 2017 and enforced on May 11, 2018. In this paper, we
investigated the issues related to the Personal Information Protection Act and the
predicted effects of the revision to the law, provided an overview, and considered the
impact of the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act.
6.1.1.1 The Personal Information Protection System
in Japan and Related Issues
The main objective of reviewing the previous law was to respond to the EU directive
concerning cross-border personal information in 1995 and the concerns about pri-
vacy infringement as a result of the resident registration network brought about by
revisions to the Basic Resident Registration Act. Furthermore, there were concerns
regarding the prospect of eavesdropping being made possible with court approval
through revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code. Also, as previously stated, this
was fully enforced in April 2005. Basically, this conformed to the OECD personal
information cross-border guidelines [3]; however, allusions to several issues have
been identified. The problems in the medical area include the following facts: the
law is a comprehensive one that does not specify the field; the characteristics of
medicine frequently provided to third parties, an essential purpose, are not being
considered; the definition of personal information is ambiguous, which inevitably
makes anonymization difficult; and focus is placed on protection, and so, the promo-
tion of reuse that does not violate the right of the individual, which was the original
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purpose of the law, is largely ignored. There is also the fact that, in a private sense, it
is aimed at the operator, and where there is an individual causing the infringement, it
is an indirect regulation concerning supervision by the operator.Moreover, the penal-
ties are light and indirect and thus lacking in effectiveness. The different systems for
acquiring personal information are enforced for governments, independent admin-
istrative agencies, local governments, and private enterprises, and this is considered
to obstruct the utilization of personal information across these frameworks.
In the revised Personal Information ProtectionAct, the concept of important infor-
mation has been introduced, and as the vast majority of medical data is designated as
important information, this is a step forward from a comprehensive law that does not
specify fields. When acquiring important information, explicit consent is required,
and third-party provision based on opting-out, which can occur when providing such
information to third parties while the intentions of the person concerned are still
unclear, is prohibited. This is clearly a step forward and promises to suppress provi-
sion to third parties where this is not intended by the person concerned. On the other
hand, in the case of third-party provision,which is essential in collaborativemedicine,
while there were concerns about the explanation of symptoms to family members,
consultations with specialists, etc., this is largely covered by the clear definition of
opt-out consent as “implicit consent” in guidance concerning the appropriate han-
dling of personal information by healthcare and nursing care providers (hereafter,
“healthcare and nursing care guidance”), implementation guidelines issued jointly
by the Personal Information Protection Commission (hereafter, “PPC”) and Min-
istry of Health, Labor and Welfare (hereafter, “MHLW”). However, the fact that,
under law, clear consent is required for provision to third parties for the purpose
of drug discoveries for the development of medicine or medical equipment remains
unchanged. Gaining clear consent places a considerable burden on medical sites, and
even where there may be no intention to violate rights, it must be considered that this
is significantly more problematic than with the previous law. In the revised law, the
concept of anonymized information has been introduced, and by anonymizing data
in accordance with the standards of the PPC, this may be provided without consent
under certain conditions.
However, it is necessary to impose the conditions of prohibition on reidentification
and safety management on the recipient of the data, and it is procedurally complex to
make third-party provisionwith anonymized information a public duty. Additionally,
to meet the anonymization standards of the PPC, a certain amount of information
processing capability is required, which is not simple.While this is not a legal item, in
regard to important information, another feature of the revised law is that traceability
must be secured. Moreover, although a significant impact is feared in healthcare and
nursing care fields where there is frequent provision to third parties, in the healthcare
and nursing care guidance, this is virtually all considered as essential for healthcare
and nursing care, thus avoiding a major increase in the workload of the healthcare
and nursing care institutions. On the other hand, in regard to provision to third parties
involved in secondary use that is not essential for healthcare and nursing care, the
creation of records and their confirmation at the time of receipt are required. For
genetic information, as well, having a personal identifier code specified from which
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the individual can be identified, provided certain conditions are met, has immense
medical significance.
The points alluded to earlier are all features of the previous and revised law as
seen from the perspective of the healthcare and nursing care field. Furthermore, as
the responsibility for enforcing the revised law has been centralized in the PPC and
penalties have been significantly increased, it has become more effective. Major
changes, such as the conditions for distributing personal information overseas being
clarified, have been determined, but these will only be listed in this chapter.
The revised law promises to improve several issues in the previous law. The
strengthening of punitive measures increases its effectiveness, and the introduction
of the concept of important information reduces discrimination based on the ille-
gal use of special personal information, preventing its use through provision to a
third party not intended by the person concerned. However, several issues remain
unresolved. The first of these is that, as operations are based on different regula-
tions from the government, independent administrative bodies, local governments,
and private enterprises, there are about 1,800 autonomous bodies and close to 2,000
statutes. Certainly, there are not any major differences in their basic thinking, but the
executing body varies depending on the statute, and subtle decisions are made by
each executing body. In the case of healthcare and nursing care, the body is a private
company, but the local government and institutions at its rank often contribute, as do
national institutions and independent administrative bodies.
For example, if one prefectural, two city, and two town hospitals and five private
medical institutions collaborate to share organic patient data, it will be necessary for
at least four autonomous bodies to review whether this is possible. For healthcare
providers looking to move forward, this can become a significant burden. Currently,
the fact that the statutemay be different depending on the acquiring body has not been
improved at all. For hereditary information, it is expected that genetic information
will be specified with a personal identification code and handled prudently; however,
under the Personal Information Protection Act, consent gives an absolute pardon. On
the other hand, in the case of hereditary information, even if the person providing
the information provides consent, the impact of such may extend to blood relatives
such as parents and offspring. If, as a result of a parent’s consent, a child became the
victim of discrimination, this could not be handled under the Personal Information
Protection Act. At the current time, improving this point seems to be not possible,
and several people indicate that this is an issue. This should be reviewed in the near
future, and it is to be hoped that it will be resolved quickly.
6.1.1.2 Review and Establishment of the Next-Generation Medical
Infrastructure Act
As previously described, with the revisions to the Personal Information Protection
Act, although several of the issues in the previous law were improved, secondary
use, where there is no intention to violate personal rights and the aim is to use per-
sonal information for the public good, was previously possible via opt-out. However,
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with the revisions, this is no longer possible. Healthcare and nursing care must be
performed based on medicine, but this cannot develop without the use of patient and
user data. Immediately utilizing research results obtained using the laboratory or ani-
mals inmedicine and healthcare is not possible, and human knowledge is essential. In
other words, if this type of usage is suppressed, the acquisition of medical knowledge
itself will likely be suppressed, and this may obstruct the development of healthcare
and nursing care itself. If medical institutions and nursing care providers are able
to anonymize, they will be able to provide data for secondary use without consent.
However, in the case of regional comprehensive care and collaborative medicine,
information is distributed between multiple operators. Therefore, unless information
can be concentrated in a single institution through a joint use declaration, linking and
anonymizing the disparate information will not be possible. Anonymization makes
reidentification impossible, and so anonymized information cannot necessarily be
linked. The simple solution would entail making a joint declaration of use; however,
in this case, the perimeter of information for joint use and other information must
be clarified. In Japan, the healthcare and nursing care services can be freely chosen
by patients and users, so setting the perimeter is essentially difficult. Additionally, it
is necessary to announce the fact that anonymization is taking place, and this can-
not be provided without restriction. A prohibition on reidentification is sought from
the recipient, and although this is effort based at best, safety management is also
required. The provider has no duty to supervise the destination, but if an incident or
illegal use occurs, the complaint from the individual embodying the information will
be directed at the providing medical or nursing care institution, which may result in
a civil lawsuit. Supervision may be considered to be mandatory. Although it is not
impossible, some preparedness and effort are required. However, it is not desirable
that this situation impacts the development of medicine/medical equipment or drug
discovery. Regarding academic research, in Chap.4 of the revised law, it states that
although various duties are not placed on the operators acquiring the personal infor-
mation, this is limited to academic research by academic research institutions, and
although there are calls to draw up and execute guidelines for those not covered by
Chap.4 of the revised law, such guidelines are difficult to implement on a statutory
basis.
Faced with this situation and the awareness of the need to promote use for the
public good that does not violate the rights of the individual, the Cabinet Secretariat
and Office of Healthcare Policy primarily reviewed the measures, whereupon the
Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act was submitted to the Diet as Cabinet
legislation. The basis of this held that if operators with the ability to perform reliable
and safe anonymization, who were able to provide safe information for the public
good in a broad sense, were accredited and medical information was provided from
the accredited operators to the medical institutions, consent could be provided via an
opt-out system. This was established at the end of April 2017 and delivered in May.
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6.1.1.3 Content of the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act
This law focuses on accredited anonymizer medical data creation operators, and as
previously described, operators who can perform anonymization reliably and handle
and provide information safely are accredited by the government. The law intends,
“through the safe and appropriate utilization of anonymizedmedical data, to promote
cutting-edgeR&Drelated to health and healthcare, and new industries, and contribute
to the development of a society where people live healthy and long lives.” The aim is
not simply commercial use but use for the public good in a broad sense. Although its
scope is narrow, it is positioned as an individual law from the Personal Information
Protection Act, and this overwrites such Act.
Definition of Wording
This law is not aimed at general personal information but “medical data.” The main
target is the information related to healthcare, which is a type of important informa-
tion, and the definition has been slightly expanded. The Personal Information Pro-
tection Law covers the information of living individuals, but the Next-Generation
Medical Infrastructure Act includes medical information on deceased people as well.
In healthcare, life and death exist consecutively, and so, this can be considered to be
a reasonable extension. Additionally, in the revised Personal Information Protection
Act, the guidelines for anonymization are indicated by the PPC, whereas the guide-
lines for the anonymizer medical data in the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure
Act are provided by the minister in charge. However, the wording in the definition is
the same, and the law clarifies that this should be determined after consultation with
PPC. Anonymizer information and anonymizer medical information are basically
the same, but with the latter, it is possible to provide detailed guidelines depending
on the case in which it is used.
Accredited Anonymizer Medical Data Creation Operators
The core of this law is the stipulation of accredited anonymizer medical data creation
operators. This is limited to companies who possess appropriate anonymizer capa-
bilities and can provide information to operators who can handle the safe anonymizer
information in accordance with the law. The anonymizer work of such operators does
not apply to stipulations regarding the creation of anonymizer information in Article
36 of the Personal Information Protection Act. Additionally, the safe management
of information and an appropriate response to this are required. This also does con-
travene the concept that this is provided to contribute to R&D in the medical field,
and use that exceeds the scope of achieving the objectives of the accredited operator
is not recognized.
With this, no particular restriction is noted on the operator other than the accred-
ited work. Additionally, provided that the information before the anonymization was
for the operator to create the anonymizer medical data, it may be provided to other
accredited anonymizer medical data creation operators within the scope of that pur-
pose. In this way, if, for example, accredited operator A is mainly accumulating
hospital information and operator B is mainly collecting clinic information, it is pos-
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sible for A to provide to B and B to provide to A and create anonymizer medical data
after linking the medical information of the clinics and hospitals.
Operators Handling Medical Data
This refers to medical institutions, and broadly speaking, two types of regulations
when providing medical data to accredited anonymizer medical data creation oper-
ators are described. The first is notice to the patients and notification to the minister
in charge. In the notice, it must be clarified that provision shall be stopped if there
is a request for such from the patient or a bereaved family member. A point to note
here is that this is just described as “notice” to the patient. Simply presenting it is not
enough, and the content of the notice must be actually notified to the patient, etc. The
second point is that if provision is stopped due to the request of the person concerned
or the bereaved family, there is a duty to issue evidence in writing that there has
been a request to stop provision, and a copy of this must be stored. In case there is
a request to stop the provision of medical data owned by the accredited anonymizer
medical data creation operator, this information may not be received.
Operators Handling Anonymizer Medical Data
Recipients provided with anonymizer medical data from the accredited anonymizer
medical data creation operators are exempt from the stipulations of Articles 37 (pro-
vision of anonymizer information), 38 (prohibition on identification action), and 39
(safety management measures, etc.) of the Personal Information Protection Act. On
the other hand, in the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act, reidentification
itself is prohibited. This should not just be a penalty stipulation for “operators han-
dling anonymizer medical data,” and the restriction of agreements with accredited
anonymizer medical data creation operators is also necessary. If an actual breach
occurs or the agreement conditions lack effectiveness, the application of the Unfair
Competition Prevention Act should also be considered.
Accredited Medical Data Handling Contractors
Operators undertaking the work of accredited anonymizer medical data creation
operators need to be accredited by the government.
6.1.1.4 Opting-Out Under the Next-Generation Medical
Infrastructure Act
Provision to third parties is specified with opt-out under Article 23, paragraph 2,
of the Personal Information Protection Act. When providing to a third party after
notifying the party concerned or in a situation where the person concerned could
easily learn of the fact, provided that there is no motion of refusal from the person
concerned, it may be provided to a third party. Originally, this was prohibited in
cases involving sensitive information, and so, medical data cannot be provided to a
third party in this way. In contrast, in the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure
Act, as long as the third-party provision is to an accredited anonymizer healthcare
information creation body, an exception shall be granted, and this may be provided
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in an opt-out form. However, it is only permitted to be provided to a third party after
notifying the person concerned if there is no motion of refusal. In other words, it just
being a situation where they could easily learn of the fact is not enough.
6.1.1.5 Safety Management Measures
The safetymanagementmeasures section stipulates the safetymanagementmeasures
to be taken by accredited anonymizer healthcare information creation bodies, and
the contents are as follows:
1 Purpose and target of application
2 Concrete measures
2-1 Organizational safety management measures
2-2 Human safety management measures
2-3 Physical safety management measures
2-4 Technical safety management measures
2-5 Other measures
These can be considered to be typical chapter headings, and the majority of these
are not particularly different from the MHLW “Security Guidelines for Medical
Information Systems.” However, the network is limited to dedicated lines and IP-
VPNs within accredited operators. In terms of availability, while the superiority
of dedicated lines is unquestionable, as they are not clearly superior in regard to
completeness or anonymity, implementationmaybe difficultwhen cost is considered.
6.1.1.6 The Future of the Next-Generation Medical
Infrastructure Act and Issues
If the Next-Generation Medical Infrastructure Act functions as intended, the reg-
ulations strengthened in the revised Personal Information Protection Act can be
introduced in a form without the risk of violating the rights of individuals. Moreover,
regarding the purpose restricted to R&D in the medical field, there are expectations
that it can be promoted in a safe and significant manner. However, two main issues
are identified. The first is the establishment of the system itself. Although the law
has been established, we are still waiting for the establishment of a basic policy as
well as the government and ministerial ordinances delegating the main part of this
work. At present, only the outline has been fixed. We do not yet have a system with
“meat on the bones” to be used in actual operation, and efforts by all related parties
are required. Additionally, it is expected that there will be public comments once a
draft of the government and ministerial ordinance or guidelines is determined, and
hopefully, several people will have constructive comments from many people. The
second issue is that although the accreditation of anonymizer medical data creation
operators is a public work contributing, in a meaningful way, to R&D in the medical
field, the law presumes the accreditation of private operators. In other words, the
accredited operators must both maintain their own survival and continue work with
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significant public work elements. This is certainly not simple for a private operator.
Unless the accredited operator can gain trust, the medical institutions, etc., will lose
enthusiasm for the provision, and the system itself may fail. If we consider the world
aimed for by this law to be significant, the support of not only the administration
and operators aiming for accreditation but also a wide range of people, including
medical-related parties and patients, is required.
Even if the aforementioned issues can be safely overcome and operations begin,
problems will remain. We have repeatedly indicated that this framework is based on
accredited anonymizer medical data creation operators who are private companies.
However, at present, the government, local governments, and insurers are systemati-
cally accumulating information, and much of the useful medical data is owned by the
government. For example, information on life and death is the ultimate outcome of
treatment, and to determine this outcome with certainty, basic resident registration
information and death certificates, etc., must be accessed. Although according to
this law, cooperation on consent with accredited anonymizer medical data creation
operators is possible, there is no consideration at all regarding collaboration on the
information owned by the government, local governments, and insurers under this
system. Despite the fact that R&D in the medical field is urgent in terms of maintain-
ing social security, it must be indicated that there is a problem in terms of efficiency,
based on the Next-GenerationMedical Infrastructure Act alone. It is considered nec-
essary to establish an external system to promote a comprehensive system for using
information for the public good for government and private enterprise. Additionally,
the security and anonymizer standards are somewhat abstract. In the case of technol-
ogy that uses individual data with Privacy Preserving Data Mining and multiparty
protocols in its anonymous form for calculation purposes only, despite the fact that it
has been demonstrated that a technical solution is possible, as no consideration has
been given from a statutory or system viewpoint, it is difficult to judge whether this
can be used under the Personal Information Protection Law. While promoting tech-
nical initiatives, it is also necessary to clarify positioning in a statutory and system
sense.
6.1.2 Ethical Guidelines and Anonymization of Medical
Information
6.1.2.1 Ethical Guidelines
The Ethical Guidelines for medical and health research involving human subjects
[4] apply to medical research for human beings and basically requires researchers to
respond to the request sought by the Act on the Protection of Personal Information.
However, Chap. 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law shown in the following
is exempt from clinical research:
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Chapter IV Obligations, etc., of a Personal Information Handling Business Operator
Section1 Obligations of a Personal Handling Business Operator
Section2 Obligations of an Anonymously Processed Information Handling Business Oper-
ator, etc.
Section3 Supervision
Section4 Private Sector Body’s Promotion for the Protection of Personal Information
It also applies to the information infrastructure for collecting and analyzing medi-
cal information that this project aims to build. In large-scale data collection research,
specific responses required by the Ethics Guidelines are mainly described in the
informed consent. The description in the Ethics Guidelines is as follows:
Researchers do not necessarily need to receive informed consent however, if you do not
receive informed consent, the subject of the study appropriate consent of the However, in
cases where it is difficult to obtain appropriate consent, information used in other studies
to conduct research. from 4(1) to (6) for the implementation of the research, if there is a
particular reason for to be notified or published to the subject of the research, and to ensure
that the research is carried out or continued. opportunities for research subjects, etc., to be
denied. personal information may be used.
Also, the Ethical Guidelines need to notify or publish the following matters to the
patient, etc:
(1)The purpose of use and use of samples and information (includingmethodswhenprovided
to other organizations)
(2) Items of samples and information used or provided
(3) Scope of use
(4) Name or name of the person responsible for the management of samples and information
(5) To use samples and information to identify the subject of the research or to other research
institutions at the request of the research subject or its agent
(6) (5) How to accept the request of the subject or its agent
This is also true for information systems that deal with large-scale data. Further-
more, if the target personal information is the anonymized one, it is not necessary
to notify the patients. At this time, the opportunity of the consent withdrawal is not
guaranteed to the patient.
In fact, regardless of the presence or absence of anonymization processing for
electronic medical record (EMR) items, in most cases, the content of research that
usesmedical information ismade public on the homepage of eachmedical or research
institution and patients. It is difficult for patients to understand how their own EMR
items are used and provided.
6.1.2.2 Anonymizer Medical Data
Anonymizer medical data is an extension of the anonymizer information under the
Personal Information ProtectionAct. Under this Act, the target information is limited
to personal information surviving, while under the Next-Generation Medical Infras-
tructureAct, the information of deceased individualsmay also be covered, depending
on the situation. Additionally, anonymizer information is information fromwhich the
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Table 6.1 Contents of guidelines for anonymizer information
1 Positioning of these guidelines
2 Definition
2-1 Medical information
2-2 Anonymizer medical data (related to Article 2, paragraph 3)
2-3 Anonymizer medical data creation business
3 Duties of accredited anonymizer healthcare information creation bodies and bodies handling
anonymizer healthcare information
3-1 Thinking behind duties regarding the handling of anonymizer medical data
4 Processing required when creating anonymizer medical data
4-1 Processing standards for anonymizer medical data
4-1-1 Deletion of descriptions, etc., from which specific individuals may be identified
4-1-2 Deletion of individual identification codes
4-1-3 Deletion of codes that interconnect information
4-1-4 Deletion of peculiar descriptions, etc.
4-1-5 Other measures based on the nature of medical information databases
4-2 Items requested for investigation when creating anonymizer medical data
4-2-1 Format for using anonymizer data
4-2-2 Possibility of identification by referring to other information
4-3 Anonymizer medical data creation process
4-4 Method of anonymization based on medical data categories
4-5 Medical data-specific anonymization
4-5-1 Medical images
4-5-2 Genome data
5 Safety management measures, such as anonymizer medical data
6 Prohibition on identification actions
7 Provision registration
individual cannot be identified by ordinary people, whereas anonymizer medical data
is information fromwhich the individual cannot be recognized by general healthcare-
related people. As this fulfills the stipulations of the guidelines on anonymizer infor-
mation determined under the Personal Information Protection Act, processing based
on additional risk analysis is required. Furthermore, another characteristic can be
considered to be the fact that even after the provision of the information, there is a
duty to followup, including confirming how it is used. The content of these guidelines
is shown in Table6.1.
Another feature is that medical information is categorized from a risk perspective,
which is shown in Tables6.2 and 6.3.
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Table 6.2 Categorization of the risk of individual identification in medical data
Category Overview
Identifier Information directly linked to an individual (name, number of insured, etc.)
Quasi-identifier Information that, when multiple types are combined, can lead to the iden-
tification of the individual (date of birth, organization, etc.)
*The medical institution code is considered a quasi-identifier
Static attributes Highly invariant information (height, blood type, allergies, dates [such as
consultation dates], etc.)
Information related to external characteristics such as disabilities
*Handling of information on chronic illnesseswith a high level of invariance
needs to be reviewed
Semi-static attributes Data with universality for a fixed period (weight, etc.)
It is assumed that this relates to information on diseases, procedures, admin-
istered medicines, etc.
Dynamic attributes Information that is constantly changing (data on inspection values, food,
other treatment, etc.)
Table 6.3 Anonymizer examples through the categorization of medical data
Category Example of anonymization method
Identifier Deleted or irreversible pseudonymization
Quasi-identifier Generalization (date of birth -> year born, address -> prefecture) or micro
application that satisfies k-anonymity
Delete data items
Add attributes (geographical, scale, etc.), such as medical institution codes,
and convert codes into an unidentifiable form
Static attributes Numerals are top-to-bottom coding
Generalization or micro application
Generalization or offset based on treatment date, etc.
Semi-static attributes Numerals are top-to-bottom coding
Delete sensitive diseases when not necessary
Dynamic attributes Anonymization not required, but where necessary, numbers are top-to-
bottom coding
In consideration of the significance of abnormal values, look at the distri-
bution of values and carry out processing, such as rounding of upper and
lower % values
6.1.3 Standardization of EMRs
The Standardized Structured Medical Record Information Exchange (SS-MIX) [5,
6] aims to promote/develop the results of the standardized electronic medical chart
information exchange system development commission project conducted by the
Health Policy Bureau of the MHLW in FY 2006 in Japan.
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Fig. 6.1 Overview of SS-MIX2 directory layout
SS-MIX includes the following:
(1) Hospital information system information gateway telegraphic message specification
(2) “Standardized Storage Specification” directory structure
(3) Electronic medical information CD and patient referral document CD specification
Furthermore, the scenes where the utilization of this standardized storage is
expected are as follows:
Ensuring continuation of medical information Repository in community healthcare coordi-
nation Information sharing among multiple vendors Utilization as backup information
Figure6.1 shows the file system layout of SS-MIX2 storage. Directories are sorted
by patient ID, clinical date, and event type.
Table6.4 shows the clinical event types covered by SS-MIX2 storage represented
by HL7 v2. We can represent 30+ clinical events using this storage [6].
6.2 Medical Test Bed Concepts and Requirements
Considering the current situation surrounding medical information as described
earlier and the development of future utilization, the public cloud is used for the
secondary use of medical data scattered through medical institutions across the orga-
nization. We are developing a secure information utilization base test bed in the
medical information field, assuming the utilization promotion by adopting.
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Table 6.4 SS-MIX2 data types
No Data type Name HL7 message type
1 ADT-00 Update of patient’s basic information ADTˆ08
2 ADT-00 Deletion of patient’s basic information ADTˆ23
3 ADT-01 Change of investigator ADTˆ54
4 ADT-01 Cancellation of investigator ADTˆ55
5 ADT-12 Reception of outpatient physical examination ADTˆ04
6 ADT-21 Hospitalization plan ADTˆ14
7 ADT-21 Cancellation of hospitalization plan ADTˆ27
8 ADT-22 Conduct of hospitalization ADTˆ01
9 ADT-22 Cancellation of conduct of hospitalization ADTˆ11
10 ADT-31 Conduct of staying outside ADTˆ21
11 ADT-31 Cancellation of conduct of staying outside ADTˆ52
12 ADT-32 Conduct of return from staying outside ADTˆ22
13 ADT-32 Cancellation of conduct of return from staying outside ADTˆ53
14 ADT-41 Plan of change of department/building (change of
room/bed)
ADTˆ15
15 ADT-41 Cancellation of plan of change of department/building
(change of room/bed)
ADTˆ26
16 ADT-42 Conduct of change of department/building (change of
room/bed)
ADTˆ02
17 ADT-42 Cancellation of conduct of change of
department/building (change of room/bed)
ADTˆ12
18 ADT-51 Plan of discharge ADTˆ16
19 ADT-51 Cancellation of plan of discharge ADTˆ25
20 ADT-52 Conduct of discharge ADTˆ03
21 ADT-52 Cancellation of conduct of discharge ADTˆ13
22 ADT-61 Registration/update of allergy information ADTˆ60
23 PPR-01 Registration/update of disease name (history)
information
PPRˆD1
24 OMD Food order OMDˆ03
25 OMP-01 Prescription order RDEˆ11
26 OMP-11 Prescription conduct notice RASˆ17
27 OMP-02 Injection order RDEˆ11
28 OMP-12 Injection conduct notice RASˆ17
29 OML-01 Specimen examination order OMLˆ33
30 OML-11 Specimen examination result notice OULˆ22
31 OMG-01 Radiological examination order OMGˆ19
32 OMG-11 Notice of radiological examination conduct OMIˆ23
33 OMG-02 Endoscopy order OMGˆ19
34 OMG-12 Notice of endoscopy conduct OMIˆ23
35 OMG-03 Physiological examination order OMGˆ19
36 OMG-13 Notice of physiological examination result ORUˆ01
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Fig. 6.2 Overview of the system developed for secure data collection and analysis
The main points in the development of a medical test bed are as follows:
• Unnecessary sensitive information not used for research should not be leaked
outside the medical institution.
• Securely extract and combine medical information across organizations.
• Information extraction control linked with patient consent is possible.
• Privacy risk can be evaluated for the extracted dataset.
• Patients can verify the history of information utilization on the platform.
Figure6.2 presents an overview of the developed system [7]. The key concepts
are the following:
1. Each medical institution has EMR data in SS-MIX2 storage, including billions
of HL7 v2 messages.
2. HL7 v2 messages are periodically parsed and stored to relational database man-
agement system (RDBMS) tables, maintaining synchronization with the billions
of message files in SS-MIX2.
3. Analysis requests from researchers and data collection are managed by the private
set intersection (PSI) service on the cloud,which communicateswith a client agent
located at a client terminal and PSI agents located at each medical institution.
4. Target data criteria, such as diseases, age, and gender, must be defined before the
PSI executes data collection. The PSI party agent deploys the target dataset in
advance from the local RDBMS to memory.
148 K. Tanaka and R. Yamamoto
5. Data collection is achieved using PSI software, which is based on Bloom filter
technology for record verification across institutions. The application of bloom
filter technology is aimed at realizing datamatching inwhich personal information
does not leak outside each hospital during the data collection process.
6. The collected dataset can be verified considering the possibility of patient identi-
fication using the extracted attributes.
7. Patients can trace the use of their medical records during data collection.
8. If they choose, patients can withdraw consent for the secondary use of their data.
Consent withdrawal information is assumed to be an input to existing the EMR
system and exported SS-MIX2 storage in each hospital.
6.3 Features and Implementations of Secondary Use
Infrastructure Development
This section describes key features and implementation details of our developed test
bed for medical field.
6.3.1 SS-MIX2 Standardized Storage
6.3.1.1 Objective
In Japan, SS-MIX2, which is the domestic standard of exporting whole EHR data
as HL7 v2 message files to the external storage for the purposes of backup, regional
collaboration, disease repository, and others, is common. In this standard, EHR data
is exported to a storage in a directory structure using patient id and clinical date and
event type. Therefore, the use of the exported storage for cross-patient analysis such
as epidemiological studies is challenging. We are applying an RDB-based virtual file
system technology to the storage to achieve cross-patient/cross-institution analysis
without collecting data files.
6.3.1.2 Methods
The overview of the system is shown in Fig. 6.3. The storage is developed based on
Filesystem inUserspace (FUSE), a virtual file system technology.We adopted pgfuse
andPostgreSQLas theFUSEandRDBMS, respectively. The recordedHL7messages
are stored to the DB tables as BLOB data, and the RDBMS traces the transaction
in real time. The HL7 messages are parsed by PL/SQL, and parsed medical records
(HL7 segments, fields) are recorded to user-defined tables in the RDBMS. Parsing
tasks are intended to be executed periodically. Once the records have been stored to
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Fig. 6.3 Overview of the developed storage with a virtual file system
Table 6.5 Evaluation results (s) for various numbers of medical records
COPY (VFS to HDD) COPY (HDD to VFS) Delete (VFS) Parse files (VFS)
3,261s 1,466s 775s 1,989s
5.03Mbps 2.26Mbps 9.52Mbps 54.9 files/s
the tables, the minimum required items can be queried through individually applied
view schemas according to the purpose of each analysis project. Performance tests
are executed with dummymessages of 109,174 files (922MB in total, 1,689 patients)
including 27 clinical events defined by SS-MIX2 standard, such as ADT-00, OMP-
01, and OML-11.
6.3.1.3 Results
Performance test results are shown in Table6.5. All types of messages could be
parsed by PL/SQL. Based on the performance, this storage can process the daily
generated medical records of our hospital in less than 2h.
6.3.1.4 Discussion
The developed storage enables the rapid cycle for the secondary use of medical
records analysis among institutions and also prevents the disclosure of unnecessary
patient information to each analysis by the regulations of applying view schemas
for queries. Moreover, using the developed storage, exported medical records and
parsed result tables can be more easily backed up to a remote place in real time using
DB replication technology, compared with synchronizing the enormous number of
files.
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6.3.1.5 Summary
This section describes the development of a standardized storage for the purpose of
cross-patient/cross-institution analysis based on the domestic EHR data exporting
standard. We will try to develop a secure data collection infrastructure assuming the
distributed environment of the developed storages.
6.3.2 Secure Collection of Distributed Medical Information
In this section,1 we propose an alternativemethod of collecting and storingEMRdata,
wherein only necessary items are included in collected data, eliminating the need
for individual identifiable information to spread outside the medical institution. The
system facilitates EMR data distribution within each medical institution, enabling
cross-patient or cross-facility data collection and analysis. The PSI library developed
by Miyaji [8] is used for the data integration and encryption of the extracted EMR
data. This paper aims to provide an overview of the system and its major technical
elements and evaluate the transaction performance of data extraction and collection
from the distributed SS-MIX2 storage.
6.3.2.1 Methods
Experimental Environment
The transaction performance of data extraction and collection from the distributed
SS-MIX2 storage was evaluated using an experimental environment comprising a
server (PSI Server), three data stores (PSI Party), and a client (PSI Client). The
Server and Party machines were deployed as VMware ESXi virtual machines. The
PSI Client can be deployed on any machine that can run Java.
Experimental data were virtually produced by anonymizing laboratory test result
data in the SS-MIX2 storage exported from the EMR system of The University of
Tokyo Hospital (Tokyo, Japan). Storage assumed to have 10% overlap between each
node was arranged and used for the evaluation tests. The hash value of the character
string combining the patient’s name, date of birth, and sex was used as the key
attribute of each record for the bloom filter.
1This section is reprinted from “Studies in Health Technology and Informatics, Vol 255, Katsuya
Tanaka, Ryuichi Yamamoto, Kazuhisa Nakasho, Atsuko Miyaji, Development of a Secure Cross-
Institutional Data Collection System Based on Distributed Standardized EMR Storage, pp. 35–39,”
Copyright (2018), with permission from IOSPress. The publication is available at IOSPress through
http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-921-8-35.
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Fig. 6.4 Overview of the transaction flow during data collection
Data Collection with PSI
Figure6.4 presents an overview of the transaction flow during a secure data collec-
tion using the system. The entire system was designed as a Web service so that in
the future the service could be available via a commercial cloud. The PSI applica-
tion programming interface was developed in Java using SOAP Web services and
deployed on an Apache Tomcat. All Web communications were implemented with
client authentication under TLS 1.2. Extracted EMR data are encrypted by Cryp-
tographic Message Syntax and can be decrypted only by the user requesting the
collection.
6.3.2.2 Results
Table6.6 summarizes the evaluation test results for data queries for calculations,
bloom filter calculations, and result data extraction for increasing numbers of EMRs.
The processing time linearly increased with the number of records.
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Table 6.6 Evaluation results (s) for various numbers of medical records
Records 20,000 40,000 80,000 160,000 320,000 640,000 960,000 1,280,000
Query data 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.0
Bloom filter processing 0.5 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.9 7.4 13.5 20.7
Data extraction 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.4 4.0 10.1 15.4 23.5
Total 3.8 3.7 4.3 5.7 7.4 18.5 30.4 46.2
6.3.2.3 Discussion
Significance of the System
The systemwas completely achieved usingWeb service architecture with the encryp-
tion of the extracted EMR data, indicating that medical institutions participating in
research would not need to maintain a secure connection to the specific service
provider if the developed PSI services are operated on the commercial cloud. The
encryption of EMR data avoids any disclosure of the extracted information to the
cloud service providers. Furthermore, because the infrastructure makes it unneces-
sary to connect an EMR storage to the Internet, this eliminates the possibility of
experiencing network attacks to the data storage. To meet the requirements of a
given analysis, the PSI can execute not only intersection operations but also union
operations on distributed datasets.
Performance
The experimental results showed that an intersection operation involving approxi-
mately 1million recordswas completedwithin aminute.With this level of processing
performance, there should not be any problemswith actual operations.Wenow intend
to verify this with larger datasets.
Future Work
The remaining issues for development include (1) the management of consent infor-
mation, (2) risk assessment for the extracted dataset, and (3) traceabilitymanagement
against data collection. The first issue can be addressed by scanning paper-based con-
sent information related to patients opting-out of the secondary use of their data and
storing the scanned data files to the SS-MIX2 storage.We intend to represent consent
information as XML files, such as HL7 CDA Privacy Consent Directives, Release 1
[9]. The other two issues are under discussion.
6.3.2.4 Summary
This section describes the underlying concepts and implementation of a secure data
collection infrastructure with distributed standardized EMR storage. Using the PSI
data collection technology, the experimental results demonstrated high performance.
A few issues remain for future implementation.
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6.3.3 Privacy Risk Assessment of Extracted Datasets
6.3.3.1 Overview
This section describes a prototype of aWeb service that enables a series of operations
to perform privacy risk evaluation against a dataset extracted from multiple storages
by the PSI service developed.
6.3.3.2 Method
The PSI and privacy impact assessment (PIA) libraries are applied using SS-MIX2
standardized storage that adopts FUSE, one of the virtual file systems developed
so far. As a FUSE, pgfuse corresponding to PostgreSQL was adopted. Assuming
that a service for finally collecting data safely will be operated in the public cloud,
the server and client, which will be the nodes of the data collection infrastructure
based on the PSI and PIA libraries, are configured as Web services using SOAP. The
configuration of the experimental system is shown in Fig. 6.5.
The data for verification was constructed by virtually distributing the HL7 v2
format data obtained by anonymously processing the SS-MIX2 standardized storage
data held by The University of Tokyo Hospital to three storages and constructing a
virtual multi-facility environment. Storing 1 million specimen test result messages
for each storage, creating a dataset using the PSI library, and developing a user
interface that can apply the extracted dataset to the risk assessment function in a one-
stop manner. In addition, patients between SS-MIX2 standardized storages were
artificially adjusted with 10% duplication as a count of the patients.
Fig. 6.5 Overview of experimental settings for privacy risk assessment
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Fig. 6.6 Operation flow of the developed privacy risk assessment service
Fig. 6.7 Overview of the developed GUI for privacy risk assessment
The privacy risk evaluation function is configured as a separate Web service and
positioned so that it can be operated as data extraction processing by PSI and data
processing after acquisition. The systemoperation flowof the risk evaluation function
is shown in Fig. 6.6. While checking the maximum and minimum values and the
number of data in each data item of the extracted dataset on the screen, top and
bottom coding and generalization processing (processing of numerical data with the
specified division accuracy) were constructed.
Figure6.7 shows the user interface for evaluating privacy risk developed in our
project. The dataset extracted by the PSI service can be read, and the maximum and
minimum values of each data item can be confirmed. For numerical data, processing
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can be performed by specifying the upper and lower limits and division unit. In
addition, it is possible to calculate the degree of overlap after processing the target
dataset using the attribute value group specified on the screen and have an interface
for confirming an index for privacy risk evaluation.
6.3.3.3 Results and Discussion
The privacy risk evaluation service operates with a response of up to several tens of
seconds when numerous attribute values are specified for a post-extraction dataset
with a scale of 100,000. Although there is no problem in performance, it is a config-
uration in which functions are centrally arranged on the service side regarding the
processing of numerical data and evaluation of redundancy, and it does not function
unless the original data is exposed to the service side. From the viewpoint of data
concealment, it remains a problem, and the functional layout needs to be reconsid-
ered.
6.3.4 Secondary Use and Traceability
This section describes how to implement the capability of traceability in the devel-
oped system for secure data collection and analysis.2
6.3.4.1 Objective
This section describes how to implement the capability of traceability in the devel-
oped system for secure data collection and analysis. Blockchain technology has been
recently applied in healthcare fields, including primary patient care, data aggregation
for research purposes, and connecting healthcare providers [10–12]. The system that
we are developing has a second purpose: to secure the traceability of EMR data,
methods to disclose the logs of secondary use are needed. In the present situation,
where patients do not have any common ID, it is difficult for a patient to audit all
the secondary use logs across the distributed hospital storages that he/she visited. By
blockchain technology, we expect to provide patients a common search infrastructure
with immutable secondary use logs. Thus, we plan to apply blockchain technology
to the aggregation of data extraction log records. This method has several possi-
ble implementations, and they must be evaluated assuming operations in real use.
2This section is reprinted from “Studies in Health Technology and Informatics, Vol 264, Katsuya
Tanaka, Ryuichi Yamamoto, Assessment of Traceability Implementation of a Cross-Institutional
Secure Data Collection System Based on Distributed Standardized EMR Storage, pp. 1373–1377,”
Copyright (2019), with permission from IOSPress. The publication is available at IOSPress through
http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/shti190452.
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The following experimental results mainly concern data structure and transaction
performance compared with traditional implementation for achieving the aggrega-
tion of distributed log records of EMR data extraction.
6.3.4.2 Methods
Traceability for Patients
EMR storage for the developed secure data collection system is supposed to process
queries from clinical researchers using the standard interface implemented by the
PostgreSQL database. EMR data are extracted by data extraction requests handled
by the PSI service. Thus, the selected records are identifiable based on each query
result, and the records represent the disclosure history of EMR data during data
collection through the use of the developed PSI service. By making the log record
of extraction searchable by patients, we suppose that traceability in the secure data
collection system will be achieved. However, because storage is supposed to be
distributed at each hospital, log records must be aggregated by some secure method
to be made auditable.
Log data is assumed to be represented by a combination of the following attributes:
1. Identifier of target patient (patient identifier)
2. Storage source (medical institution identifier)
3. Disclosed destination (extracting user identifier)
4. Purpose of use
5. Type of extracted EMR data
6. Extraction timestamp
Attribute 1 (patient identifier) is mandatory for patient identification. In Japan, at
present, universal patient identifiers are not available.We assume that insurance num-
bers may be desirable for searching log records across medical institutions because
the patient ID at one medical institution is only applicable for searching log records
at that medical institution.
Attribute 2 (medical institution identifier) is used to distinguish the institution
storing the extracted EMR data.
Attribute 5 (type of extracted EMR data) is represented by HL7 v2 message types
such as “ADT-00,” “OMP-01,” and “OML-11.”
Attributes 3, 4, 5, and 6 are used to distinguish the secondary use of target EMR
data by patients. By verifying these attributes, patients can determine whether actual
secondary uses meet their consent.
Data Structure for Query
A query for EMR storage may extract the records of several patients at one time.
For disclosing extracted history to patients, the extracted history should be sorted by
patient, and each history should include the aforementioned attributes.
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By focusing on one patient, the extracted history grows as queries hit the target
patient EMR record. Moreover, this extracted history is distributed at each EMR
storage site across the participating medical institutions.
For achieving desirable response, the aggregation of extracted history should be
obtained in a realistic time. This is closely related to the data structure and size of
each log record. Future studies should focus on the data size of stored log records.
In the performance test, a simple message structure is defined as a JSON (shown
in Table6.7). The identifiers of patient and institution are represented as hash val-
ues. Each log record can be stored separately in the blockchain (separate style) or
aggregated in a block by a patient appending records to the corresponding block
(appending style). In the former method, the pieces of the records related to the
patient of interest must be gathered. In the latter method, the block size grows as the
system is used. We examined performance differences when the data size of a record
to be written is changed.
Experimental Setups
We evaluated the following three approaches to implement traceability function. Of
these, two are based on blockchain technology. The last approach uses the same
method of secure data collection as PSI against log records stored in distributed
PostgreSQL databases.
• Hyperledger Fabric [13]
• BigchainDB [14]
• PSI (Bloom filter)
The experimental settings for each approach are described as follows. Between
Hyperledger Fabric and BigchainDB, key/value store implementation for search use
differs from each other.
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Fig. 6.8 Experimental settings (hyperledger fabric)
1. Hyperledger Fabric
Figure6.8 shows the experimental setup using Hyperledger Fabric to store query
log records during data collection. Assuming two participating institutions, two
nodes were set for the performance test. Native implementation only offers key-
value storage and is applicable to a separate style. Furthermore, we evaluated
Hyperledger implementationwithCouchDB[15],which enables query against the
value of the JSON message described earlier. Thus, both separate and appending
styles can be implemented.
2. BigchainDB
Figure6.9 shows the experimental settings for usingBigchainDB to store log data.
As mentioned earlier, two nodes were prepared for evaluation. MongoDB [16]
was selected as the backend database. In this case, both separate and aggregated
structures are possible on the same implementation.
Query key candidate is the transaction ID of the stored block or stored JSON
value.
3. PSI (Bloom filter)
Figure6.10 shows the experimental settings in the case of PSI implementation.
The log records of data extraction are recorded at the time of extraction. Using the
same method of EMR data collection, we can gather the log records against dis-
tributed storages under encryption. Particularly, although the search is performed
by specifying the insurance number, date of birth, and gender by patients, since
the matching is performed using the bloom filter, these values are not directly
disclosed on the infrastructure.
In this test, three nodes were prepared for evaluation, but the performance test
measurement was executed on only one node.
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Fig. 6.9 Experimental settings (BigchainDB)
Fig. 6.10 Experimental settings (PSI)
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6.3.4.3 Results
Performance by Data Size
Figure6.11 shows the performance of writing records to the blockchain storage by
record size for Hyperledger. In the experimental environment, it worked normally
for records with a size of 7 MB or smaller. As the record size grew, the response
became unstable.
Figure6.12 shows the same test for BigchainDB. The maximum record size was
0.6 MB, which was much lower than that for Hyperledger. However, the transaction
time to commit was larger than that for Hyperledger.
By contrast, the data size for PSI can be as large as allowed by the database system.
Transaction Performance
Figure6.13 shows the performance results of writing records to the blockchain stor-
age forHyperledgerwith/withoutCouchDBandBigchainDBunder one or five thread
processings. In all cases, processing by threads contributed to storage performance,
but the throughput did not increase linearly with the number of threads.
Comparing the three implementations, BigchainDB was slightly faster than
Hyperledger. Hyperledger with CouchDB had the worst performance; this is likely
caused by the cost of indexing within CouchDB. In the best case, 1 million records
were written to the blockchain storage in 3–4 h. This performance is equivalent to
writing 10 million records or less in one day.
Comparing these implementations using blockchain technology, the performance
of PSI was equivalent to the “insert” performance of the PostgreSQL database used.
The necessary time for inserting 1 million records to the database was below 10 min.
This performance is about 1,000 times faster than the blockchain implementations.
Fig. 6.11 Performance results by record size (Hyperledger)
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Fig. 6.12 Performance results by record size (BigchainDB)
Fig. 6.13 Performance result of writing records
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Fig. 6.14 Performance result of querying records
Query Performance
Figure6.14 shows the performance test results of retrieving one record from the
blockchain storage using four types of implementation. No significant differences
were noted in the query response times between Hyperledger and BigchainDB.
“Hyperledger Key” and “BigchanDB transid” represent the separate style of storage,
whereas “Hyperledger Value” and “BigchainDB AssetsText” represent the aggre-
gated style.
Query response is fast enough for actual use in the case of 1 million records in the
storage. This result shows hitting 1 record, and the response time linearly increases
as hit records increase.
On the other hand, PSI implementation needs 1 min or less to aggregate the
extracted results across the distributed databases.
6.3.4.4 Discussion
Based on the initial evaluations, the following recommendations are made.
Transaction Performance
The transaction performance of a blockchain network was quite low for storing
massive numbers of log records generated by queries in the developed system. In the
case of blockchain, at most 100 transactions per second is best for a node to register
to storage. Compared with implementation with PostgreSQL, the total transactions
per day will be 1,000 times smaller. If we do not implement any aggregation of
log records, it will be impossible to process the enormous numbers of log records
generated for each EMR item. Some patient-based aggregation of log records should
be considered to overcome performance limitation.
6 Health Test Bed Group 163
Data Size
The results by data size show the upper limit for storing log records to the blockchain
storage. As writing large records to storage makes the system unstable, writing in
the appending style is not suitable because of the long operation time of the sys-
tem. Considering the transaction performance test results mentioned earlier, the total
number of transactions to the blockchain network per day should be limited.
Query Response
As the amount of storage increases, the search function must query all storage in the
network. The whole log records thus require some possible indexes for searching
by patient. The query performance test results show a good response for searching
for a log record in the blockchain network despite the increase in the number of log
records.
Proposed System for Future Implementation
Based on the performance evaluation results, we decided to implement the following
policy as the basis for making the search log history visible to patients when using
the developed secure data collection system:
• Aggregate log data by patient in each facility.
• All log records are stored at each facility.
• Record the minimum amount of data, such as the log record identifier key and
facility identifiable key, for retrieving index data in the blockchain.
• For query log data, use personal identification information, such as insurance
number, date of birth, and gender.
By following these policies, a patient can search the blockchain and find the
storage facility. Moreover, the number of records that must be recorded per period
can be reduced to the number of related patients. Figure6.15 shows an overview of
the proposed log search system. The log records should include the following:
• Facility identifiable key
• Log record identifiable key
• Digest to audit each log record
• Key to identify each patient (this could be generated by encrypting a patient iden-
tifier such as insurance number, date of birth, and gender)
We plan to develop a log search system with the described structure.
6.3.4.5 Limitations
Because we did not have sufficient time to set up larger records, performance tests
were executed for 1 million records or less. As the number of records increases, the
test results and system stability may change. Performance tests with more records
are required in the future work. Similarly, performance should be estimated for larger
numbers of nodes.
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Fig. 6.15 Overview of the proposed log search service using a blockchain network
6.3.4.6 Summary
This section reports the initial performance results related to traceability for a secure
data collection system under development. The desired data structure and system
infrastructure were examined. Although blockchain implementation is a strong can-
didate for establishing an audit infrastructure to verify the use of EMR data for
clinical research, there are some challenges for maintaining long-term operation
as the amount of data increases. Thus, we proposed a data structure and querying
implementation to overcome the implementation performance.
6.4 Integration and Prospects
As described earlier, the implementation and verification of the following element
function have been carried out for a secure secondary use of medical data with
the capability of access control by consent information and secondary use status
confirmation by traceability function. The key features of our medical test bed are
the following:
1. Improvement of the searchability of medical data in SS-MIX2 standardized stor-
age
2. Safe medical data extraction function from SS-MIX2 standardized storage using
PSI
3. Electronic description of consent information and mechanism for checking con-
sent information when extracting data
4. Privacy risk assessment function for the extracted dataset
5. Traceability function that can be verified by patients.
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Currently, the development of the aforementioned functions is being integrated
and developed with the in mind that it can be used as a Web service applicable to
public cloud.
If our developed system is ready on public cloud, it would help clinical researchers
to conduct cross-institutional data collection and analysis with a certain level of
security guaranteed.
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